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Abstract 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court case of Shaw v. Reno has 
widely been seen as withdrawing judicial protection of minority voting rights -- a welcome development 
to those who believe as a matter of faith that discriminatory electoral rules, racist appeals in elections, and 
racially polarized voting are things of the distant past, but less hopeful to close students of redistricting 
and election campaigns of the last two decades. Deeply ambiguous, the opinion has spawned a wide range 
of interpretations, from assertions that it bans redistricters from taking the race of voters into account at 
all, even when they place them in majority-white districts, to contentions that il merely asks for further 
information about the basis for establishing certain "ugly" districts that have majorities of African­
Americans or Latinos. 
In Lhis paper, which is based on research that I carried out for Shaw v. Hunt, the remand version 
of Shaw v. Reno, and Vera v. Richards, its Texas counterpart, I try to restore a sense of reali ty to the often 
factually incorrect assertions or implications of Justice O'Connor's opinion, not only by a close textual 
reading of the briefs and opinions in the Supreme Court case, but also by looking in considerable detail 
at the actual redistricting processes in North Carolina and Texas during the 1 970s, 80s, and 90s. Were 
race, partisanship, and individual politicians' interests taken into account in redrawing districts before 
1 99 1 ,  or were all previous reapportionments pristine exercises in civic virtue? Might the states in  the 
1 990s have had compelling interests in redressing past racially discriminatory practices? Were the motives 
of the 1 991 -92 redistrictings so uncomplicated that they can be easily and unambiguously determined by 
a quick glance at a map? For North Carolina, I also examine whether white and black public opinion and 
the voting records of white and black members of Congress differ systematically from each other. Do 
black voters need black faces to represent them? 
Shaw's vagueness affords the Supreme Court the possibility of gracefully backing away from its 
separate but unequal standards, standards that allow whites standing lo sue without having lo prove that 
the electoral rules al issue have a racially discriminatory effect and without having to show in detail that 
they were adopted with a racially discriminatory intent. In the final section, I outline five escape routes 
from Shaw, all of which are based on i ls factual inadequacies. 
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SHAW V. RENO AND THE REAL WORLD OF REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno' has widely been seen as a 
radical depanure from precedents, an indication that strengthening minority voting rights is no longer 
the only achievement of the Second Reconstruction safe from congressional or judicial attack.2 It is 
true that the abstract, deeply ambiguous, and often unreflective opinion suggested only vague and 
unworkable standards that have led to much-heightened judicial intrusion into the political process,3 
and that it encouraged a cruelly ironic interpretation of the Founeenth and Fifteenth Amendments, an 
interpretation surely unintended by their framers, that aims to undermine the sharpest minority gains in 
politics since the First Reconstruction. In this paper, however, I will argue that the fears of l iberals 
and the hopes of opponents of the voting rights revolution have been exaggerated. Many of the 
problems of the Shaw opinion stem from the inadequate factual and legal record before the Coun in 
1993, panicularly from its depanure from the reality of redistricting and representation, past and 
present.4 The way to avoid the extreme consequences that have sometimes been predicted to flow 
from Shaw is to restore a dose of that reality. That restored, Shaw's apparent separate and unequal 
1 1 13 S .CL 28 16  (1993). 
2Laughlin McDonald, "Voting Rights and the Court: Drawing the Lines," 15 Southern Changes 1 (Fall ,  1993); 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff, "Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw 
v. Reno," 92 Mich. LR. 588 ( 1993); Kimberley V .  Mann, "Shaw v. Reno: A Grim Foreboding for Minority Voting 
Rights," 5 Md. JI. of Contemp. Legal Issues 147 (1993-94); Pamela S. Karlan, "End of the Second Reconstruction?" 
The Nation (May 23, 1994), 698-700; A. Leon Higginbotham, Gregory A. Clarick, and Marcella David, "Shaw v. 
Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions With Devastating Racial Consequences," 62 Fordham l.R. 1593 (1994); 
Jonathan M. Sperling, "Equal Protection and Race-Conscious Reapportionment: Shaw v. Reno," 17 Harvard J. Law 
& Public Policy 283 ( 1 994); Anthony Q. Fletcher, "Recent Development," 29 Harvard CR-Cl l.R. 231 (1994). 
3Shaw has also damaged an administrative procedure, oversight by the Deparunent of Justice under Section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act, that, along with private litigation, has been working rather smoothly to foster the rights 
of discrete and insular minorities, has been reasonably free of partisanship, and has become, over the years, quite 
efficient. See Drew S. Days III, "Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Deparunent," in Bernard Grofman and 
Chandler Davidson, eds., Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1992), at 52-65_ .. Conservative judicial. activism, in this instance, is poor administration, 
needlessly expensive and time-consuming. 
4Cf. Aleinikoff and lssacharoff, supra, n.2, at 612. 
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standard, a standard that gives whites rights that blacks and browns5 do not equally enjoy, may fairly 
easily be reconsidered and the issue of race and redistricting may be folded back again into the main 
line of vote dilution cases. 
After offering an interpretation of O'Connor's opinion in Section II, I will tum i n  Sections III and 
IV to the recent history of redistricting in North Carolina and Texas, drawing on my research for the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund in  the remand case of Shaw v. Hunt6 and for the U.S. 
Department of Justice in the analogous Texas case, Vera v.  Richards.1 This excursion into political 
reality has three purposes. The first is to test the validity of what economists would call the "stylized 
facts" that undergird O'Connor's opinion: The Justice seems to assume that the beliefs and opinions 
of African-Americans are generally the same as those of whites, or if not, that white members of 
Congress from districts with large proportions of blacks so closely represent black attitudes that there 
is no need for black representation. If black and white attitudes are indistinguishable, or if white 
members of Congress, or at least white Democrats vote in the same way that black members of 
Congress do, then enabling black voters to elect candidates of their choice has merely symbolic 
importance. Black interests would not be different from white interests or at least they would not need 
to be represented by black faces, in the words of a recent book title by a conservative political 
scientist.8 A second stylized fact alleged by the North Carolina and Texas plaintiffs is that voting is 
no longer racially polarized, that whites in these states freely and quite frequently cast ballots for black 
candidates when they are adequately funded and qualified, and that campaigns are not marred by racial 
appeals.9 If experience shows that the political system was not previously biased against blacks in the 
5The conventions on racial designations are in flux. To avoid tiresome repetition, I will use the terms 
"African-American" and "black" interchangeably, and likewise, the terms "Latino," "Hispanic," and 
"Mexican-American."  To avoid confusion, in the Texas portion of the paper, non-Hispanic whites will be called 
"Anglos." 
6861 F.Supp. 408 (E.D. N.C .  1 994). The discussion of the facts of historical discrimination, on which Judges 
Phillips and Britt partially relied in upholding the Isl and 1 2Lh Congressional Districts, is very briefly summarized 
in their opinion, al pp. 462-65 . 
7861 F.Supp. 1 304 (S.D. TX. 1984). 
8Carol S wain, Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1 993). 
9Robinson 0. Everett,. "Appellants' .  Brief.on the Merits ," Shaw v. Barr (U.S Supreme Court appeal of federal 
district court case), al 42-43; Mark Horvit and Jay Root, "Suit challenges congressional districts," Houston Post, Jan. 
28, 1 994, p.A-25. O'Connor repeats, bul does nol endorse these factual claims. Shaw v. Reno, at 283 1 .  If  no black 
candidate had run because everyone recognized that the chances of a black winning were infinitesimal, the system 
would in fact be even more discriminatory than if some African Americans ran and lost. It is sometimes possible 
to verify this state of affairs through statements by potential candidates or knowlegeable political observers. See 
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state, then drawing districts in a race-conscious manner in 1991 -92 granted them an unnecessary 
special privilege, unnecessary because they could compete equally anyway, and special because no 
white politician needed or received districts tailored for them. Color-blind districts would then be 
appropriate for a color-blind state. A third stylized fact, apparently embraced by O'Connor, is that 
each state has previously followed what the Raleigh News and Observer in 1991  called the "basic 
criteria [that] haven't  changed in 200 years: to make each district as compact as possible, as 
contiguous as possible, and as reflective as possible of common interests." 10 Have compactness, 
contiguity, the recognition of all "communities of interest" (including those of minority ethnic groups), 
non-partisanship, and indifference to the protection of incumbents been the "traditional districting 
principles" in North Carolina and Texas, and did the 199 1 -92 l ine-drawings represent radical changes 
from past practices, unprecedented corruptions of a previously unbroken devotion to the principles of 
civics textbooks? If so, then the evil would stand out, would condemn itself. There would be no 
reason for the state to remedy past discrimination or to fear that a court might overturn a continuation 
of the same districting policies that the state had always used, because there would have been no 
discrimination, and thus no excuse for a remedy -- no compelling state interests, just special interests. 
This contrast of real with idealized "traditional districting principles" will fulfill the second major 
purpose of the paper: to examine whether North Carolina and Texas had two "compelling state 
interests" for race-conscious districting -- to remedy their history of discrimination and to avoid 
potential, well-grounded legal suits under the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution. Rather than 
being concerned with some vague "societal discrimination" 1 1  or with events primarily of the remote 
past, this inquiry treats the particularized and usually the recent history of racial discrimination in 
redistricting. 
A third purpose is to consider whether the 199 1 -92 redistricters had undiluted racial motives that 
can be read perfectly by comparing district maps with those showing racial percentages of the 
population, as plaintiffs in these cases have conveniently assumed. Do shapes tell all, or all we need 
to know? 
Social scientists, as well as judges, have long realized that redistricting in America is a mixture of 
the general and the particular. The general motives and constraints are the same everywhere. 
Redistricters try to protect incumbents or design districts for particular candidates; to help friends and 
harm enemies; to maximize the strength of their parties or ideological factions; and to inhibit or 
below, Section III.B.6; and Williams v. City of Dallas, 734 F.Supp. 1 3 1 7  (N.D.Tcx. 1 990), al 1 324, 1 396. 
10Raleigh News and Observer (hereinafter referred to as "RN"), editorial, "A map Lo boggle minds," June 1, 1 99 1, 
al Al2. 
11Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S.CL. 1 842 ( 1986), al 1 847-48; City of Richmond v. Croson, 1 09 S.Cl. 
706 ( 1989), at 724. 
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promote the representation of various groups, especially racial and ethnic groups.12 They also often 
provide high-sounding justifications for their actions that are factually misleading or incorrect or are so 
illogical as to be transparently pretextual. 1 3  They seek to achieve their ends within a certain legal 
framework -- state and national constitutional and statutory requirements , such as population equality 
and the Voting Rights Act. They are also constrained by the technical capabilities of the time, such as 
the specificity of census compilations and the capacities of tabulating hardware and software. 
But every such story differs so crucially in particular, often subtle details that superficial glances at 
the shapes and demographic statistics of districts may be quite misleading, whether performed by 
expert witnesses, attorneys, law clerks, or judges. To paraphrase Justice O 'Connor's opinion, shapes 
are one area in which details do maner. 14  
In a short Section V,  I will argue that "race blind" or absolute or partial compactness standards are 
unworkable, unrealistic, and/or racially unequal in  their effects and propose a return to traditional 
dilution case standards, a return that the Supreme Court appeared to be heading toward in its June, 
1 994 decisions of Johnson v. DeGrandy15 and Holder v. Hall. 16 
12J>erhaps the best introduction to reapportionment is Bruce E. Cain, The Reapportionment Puzzle (Berkeley, CA: 
Univ. of California Press, 1 984). 
1 3Thus, a Republican redistricting consultant in California defended a decision LO decrease the Latino percentage 
in a marginally Latino congressional district on the grounds that preserving the high Latino percentage would require 
splitting the unincorporated "KoreaLOwn" area in the City of Los Angeles. He failed to note that his plan did, in fact, 
split Koreatown in half, and that the percentage of Koreans who actually lived there and were registered to vote was 
negligible -- much less than the proportion of Latinos that the plan cut out of the district. For more details, see my 
unpublished paper, "Reapportionment Wars: The Beginning and End of Politics in California?" (mimeo., Calif. 
Institute of Technology, August, 1 993), at p. 64. 
14Shaw v. Reno, at 2827 (" . . .  reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.") 
1 562 LW 4755 (1994). There are four very important things to note about this case. First, the majority opinion 
by Justice Souter, who dissented in Shaw, treats vote dilution law as if Shaw did not exist, remarking, for instance, 
that " the lesson of Gingles is that society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority 
districts LO ensure equal political and electoml opportunity . . .  " (p. 4 762). Note that he does not say that such 
districts can never be drawn, or that they must fit some definition of compactness. Second, he does not cite Shaw 
at all, which is particularly noticeable because Shaw pervades Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Third, Rehnquist and 
O'Connor, two members of the Shaw majority, joined Souter's opinion, and not just his judgment. If they had 
agreed with the outcome, but wished to associate themselves with Shaw to a greater extent, they could have signed 
on LO Kennedy's concurrence. Fourth, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a radical and remarkable 
dissent in Holder v. Hall,. .which he incorporated in a short dissent-in DeGrandy, that repudiated 25 years of the 
history of the Voting Rights Act by claiming that it should not apply to electoral structures at all . If Thomas and 
Scalia were sure that a stable Shaw majority took the radical view of that opinion that some lower courts and lawyers 
for white plaintiffs in Shaw-type cases have, there would be no necessity to engage in a blatant falsification of 
legislative history in an opinion that has a desperate and despairing edge to it. 
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II .  A HARMLESS SUIT 
A. Shaw Barred 
The Shaw saga began after the state of North Carolina, which had not sent an African-American to 
Congress since 1 898, drew two bare-majority black congressional districts in 1 99 1 -92, for reasons that 
will be explained in more detail in Section III, below. The rural First District sprawled over a good 
deal of eastern North Carolina, while the urban Twelfth tracked Interstate-85 for 1 60 miles from 
Charlotte to Durham. Led by Robinson Everett, a Duke University law professor who was both chief 
attorney in the case and, along with his son, a plaintiff, five white people from Durham, three of 
whom lived in neither the First nor the Twelfth Districts, filed suit in federal court, charging that the 
legislature, under pressure from the U.S. Department of Justice, had perpetuated a "racial gerrymander" 
that infringed their right "to participate in a process for electing members of the House of 
Representatives which is color-blind and wherein the right to vote is not abridged on account of the 
race or color of the voters." 17 They also claimed to speak for all North Carolinians of every race. 1 8  
Judges J. Dickson Phillips, Jr. and W.  Earl Britt of  a three-judge federal court in North Carolina 
dismissed claims against both federal and state defendants on the grounds that the plaintiffs had proven 
neither a discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect, and that therefore, according to specific 
constitutional provisions and previous vote dilution precedents, they had failed "to state a claim under 
which relief can be granted. "  Not only did United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey (hereinafter 
1662 LW 4728 ( 1994). 
17EveretL, supra, note 6, at 1 5 .  
18Shaw v. Barr, 808 F.Supp. 461 , 470 (E.D.N.C. 1 992). In a classic "kitchen sink" brief, the plaintiffs challenged 
the action not only under the Fifteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
but also under Article I, Sections 2 and 4, and under the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth. They 
claimed that mention of "the people" in Art. I, Sec. 2 implied that "the people" could not be divided on racial 
grounds, that Art. I, Sec. 4 's grant of conttol over the "times, places and manner of holding elections" to state 
legislatures implied that all federal.control was illegal;-and that·color-blind voting was a "privilege" guaranteed by 
the privileges or immunities clause. Such unprecedented, quirky arguments have typified plaintiffs' attorneys, none 
of whom is experienced in voting rights law, in this whole series of cases. In Vera v. Richards, attorney Paul Hurd 
contended that taking political consequences into account in a redistricting was unconstitutional -- a suggestion that 
could only have brought derisive laughter from two centuries of politicians. 
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UJO), 430 U.S. 1 44 ( 1 977) , in Phillips' s  view, squarely decide the issue,19  but the fact that blacks 
comprised only a small proportion of the legislature virtually foreclosed a case of invidious racial 
intent and the fact that even if they won two of the twelve seats, African-Americans would have less 
than proportional statewide representation in Congress, made it impossible to demonstrate a 
discriminatory effect.20 
Although agreeing with the majority that the case against the federal defendants should be 
dismissed and that race-conscious districting per se was not unconstitutional, Judge Richard Vorhees 
thought that UJO allowed such districting only if lines followed what he characterized as the 
" time-honored, constitutional concepts . . .  such as contiguity, compactness, communities of interest, 
residential patterns, and population equality." Plaintiffs might, he thought, be able to prove at a full 
trial that there had been d iscrimination against black voters who had not been included in the First or 
19430 U.S. 144 ( 1977). In a 7-1 decision, with Justice Marshall taking no parl in the case, the Supreme Court 
in UJO squarely rejecLed the sorts of conLenLions raised by the Shaw plaintiffs. Allegations, but not, apparently, 
extensive proof of racial bloc voting and pasl purposeful racial discriminaLion againsl African-Americans in drawing 
lines in the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of New York City were enough to convince every judge except Chief Justice 
B urger to reject the claim of Hasidic Jews that their community had been unconstitutionally spli t  by the New York 
legislature, in response to a Section 5 ruling by the U.S. Department of Justice, in order to create new state 
legislative districts for African Americans and Puerto Ricans. In the prevailing opinion in UJO, Justice White, who 
harshly dissented in Shaw v. Reno, recognized the reality of racial bloc voting and the consequent likelihood of 
representation by a member of the race that is in a majority in a particular district, held that the purposeful use of 
race in redistricting was legal unless it was used to stigmatize members of a particular group, and noted that the 
whites who were in the majority nonwhite districts still enjoyed an equal right to vote. UJO, at 1010.  Concurrences 
by Brennan and S tewart emphasized that a desire Lo comply with the Voting Rights Act shielded the state legislative 
action from attack as a purposefully discriminatory action. Only Burger's singleton dissent accepted the propositions 
(without citing any evidence) that racial bloc voting was a thing of the pasL and that a poliLical melting pot was 
constitutionally required (except in the case of Hasidic Jews, which he thoughl had a righL nol Lo be split between 
districts). Id, at 1 020-21 .  Only one sentence in Justice White's opinion links the majority in UJO to that in  Shaw 
v. Reno: " . . .  we think it also permissible for a S tale, employing sound districting principles such as compactness 
and population equality, to atlempl Lo prevent racial minoriLies from being repeatedly outvoted by creating districts 
that will afford fair representation to the members of those racial groups who are sufficiently numerous and whose 
residential patterns afford the opportunity of creating districts in which they will be in the majority ." Id., at lOll. 
Although he did not specifically refer to that sentence in Shaw, Justice While did reject it by implication when he 
remarked, at 284 1 ,  thaL "district irregularities . . .  have no bearing on whether the plan ultimately is found to violate 
the Constitution."  Justice O'Connor's attempt in Shaw Lo distinguish UJO on two grounds, White's sentence and 
Lhe facL thaL the North Carolina plainliffs claimed that the legislaLure 's sole purpose was to "segregate" voters is 
especially ironic, since in fact the degree of segregation in the New York districts was greater than in those of North 
Carolina -- 65% and 67.5% nonwhite. in New York, compared to .57% in North Carolina. Moreover, by traditional 
rules of standing, the-Hasidic Jews; surely a socially·distinctive community, had a much better claim than the Shaw 
plaintiffs, since the New Yorkers asserted that they were damaged by the district lines. 
20Id., quote at 4 73. 
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Twelfth Districts or white voters who had not been excluded from them.21 OperaLing fully within the 
Lradition of vote dilution l itigation, Vorhees called for a trial to give plaintiffs a chance to prove 
"invidious discrimination against majority race voters." The rough statewide proportionality between 
the percentage of blacks in the population and the percentage of "minority opportunity districts"22 in 
Congress had to be balanced against what he asserted to be the facts that blacks and whites who lived 
in the same areas "share the same interests and concerns," and that there was no racially polarized 
voting, enabling them to "elect a mutually agreeable Representative, irrespective of race. "23 
B .  An Appealing Fantasy 
Because the three-judge panel held no hearing on the facts of North Carolina politics or 
redistricting, the Shaw appellants were free to construct a fictitious, false, "colorblind" picture of the 
state 's  past and present, and to make utterly unevidenced assertions about social psychology, and the 
Supreme Court had no concrete reason to doubt any of it. Shaw v. Reno was thus argued and decided 
in a storybook aunosphere in which the Justices' inclinations were given free sway because they were 
not restrained by any considerations of reality. The Court even seemed unaware of the proportion of 
African-Americans in the First and Twelfth Districts -- 57% in the whole population, 53% in the 
voting age population, and 5 1 -54% of the registered voters. Justice O'Connor's opinion avoided all 
memion of the mauer and Justice WhiLe 's  d issent reported the black proportion of registered voters, 
but not people in the Twelfth District, and then made nothing of the fact that the white and black 
populations there were nearly equal, not "segregated."24 
Thus, in his appeal brief, Robinson Everett claimed that "No court or agency has determined that 
racial discrimination has ever occurred in the creation of congressional districts in North Carolina. 
21ln light of O'Connor's emphasis on "segregation" in Shaw v. Reno, iL is noteworthy that Vorhees's criticism 
here was that there was too little segregation, not enough apartheid in the districts as drawn. 
22This is a term of art, not used in Yorhees 's or O'Connor's opinions, that emphasizes that minorities may not 
be able LO elect the candidate that they prefer in such a district; that even if elected, the candidate herself is not 
guaranteed LO be a member of the minority; and that, depending on the degree of Anglo and other minority crossover 
voting, the district need not contain any particular percentage of minority voters, adults, or total persons. In some 
circumstances, 50% may be more than enough; in others, 70% may be too few for a particular minority to have an 
equal opportunity with Anglos LO elect a candidate of choice. See Kousser, "Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts 
and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law," 27 U.S.F.L.R. 55 1 ( 1993). 
231d., quotes at 4 76-77. 
24Shaw v. Reno, at 2840, n. 7. The Appendix of the appeal brief by the state of North Carolina and Appendix 
D of the Justice Department's appeal brief had the correct figures for the population and the voting-age population. 
Registered voter percentages were provided LO me by the state during the Shaw v. Hunt litigation. 
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Indeed, it is clear that none has taken place; and so there was no constitutional violation to be 
remedied by establishing two majority-minority districts."25 As Section III of this paper will show, 
both factual assertions are false, and, since several of the plaintiffs were longtime political activists in 
the state, the statements must have been known to have been false at the time of the appeal. 
Furthermore, whites, Everett asserted, suffered an "impression of injustice"26 because the Twelfth 
District was drawn to allow black voters to elect a candidate of choice, who, Everett claimed, without 
any evidence whatsoever, would "consider his primary duty to be the representation of blacks." Yet in 
a curious racial double standard, he contended that African-Americans would gain no benefit from 
having a responsive representative. Indeed, the action "was an implicit affront to blacks because it 
implied that they are incapable of organizing coalitions to elect favored candidates of whatever race" -­
another statement widely known to have been false because of the nationally-watched campaigns 
during the 1980s in the congressional district containing the plaintiffs' Durham homes.27 Naturally, 
Everett did not suggest that all of his amateur psychology could be reversed by substituting the 
opposite race in each statement, but merely satisfied himself with asserting that any districts drawn 
"because of compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, community of interest, or other 
factors" could not have had a discriminatory intent, whatever the racial effects of the lines.28 Any 
evidence of legislators• motives for drawing such districts was apparently not only presently absent 
from the record, it was presumptively irrelevant, even if, say, legislators admitted and the media 
reported that they drew such districts with a racially invidious intent. In other words, facts could be 
invented as needed or dismissed if inconvenient. 
25Everett, supra, note XX, at p. 1 9. S imilar assertions are made on p.58. 
26Everett made no effort to determine how widespread such an "impression" was, how important i t  was to each 
person, or exactly what caused it, if it existed, and he never attempted to weigh it against any analogous impression 
that African-Americans may have had at previously or prospectively being denied any congressional representation 
at all by persons of their race. This might be contrasted with the new industry that has sprung up since 1989 to 
perform excruciatingly detailed "Croson studies" to justify affirmative action programs. 
27After extensive evidence to the contrary had been presented in Shaw v. Hunt (Tables of Dr. Richard Engstrom, 
Exhibit 2 1  to Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Preliminary Injunction Motion), the plaintiffs continued 
to maintain that African-American candidates could be elected from overwhelmingly majority-white districts in  
contemporary North Carolina. Even if  there were any justification for this wishful thinking, it confuses the 
preferences of the voters, which is the object of constitutional concern, with the race of the candidates, which is 
important only as a reflection of the electorate's preferences. Robinson Everett, "Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support 
of Response in Opposition to·the Motion of the United States-for Leave to Participate as Amicus Curiae," in Shaw 
v. Hunt. 
28Id., at 42-45, 75-76. 
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Everett believed that the Constitution prohibited any race-conscious districting at all, whether 
performed by the state on its own or under the rubric of the Voting Rights Acl.29 An amicus brief 
by the Republican National Committee (hereinafter "RNC"), an organization that later gained 
representation as plaintiff-intervenor in the remand case of Shaw v. Hunt, took a strongly contradictory 
stance, one that continues to bedevil "conservatives" in this whole controversy. Simply put, the RNC 
favors race-conscious districting if it hurts Democrats, but opposes it if it hurts Republicans. Thus, 
Everett's "color blind" principle would have prohibited the use of racial statistics to aid in drawing 
majority-minority districts, and he would have imposed a compactness requirement only on those 
districts, because only a racially-based criterion, he believed, offended the Constitution. Republicans, 
who unsuccessfully challenged both the North Carolina30 and Texas31 congressional redistrictings as 
partisan gerrymanders in which Democrats had allegedly only paraded a concern with racial minority 
interests to cover their real, partisan motives, favored allowing some race-conscious districting. As 
their actions in Ohio made clear,32 Republicans were perfectly willing to pack blacks into 
majority/minority districts. What bothered them was allocating minority voters who were not 
necessary for control of a district to nearby districts in order to increase the number of legislators that 
minorities could influence and Democrats could elect. Section III, below, shows that Republicans in 
North Carolina were more than willing to draw a second sprawling district with a high proportion of 
minorities so long as it had the net effect of eliminating two Democratic seats. What the RNC was 
interested in, in other words, was electing Republicans.33 Thus, in their Shaw briefs, the RNC 
29Everett, supra, note 6, at 15 ,  27. Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw v. Reno, at 2824 talces advantage of the 
ambiguities of Everett's brief lo give it a softer impression on this point than it actually has. 
3°?ope v. Blue, 809 F.Supp. 392 (WD.N.C. 1992), ajfd113 S.Ct. 30 (Oct. 5, 1992). 
31Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F.Supp. 828, al 834-35 (W.D.Tex. 1991) .  
32See Voinovich v.  Quilter, 1 13 S .Ct. 1 149 ( 1993); Pamela S.  Karlan, "All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's 
Voting Rights Trilogy," 24 Supreme Court Review 245, al 264-70. 
33Analogously, what Professors Daniel D. Polsby and Robert D. Popper are interested in, by favoring a 
constitutional compactness standard for all districts in "Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial Gerrymandering 
Under the Voting Rights Act," 92 Mich. l.R. 652 ( 1993), is the election of racial "moderates" (p. 671 )  and white 
Republicans (p. 682). In the South, of course, those "moderates" would be while and as Section III .A., below, 
shows, they would not be very moderate. S ince 1964, white Republicans throughout the country have been 
growingly adverse to the interests of minorities. See, e.g., ·Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue 
Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton, N.J . :  Princeton Univ. Press, 1989); Robert 
Huckfeldt and Carol Weitzel Kohfeld, Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics (Urbana, IL: Univ. of Il l .  
Press, 1989). Polsby and Popper's revolutionary suggestion, then, could only adversely affect African-Americans 
and Latinos. 
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recycled the political gerrymandering claims from the earlier case and reused the arguments with 
which the Bush Administration had failed to convince Congress to pass a mandatory compactness bill 
to apply to the 1990s round of redistricting. Unlike Everett, the RNC wanted compactness imposed on 
every congressional district, whatever its racial proportion, and whether or not racial considerations 
played any role in setting its boundaries.34 
Containing no more facts than the RNC's had, the amicus brief for the Washington Legal 
Foundation (hereinafter "WLF"), the Equal Opportunity Foundation, and North Carolina Sen. Jesse 
Helms, whose 1990 campaign against African-American Harvey Gantt was the most notoriously racist 
of the season, straight-facedly purported to embrace egalitarianism: "Racial gerrymandering," it 
intoned, "by placing the state's stamp of approval on the notion that people of different races are 
inherently different from one another -- is a giant step backward from our goal of a color-blind 
society." Whites who lived in black-majority districts, the WLF declared, "have effectively been 
disenfranchised," and since the number of congressional districts that white voters in the state could 
absolutely control had dropped from eleven to ten,35 whites throughout the state had also been 
damaged. Nor could the State legally claim to have drawn majority-minority seats on the grounds that 
otherwise, it would have faced a Section 2 or equal protection clause suit. Even if the state had 
knowingly drawn twelve majority-white districts, under Feeney,36 the WLF asserted, potential 
opponents would still have to prove that it had done so "because of' race. Any compact district, the 
WLF believed, would be "largely immune" to such a challenge.37 Whatever its effect on blacks, 
"color blindness," as the WLF employed il, certainly seemed to proLecL against any decrease in the 
power of whites. 
The State of North Carolina and the Justice Department, along with the State of Florida, the 
Democratic National Committee, and a group of liberal legal organizations, as amici, neither contested 
34Michael A .  Hess, appeal brief for RNC in Shaw v. Barr, at 1 - 10, 23-24. Although there has never been a good 
empirical study on the subject, Republican and Democratic redistricting experts agree that because the most loyal 
Democrats (blacks, Hispanics, Jews, and lower income voters in general) seem to be more geographically segregated 
than Republican voters are, compact districts would tend to minimize the number of seats Democrats win. See, e.g. , 
Daniel Hays Lowenstein and Jonathan Steinberg, "The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: 
Elusive or I l lusory?" 33 U.CL.A.L.R. 1 ( 1985). 
35As a result of population growth, North Carolina's congressional allocation had risen from eleven to twelve 
after the 1 990 census. 
36Personnel Administrator of Mass . .11., Feeney, 442U.S. 256 ( 1979). 
37Washington Legal Foundation, Equal Opportunity Foundation, and Jesse Helms, appeal brief in Shaw v. Barr, 
at 2, 15- 1 6, 20-21 .  
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nor added to the factual record of the Shaw case on appeal,38 contenting themselves with discussing 
principles and precedents, which they believed, with considerable justification, supponed the position 
of the district court. They focused on injury to whites and racial equality before the law. Reading 
Feeney as imposing a "racial animus" standard, the state contended that since it had not meant to hurt 
whites by drawing two majority/minority districts, whites had no basis for an equal protection claim. 
Moreover, whites could freely participate in politics and could dominate elections in ten out of twelve 
seats, which was more than their population percentage in the state (83% vs. 77%).39 Complying 
with the Voting Rights Act or trying to insure equal opportunities for minorities were legitimate 
reasons for race-conscious districting, and imposing a special burden of justification on minority 
opportunity districts would not only contradict numerous lower federal and Supreme Court decisions, 
but it would also undermine the Voting Rights Act, impose a racial double standard, and treat racial 
groups differently from other "communities of interest."40 
From Roberts v. Boston, the nation's first well-documented school segregation case,41 through the 
present, civil rights cases have been fact-intensive, inquiring into the specifics of whether schools, 
public accommodations, job opportunities, the chances of being convicted of crimes, the possibilities 
of registering, voting, or attaining office were actually inferior for African-Americans or other 
historically disadvantaged minorities. Not Shaw v. Reno. Shaw was decided in a factual vacuum; 
C. "Classifications of Citizens Solely on the Basis of Race"42 
Yet for a case that was argued on the basis of few facts, many of them wrong, Shaw v. Reno was 
suiprisingly dependent on empirical assertions and it pointed lower court judges toward much more 
38A brief filed for the Lawyers ' Committee on Civil Rights Under Law, the ACLU, MALDEF, and the NAACP, 
pp. 12- 13 ,  did refer generally to the history of racial discrimination in the state as a justification for drawing minority 
opportunity districts. 
39Jefferson Powell, appeal brief for State of North Carolina, Shaw v. Barr, al 7, 17 ,  49. 
4°Id., at 44-45; Brief of Lawyers' Committee, supra, n. XX, al 4-5, 8; Brief of Bolley Johnson, Speaker of the 
Florida House, and Peter R. Wallace, chairman of the Florida House Reapportionment Commiuee, in Shaw v. Barr, 
al 5-6, 17 ;  Brief of U.S. Dept of Justice in id., al 22-23, 26; Brief of NAACP-LDF in id., al 3; Brief of Democratic 
National Committee in id., at 23. 
4159 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 ( 1849). For the case in context see Kousser, '"The Supremacy of Equal Rights ' :  The 
Struggle Against Racial Discrimination -in Antebellum· Massachusetts· and the Foundations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," 82 N.W.U.L.R. 94 1 ( 1988) . 
42Shaw v. Reno, al 2824. 
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intensive attention to factual details in future cases. Logically, the opinion may be divided into four 
parts: a consideration of precedents, an analysis of legislative decisionmaking on redistricting, a public 
policy/constitutional argument about the evils of "racial gerrymandering," and a rather vague guide to 
further judicial decisionmaking on the issue. 
1. A New Cause of Action 
Implicitly recognizing that white plaintiffs could not prove the sort of discriminatory effect that 
had been required in vote dilution cases43 and could not demonstrate that they had been harmed,44 
43In majority vote dilution cases such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964), specific groups of individuals, especially white suburbanites , were underrepresented, compared to whites 
who lived in certain rural areas. Those who were harmed brought the cases and the injuries to them and the 
possibilities of judicial remedies for those injuries dominated the discussions in the cases. In minority vote dilution 
cases such as Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), White v. Regester, 412 U.S . 755 (1973), and 
Thornburg v. G ingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), plaintiffs went to considerable lengths to prove racially discriminatory 
effects. The focus of the Senate controversy over amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982 was on 
whether to write into the law a specific standard, proportionality, against which to measure those effects. Even where 
racially discriminatory intent, rather than effect, has been the crux of a case, courts have required some showing of 
effect. See Garza v. los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 756 F.Supp. 1298, 918 F.2d 763 (1990). O'Connor 
· explicitly distinguishes Shaw from other vote dilution cases on the grounds that those cases did not involve "racial 
gerrymanders."  Shaw v. Reno, at 2828. 
�o Justice Scalia and three of the other four Justices who, along with Scalia, composed the majority in Shaw 
v. Reno, a plaintiff must demonstrate as an "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing," that he has "suffered 
an 'injury in fact' -- an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . .  and (b) 
'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."' . . .  We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only 
a generally available grievance about government -- claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper 
application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it  
does the public at large -- does not state an Article III  case or controversy." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 
S .CL 2130 (1992), at 2136, 2143. In a case in which African-American parents challenged I.R.S. tax exemptions 
for private segregated schools, Justice O'Connor for a six-person majority denied the parents standing because they 
merely claimed what she called an "abstract stigmatic injury." Allen v. Wright, 104 S .Ct. 3315 (1984), at 3327. 
In affirmative action cases, such as Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 and Richmond v. JA. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S . 469, which are so heavily relied on in Shaw, white plaintiffs have always demonstrated injury -- loss 
of jobs or contracts. In this sense, Shaw does not "Crosonize" voting rights law. On the contrary, it reinterprets 
Croson to make it, in effect, stand for the proposition that every contractor has a right to participate in a colorblind 
contracting process, a right that anyone could claim, even if she won a contract, got a job, or gained admission to 
a law or medical school. Indeed, Ruth Shaw, the lead plaintiff in Shaw, voted in 1992 for Mel Watt, the successful 
African-American Democratic congressional candidate in the Twelfth District. 
During the 1970s, some legal scholars on the left criticized the Court for denying standing "as a surrogate for 
disposition on the merits" and for inconsistencies in applying the doctrine. Mark V. Tushnet, "The New Law of 
Standing: A Plea for Abandonment," 62 Cornell L.R. 663 (1977), quote at 699; Tushnet, "The Sociology of Article 
III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer," 93 Harvard LR. 1698 (1980). In Shaw v. Reno, the Court majority blatantly 
ignored their own broadly stated standards on standing in order to get to an issue that they wanted to decide. 
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much less singled out for injury because they were white,45 O 'Connor recognized a new, "analytically 
distinct claim," a generalized injury to the political system itself, a "lasting harm to our society,"46 
that apparently anyone could assert -- that the way the state had drawn district lines amounted to a 
"racial classification."47 The equal protection clause, as she glossed it, prevented "discrimination 
between individuals on the basis of race," not merely discrimination agains1'8 indiv iduals or members 
of a group.49 Under this new cause of action, plaintiffs could proceed if there was a correlation 
45E.g., in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 755 (1973), the Supreme Court ruled that black plaintiffs had not proved 
that their underrepresentation was the effect of their race. Black candidates lost, the Court decided, because they 
were Democrats. This line of reasoning was carried furthest in Judge Higginbotham 's opinion in LULAC v. 
Clements, cite. The only obvious way to reconcile the Fifth Circuit's opinion in LU LAC with Judge Jones's in Vera 
v. Richards is to notice the race of the plaintiffs. Partisan motives explain away racial ones if black and brown 
Democrats allege discrimination, but partisanship may be disregarded for the benefit of white Republicans. In Irby 
v. Fitz-Hugh, 692 F.Supp. 610(E.D. Va. 1988), 693 F.Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988), 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), 
the judges decided that since blacks were proportionately represented on Virginia school boards, a law that was 
arguably adopted with a discriminatory intent had become legitimate. The authoritative Senate Report on the 1982 
renewal of the Voting Rights Act stressed proof of a racially discriminatory effect. See S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 
2d Sess. 28-29 (1982). Compare also O 'Connor's stress on injury in her dissent in Metro Broadcasting, supra, n. 
X, at 3032-33 ("To the person denied an opportunity or right based on race, the classification is hardly benign.")  
46Id., at  2832. 
47Id, at 2830, 2824. O'Connor's exact words are that this claim could be brought by "white voters (or voters 
of any other race)." 
48In dissent, Justice White, at 2836, considered the issue "whether the classification based on race discriminates 
against anyone by denying equal access to the political process."  (his italics) It is worthy of note that White joined 
the majority, which also always included O'Connor, in four recent "colorblind" cases that formed the precedential 
foundation for Shaw -- Wygant, Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986), Croson, and Holland v. l/linois, 110 
S.Ct. 803 (1990), all of which except Batson were 5-4 decisions. Justice White certainly did not believe that Shaw 
necessarily followed as a logical implication of the others. Batson, at 1718, n.19, used the phrase "discrimination 
against." 
49ld. ,  at 2824. Italics added. Although voting is an individual right, it is exercised in a way that is fundamentally 
different from the social processes that underly judicial decisions in school segregation or employment discrimination. 
From the time of Charles Sumner's brief in Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (1849) to the present, critics of school 
segregation have decried treating individuals differently because of a fact that was irrelevant to their educational 
ability or learning styles, their race. Thus, to deny an individual admission to a particular school on the basis of 
ability might be reasonable, but to assume that her ability was lower just because she was African-American was 
arbitrary, a deprivation of due prooess or, as in many early· state constitutions, of the "law of the land. " Exactly the 
same propositions underly employment discrimination law. On the Roberts case and the arguments that swirled 
around it, see Kousser, supra, n. 41. 
On the contrary, voting and redistricting are inherently group-oriented processes, because success depends not only 
on your own vote, but on the votes of people like you, not only on what district you are in, but who else is in your 
district. In an electorate where opinions and behavior are sharply divided on the basis of race, to fail to take race 
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between racial and district lines in minority opportunity districts and if the boundaries of such districts 
were, in the mind of some judge, "bizarre. "50 
It might be difficult to determine "from the face of a single member districting plan that it 
purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race,"51 O'Connor admitted, but an irregular 
shape was a tangible and immediate indication of such a purpose.52 To be sure, not every such 
distinction or irregularity raised constitutional suspicions. Despite pleas from the RNC, the only 
sitting Justice to have been a member of a state legislature during a redistricting (she was appointed to 
the Arizona Senate in 1969)53 refused to overturn strong precedents and read compactness into the 
Constitution.54 Nor did she grant Everett's prayer for race-unconscious districting, for "This Court 
into account in districting is to deny any particular member of a minority group the opportunity to have her views 
represented. In other words, to deny group representation is to deny individual representation. 
50 To the extent that O'Connor's opinion stresses compactness, it is much less clearly grounded in constitutional 
language than, for example, Justice Brennan's stress on population equality in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 89 S.Ct. 1225 
(197 1). In this respect, Brennan and his allies were constitutional conservatives, constraining judicial latitude, while 
O'Connor and the other members of the Shaw majority were loose constructionists, tending toward untethered judicial 
supremacy. 
51Id, at 2826. Italics supplied. 
52In her discussion of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), Justice O'Connor seems to distinguish 
between "purpose," which she treats as a Fourteenth Amendment concern, and "motivation," which she appears to 
associate with the Fifteenth Amendment only, and she appears to mean "effect" when she says "purpose." Shaw, 
at 2826. ("Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of 
separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations 
underlying their adoption.") 
This usage, if followed consistently, would throw equal protection law into utter chaos. In voting rights law, for 
example, Bo/den's intent requirement and White v. Reges1er's "totality of the circumstances" effect test would 
become indistinguishable, and presumably the incidental effect standard of Whitcomb v. Chavis would have to be 
abandoned entirely. Washington v. Davis and all its progeny, several of which were cited favorably by O'Connor 
in Shaw, at 2824-26, would be difficult to justify, because they stand for the principle that a statute that impacts 
people of different races or genders differently -- i.e., has a racially discriminatory effect -- is only unconstitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment if its purpose or motivation or intent (the Court does not consistently differentiate 
between these terms) is racial or sexist. Since O'Connor cannot have meant to throw out so much settled law so 
casually, I conclude that her distinction between purpose and motivation in Shaw has no significance. 
53Peter William Huber, "Sandra Day O'Connor," in Claire Cushman, Ed. ,  The Supreme Court Justices: 
lllus1ra1ed Biographies,.J.789-1993 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1993), 506-10. 
541d, at 2827. For precedents, see, e.g.,  Gaffney v. Cummings, 412  U.S. 735, at 752, n. 1 8  (1973); Kirkpatrick 
v. Preisler, 89 S .Ct. 1225 (1969), at 123 1 .  In Shaw v. Hunt, plaintiffs contended without any evidence in actual 
experience that compactness was implicit in the notion of single member districts because "There would have been 
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never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking i s  impennissible in all circumstances. "55 But  
O' Connor did agree with Justice Stevens' s  view in the 1 983 Karcher case that "dramatically irregular 
shapes may have sufficient probative force to call for an explanation. "56 All the presence of 
"bizarre,"  heavily minority districts in a plan d id  was to create a rebuttable, prima facie case of  "racial 
gerrymandering."  The explanation to be offered was of racial intent, not e ffect ,  and e ffect was 
irrelevant because O ' Connor was concerned with d iscrimination between, not against, concerned with 
what she viewed as a general societal evi l ,  not with with deprivation of the rights of a person or group.57 
no logic in requmng single-member districts if there were no principle of compactness to help assure that 
representatives in Congress would have a reasonable opportunity to know their constituents and that voters would 
have a reasonable opportunity to know incumbents and learn about challengers."  If such considerations did not 
compel politicians in the 19th century, when transportation and communication were much more difficult and when 
the population of each district was considerably smaller, it would be bizarre to make them controlling, for the first 
time in American history, in the 1990s. 
55Id, at 2824. 
56ld, at 2827, quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, at 755 ( 1983) (Stevens, J . ,  concurring). 
571 am of course not the first to notice this distinction in O'Connor's opinion. See Note, "The Supreme Court 
-- Leading Cases," 1 07 Harvard LR 144 ( 1993), at 200-04; Thomas C. Goldstein ,  "Unpacking and Applying Shaw 
v. Reno, 43 A.U.L.R. 1 1 36 (I 994), at 1 1 54. The importance of the distinction is most easily illustrated in the classic 
cases of Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.A. 537 ( 1896), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.  483 ( 1954). The 
argument in Plessy between Justice Henry Billings Brown, who wrote the majority opinion, and Justice John Marshall 
Harlan, who dissented, was in effect over whether the Louisiana legislature had meant to make a discrimination 
between railroad passengers on the basis of race also a discrimination against people whom a conductor did not 
consider white. Segregation, Justice Brown disingenuously concluded, stamped "the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority . . .  solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction on it. "  The Kentuckian Harlan would 
have nothing of this charade: "Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so 
much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches 
occupied by or assigned to white persons." In other words, recognizing that in this instance, a discrimination between 
amounted to a purposeful discrimination against, Harlan found a violation of equal protection. See the discussion 
in Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1 987), 
at 1 72 ,  1 92.  
In Brown v. Board, the associated cases decided with i t ,  and a myriad of previous "separate but unequal" cases at 
the state, district, and Supreme Court levels, the NAACP-LDF spent an incalculable amount of time trying to show 
that either the inputs or the outputs of segregated education discriminated against blacks. That is, either the facilities 
or expenditures were unfairly distributed or African-American children were psychologically damaged by being 
treated as inferiors or both. That is, of course, the reason for the famous footnote 1 1 ,  based on extensive evidence 
presented by social psychologists at trials; which showed that the Court had what was thought to be sound empirical 
evidence for the view that for blacks, segregation was "inherently unequal." If courts had believed that a simple 
enunciation of a "colorblind principle" were all that was necessary to win a segregation suit, it certainly would have 
saved a great many plaintiffs a great deal of trouble. See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1 976), at 3 1 5-45. To suggest now that those and other cases stand for no more than that slogan is to falsify 
the history of that struggle. 
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2. Three Stages in Drawing a Minority Opportunity District 
The Supreme Court 's implicit understanding of a set of legislative decisions that result in an 
irregularly shaped, heavily minority district actually models the decisions in North Carolina and Texas 
fairly accurately. O'Connor's opinion recognized a sequence of three decisions: to take race into 
account, to draw a minority opportunity district at all, and to draw it in the place that it was drawn 
with the shape that it finally had. The first decision, O'Connor agreed, was inevitable and therefore 
surely constitutional: "(R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the 
legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic 
status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. "58 Since they 
will always have the information and since the knowledge may be crucial to their political careers and 
policy goals, it would be naive to assume that redistricters will avoid using it, and pointless to spend 
time and effort proving that they do so. 
Second is the decision to establish such a district. Four pieces of evidence suggest that the 
majority recognized this as a distinct stage, and that they found no constitutional infirmity here. For 
one thing, the Court had directed the attention of attorneys to the following question when it granted 
cert.: "Whether a state legislature's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act and the Attorney 
General's interpretation thereof precludes a finding that the legislature's congressional redistricting 
plan was adopted with invidious discriminatory intent where the legislature did not accede to the plan 
suggested by the Attorney General but instead developed its own. "59 As complicated as the question 
was, it certainly focused not on the adoption of such a district per se, but on the establishment of a 
district different than the Department of Justice had mentioned in its Section 5 objection letter. That 
district, O'Connor casually termed "reasonably compact," without having been presented with any 
detailed evidence about the district or giving any definition whatsoever of compactness.6() For 
another thing, O'Connor approvingly discussed the division of Manhattan in the 1960s into one 
overwhelmingly minority and three white congressional districts, which had withstood legal 
58ld., al 2826. O'Connor did not explain how the legislature became aware. But, as we shall see below, 
politicians and technicians did not need all the very latest census figures in order to know, in a general sense, what 
types of people l ived where. 
59Department of Justice appeal brief in Shaw v. Barr, p. I. The Court ignored that question entirely in its 
opinions. 
�d. at 2832. In fact, although O'Connor had no reason to know it, the Republican-drawn district that the Justice 
Department referred to was thirty miles longer and was much more difficult to traverse than the Twelfth District that 
the legislature finally adopted. It also did not contain a majority of African-Americans. 
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accusations of racial gerrymandering.61 For a third thing, she stated explicitly that "we express no 
view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more ' always gives 
rise to an equal protection claim. "62 For a fourth, the Supreme Court and numerous lower courts 
have approved drawing minority opportunity districts, as the Supreme Court did unanimously in the 
Quilter case during the same tenn.63 
A comparison between the packing of blacks into Ohio state House districts by the 
Republican-majority State Apportionment Board that was at issue in Quilter and the situation in Shaw 
underlines the point. In both cases, apportioners admitted their color-conscious intention to draw 
majority black districts; in both, they claimed to have been acting in order to satisfy commands of the 
Voting Rights Act; in both, it was so widely understood that partisan, as well as racial motives played 
a role in the drawing of the majority-minority districts that judges took explicit notice of the fact; in 
both, the effect of their actions was to draw districts that black candidates could carry and, in fact, 
most of the Ohio districts were more heavily black -- more nearly "segregated" in the Shaw opinion 's 
tenn -- than the racially quite balanced North Carolina districts. What separated the two cases most 
fundamentally was that because the Ohio redistricters had more districts to work with -- 4 3  state 
House districts in the 6 counties where blacks were mostly concentrated, as opposed to 1 2  
congressional districts in North Carolina64 -- and because the ghettoes in in Charlotte and Raleigh 
were not as large as those in Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati, the North Carolina districts could 
not be so geographically compact as those in Ohio. Thus, Shaw should not be taken to rule that 
- minority opportunity districts can never be created, that the equal protection clause somehow dictated 
that every district be majority Anglo, no matter what.65 
The Court's focus on irregular66 shapes, as well as its apparent approval of the two earlier stages 
of legislative decisionmaking, indicate that the key choice that the majority in Shaw v. Reno thought 
61ld., at 2826, citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). Adam Clayton Powell 's district was 86.3% black 
and Puerto Rican, and plaintiffs had challenged its · lines as "jagged" and "irrational" ones that "ghettoized" 
non-whites. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge, 7-2, as had the district court. 
62Id., at 2828, quoting White's dissent in id., at 2839. 
63Voinovich v. Quilter, supra, n. XX. 
64U.S. Dept. of Justice Brief to Supreme Court in Voinovich v. Quilter, at 3 .  
65Nonetheless, plaintiffs in the Mississippi case of Thornton v .  Molpus (No. 2:74 CIV 357 PS, S.D. Miss., filed 
Oct. 11, 1994), at par V., come close to making this contention. 
66By my count, O'Connor uses or quotes the word "irregular" four times, "bizarre" three, and "egregious" once. 
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needs explanation is the third stage, the reasons for the final outline of the district.67 If that is what 
has to be explained, and if the real reasons,68 not just the public relations justifications for the shape 
count, then, as the detailed analyses of North Carolina and Texas redistricting below will show, race 
may have been only a fairly minor contributing factor at that stage of the process.69 
3. Why "Racial Gerrymandering" Harms Society: Shaw 's Contradictions 
O'Connor justified the radical break with precedent in Shaw v. Reno by three assertions about 
what are, in essence, empirical questions that can be answered by social science, but on which she was 
neither provided with any evidence by any parties to the litigation nor sought systematic evidence 
herself.70 Non-compact minority opportunity districts, she said, in a public policy argument that 
67 Across the country, the 1991 reapportionment processes were probably the most open in our history and the 
rules for drawing districts were the most explicit and fair (avoid population deviations and avoid splitting areas 
containing concentrations of minority groups) that they have ever been. If in the future, fears that openly 
race-conscious redistricting will legally endanger a plan inhibit people from using and publicizing racial statistics 
and from openly considering the racial consequences of different apportionment schemes, the consequent subterfuges 
will no doubt only hamstring defenders of minority rights and undermine the unfinished effort to bring full equality 
of opportunity to the political sphere. Is a charade that employs proxies of race, such as Democratic registration and 
poverty, lo set up black and Latino districts or to pack m inorities into districts really preferable to honest public 
discussions not conducted in coded language? 
68Pildes and Niemi, supra, n. XX, argue thal instead, Shaw should be read as constitutionalizing a "district 
appearance claim," that it will ultimately be seen as merely a constraint on objectively non-compact minority 
opportunity districts, and that courts may disregard the real reasons that a district attained the shape it had. Id., al 
204-05 . Although this may be the best strategy for confining Shaw, it is one that, as they realize (p. 1 87), potentially 
threatens many minority seats, and it is difficult to reconcile with vole dilution and affirmative action law, making 
Shaw much more revolutionary and original than it purports to be. 
69The majority opinion in Shaw v. Hunt (supra, n. XX, at n. 54) seems to suggest thal O'Connor believed that 
any district in which racial and district lines were highly correlated was suspect, whatever the actual purposes of the 
legislature in drawing those lines were. The Louisiana court in Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.Supp. 1 188 (W.D. La. 
1993), al 1 195, does so more clearly, though it confuses what I have called Lhe second and third stages. Id., al 1 202. 
Thus, a prima facie case would allow plaintiffs to jump immediately to strict scrutiny. This interpretation of 
O 'Connor's opinion ignores both its language and its logic. 
7°It is noteworthy that for all of the emphasis on coinpactness in Shaw and its successors, O'Connor nowhere 
discussed the chief alleged benefit of compactness, to which empirical evidence would also have been pertinent - ­
that compact districts facilitat(} communication between a representative and her constituents. One might compare, 
e.g., the volume of constituent requests to members of Congress in districts with different compactness levels, 
allowing for differences due to the representative's  seniority. If proponents of compactness are correct, there ought 
to be many fewer requests directed to the representative of a "funny-shaped" district than to one of a more regular 
district. Other social scientists could no doubt think of other relevant evidence. For the claim that such 
communication is a benefit of compactness, see Everett, supra, n. X, al 44-45, n . 1 1 .  
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might well have been addressed to a legislature, reinforce the stereotype "that members of the same 
racial group -- regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live 
-- think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls." 
Such districts "may exacerbate . . . patterns of racial bloc voting . . .  " Finally, they make elected 
officials "more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole." Putting all three together in a quotable conclusion, 
O'Connor suggests that "Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into 
competing racial factions . . .  "71 
This is the heart of O'Connor's opinion.72 If the assertions are wrong or unsupported by 
evidence or unreflective, or if other potentially beneficial real-world consequences balance them, then 
there is no rationale for the majority's new cause of action, no compelling judicial reason to toss aside 
the conservative tradition of judicial self-restraint. But what social scientific research there is on the 
first two issues, which will be cited in Sections III and IV, below, lends O'Connor very little support. 
The vast majority of African-Americans are driven toward unity because they are still discriminated 
against, and racial bloc voting is already a stark reality.73 Indeed, creating minority opportunity 
districts may reduce racially polarized voting, if they replace districts where blacks or Latinos are 
present in proportions slightly below those that allow them to elect candidates of their choice. This 
71ld. ,  2827, 2832. O'Connor's peroration continues with two other essentially factual assertions that I believe 
are incorrect, although it would Lake much too long to demonstrate that here: " . . .  it threatens to carry us further 
from the goal of a political system in which race no longer maners -- a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments embody, and Lo which the Nation continues to aspire." I believe that the framers of the Reconstruction 
Amendments strove primarily to protect minorities against discrimination, a discrimination that they had fought 
against too long to expect to evaporate. And I think the nation continues to be deeply split on whether colorblindness 
is a desirable public policy. The practical effect of O'Connor's assumption of a consensus on such still far-off goals 
is to impede their attainment, as the post-Shaw "racial gerrymandering" cases, which threaten to eliminate at least 
half of the minority members of Congress, so clearly show. 
72The NAACP-LDF asserted (Adam Stein, "Gingles Defendant-Intervenors' Pretrial Brief," in Shaw v. Hunt, at 
pp. 3-5; Penda Hair, "Post-Trial Brief of Lawson Defendant-Intervenors," in Vera v. Richards, at p.6) that plaintiffs 
had to prove the last two assertions true in particular instances in order to have standing to sue. There is no evidence 
for this gloss in O'Connor's opinion, and it surely contradicts the notion of a "new cause of action" that did not 
require proof of discrimination against anyone, which was the focus of the dissents of White and Souter. 
73lt seems especially odd that Chief Justice Rehnquist would join in this assertion of O'Connor's, in view of his 
statement in Batson, at 1 744-45, that "The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a 'proxy' 
for potential juror partiality, based on the assumption or belief that members of one group are more l ikely to favor 
defendants who belong to the same group, has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of 
peremptory challenges." 
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was, indeed, the case in both North Carolina and Texas.74 As to the third assertion, it is doubtless 
true that all representatives of any race pay special attention to the constituents who support them or 
whose votes they might be able to win in the future. White members of Congress from North 
Carolina before 1 993, objective measures will show, were largely unresponsive to the policy pref­
erences of their African-American constituents. For instance, despite the fact that it was over 20% 
black, the Charlotte congressional district before 1992 sent to Washington unifonn ly conservative 
Republican congressmen, who completely ignored the policy views of their African-American 
constituents. O'Connor's implicit assertion that white representatives pay attention to their 
"constituency as a whole" is simply not true, especially if some of their constituents are black. 
It is also worth noting that the three assertions contradict each other. If there already is racial bloc 
voting, then treating members of each racial group as having systematically different preferences is 
facing reality, not creating stereotypes.75 The proposition that an African-American or Latino 
member of Congress may feel herself responsive only to members of her group, and not to whites, 
presumes that her group has distinctive preferences, again contradicting the stereotype argument. 
Finally, if the stereotypes are not true, then racial bloc voting will not occur, no member of Congress 
will think herself particularly beholden to any group, and no constituent will be left out. 
Whatever their factual or logical status, these alleged consequences of racial gerrymandering 
make clear that the majority opinion in Shaw v. Reno should not be extended, as the Texas court 
imagined, to ban the conscious placing of blacks or Latinos into majority-Anglo districts to buttress or 
create Democratic majorities.76 First, such an extension would contradict the stereotype argument 
because the minority group members would be assumed to have the same preferences as large numbers 
of Anglos in the majority-Anglo district, joining them to vote for a presumably Anglo Democrat. 
Second, racial bloc voting could not increase in such a case, because it is assumed that minorities 
would join many whites in supporting a candidate for Congress. Third, although the winning 
Democrat might be responsive only or mostly to Democrats, by assumption, those Democrats would 
come in all colors, contradicting the third assertion. Placing overwhelmingly Democratic 
African-Americans or predominantly Democratic Latinos in Anglo Republican districts might dilute the 
minorities' votes, but would not increase segregation or, on the evidence from North Carolina and 
74Although there were racially polarized Democratic primaries in the North Carolina l sl District and the Texas 
29th in 1992, the primary elections in the North Carolina 12th, and the Texas 28th and 30th were not polarized. In 
all five of the general election contests in new minority opportunity districts, the Democratic candidates won so 
overwhelmingly (by from 65% to 87% of the vote) that there could not have been much racial polarization. The 
contrast between these elections and those in the old North Carolina 2nd in 1982 and 1984 (see below, Section 
111.B .6-7) is very striking. 
15Shaw v. Reno, al 2845, n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
16Vera v. Richards, supra, n. X. 
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Texas, change the way the Republican voted. It would therefore not be illegal under Shaw. What 
O'Connor believes are the bad consequences of racial gerrymandering, then, serve also to confine the 
application of the decision to minority opportunity districts alone. 
4. Unsettled and Unsettling Issues: Shaw 's Ambiguities 
It is useful to divide the many ambiguities in O'Connor's opinion -- ambiguities that bedeviled the 
lower courts and helped to lead them into error -- into two major parts, depending on which side of 
the "strict scrutiny" line they fall. That is, are they part of the argument on whether the legislature has 
made a forbidden classification, or do they apply to the phase of the case in which a court has decided 
that the classification is tainted, and it requires the legislature to come up with extremely good reasons 
("compelling interests") for it and to have used means of putting the classification into effect that have 
the fewest bad consequences ("narrow tailoring")?77 
a. Before Strict Scrutiny 
There are five crucial issues in determining whether a boundary constitutes a "racial 
gerrymander" on which O 'Connor 's opinion is deeply ambiguous. First, did she really mean to 
exclude any consideration of effect, as dissenters White and Souter charged?78 If so, how would the 
case fit into any line of previous civil rights or affirmative action cases and who could claim the right 
to vindicate the public interest in avoiding racial classifications? Can anyone living anywhere in a 
state -- or anywhere in the country, for that matter -- claim standing to represent the public interest 
against what he claims is a racial gerrymander? If liberal judges had suddenly announced a new, 
77Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ. , 106 S.Ct. 1 842 (1986), at 1847. It is extremely ironic that the strict 
scrutiny/compelling state interest/narrow tailoring triad should be said to derive from the Japanese exclusion cases, 
not only because the Court in those cases al lowed that massive deprivation of rights to proceed, but also because 
the U.S. government almost certainly could have proven, on the basis of information that it made public then, that 
it had a compelling interest and that its actions were narrowly tailored. The interest was preventing a potential 
Japanese invasion from being assisted by what the government would have claimed to be suspicious persons, and 
the action was tempered by being aimed only at Japanese-Americans on the West Coast, where such an invasion 
would have been most likely. That is, the test by itself would not even have outlawed the paradigm case it is aimed 
at, unless the Court had been willing to contest the government's presentation of facts. Thus, the classic formulation 
of equal protection law .rests not on a formal theoretical structure, but on thejudiciary 's willingness to get to the 
underlying facts, which accords with the overall argument of this paper. 
18Shaw v. Reno at 2834, 2836, 284 1 (White, dissenting), 2847 (Souter, dissenting). 
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far-reaching right, the "right to panicipate in a 'color-blind ' electoral process,"79 that emerged from 
no panicular section or even penumbra of the Constitution, if that right by its very existence 
contradicted the standards implicitly or explicitly employed in hundreds or thousands of cases, if the 
newly-minted right invited the assenion by analogy of other vast and vague rights, then the cries of 
outrage and derision from conservative critics would have been deafening. One imagines Roben 
Bork's stern denunciations of this breakdown of judicial self-restraint, George Will ' s  shoner, but more 
polysyllabic version of Bork's line, and endless snide Wall Street Journal editorials. When a 
"conservative" coun acts in this way, however, the erstwhile critics of judicial overreaching are 
strangely silent, and the news media almost uniformly fail to emphasize the potential doctrinal 
significance of the case. 
Second, how high did the correlation between racial percentages and district lines have to be to 
constitute a prima facie case of racially discriminatory intent? Playing the language game by Humpty 
Dumpty's  rules,8() O 'Connor repeatedly described the issue as one of "segregat[ing] voters." But 
what level of "segregation" is  suspect? The First and Twelfth districts in Nonh Carolina and the 
Thinieth in Texas are the most racially balanced in each state -- i .e. ,  the closest to 50% of the 
predominant ethnic group. Why does this amount to "segregation"?81 Third, how is compactness to 
79Shaw v. Reno, at 2824. 
80" 'When I use a word' ,  Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ' it  means just what I choose it to mean 
-- neither more nor less.' 
'"The question is' , said Alice, ' whether you can make words mean so many different things.'  
" 'The question is ' ,  said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master -- that' s  all.'" 
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, in The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll (London, The Nonesuch Press, 
1939), at 196. 
81The asserted connection and analogy between Gomillion v. Lightfoot and Shaw are very inexact. In 1960 
Macon county, Alabama had the highest proportion of black population, 84%, of any county in the country, and to 
avoid the consequences of rising black voter registration, a slate senator redrew the previously square boundaries of 
the city of Tuskegee in a way that excluded all but about a dozen African-Americans. This was, indeed, segregation, 
and blacks were excluded or "fenced out" of the most important decisions in the county. And the evidence for the 
racial discrimination was not merely the "uncouth, 28-sided figure" of the resulting boundaries, but also the 
percentages of people of each race in the county who were inside and outside of the Tuskegee city limits before and 
after the change. (In fact, plaintiffs could easily have offered much more extensive qualitative evidence of 
discriminatory intent.) In stark contrast, those in or out.of.the 1st and 12th congressional districts in North Carolina 
and the 18th, 29th, and 30th in Texas could still vote in equally important congressional elections and were not 
placed in districts that were nearly so overwhelmingly composed of members of one race as in Alabama in the late 
1950s. For these and other pertinent facts about the Tuskegee gerrymander, see Robert J. Norrell, Reaping the 
Whirlwind: The Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). 
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be measured and what level of which of the twenty-odd indices proposed is constitutionally 
suspect?82 If no objective measure83 is to be employed, how are courts to avoid inconsistent, 
unprincipled, or even biased or partisan decisions?84 And how are they to avoid the appearance and 
the reality of instituting a racial double standard if they apply strict compactness standards to minority 
opportunity districts, but not to majority-white districts? Moreover, does O 'Connor seriously believe 
that compactness is a "traditional districting principle,"85 or should courts that are trying to determine 
whether a particular districting arrangement requires extraordinary justification first determine what 
past practices in the state have been and then compare the process and outcomes in the instance at 
issue? Suppose that irregular boundaries and racial discrimination against minorities typified past 
practices and that the difference this time was that minorities won. Would this constitute a 
constitutional violation, if some judge did not like the shape of a resulting district? 
Fourth, how much does race have to count in the decisions about boundaries? O 'Connor states 
fifteen times that it must be the single reason: 
What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its 
face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for 
82For a list of indices, see Richard G. Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci, and Thomas Hofeller, "Measuring 
Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering," 52 Journal 
of Politics 1155, at 1161-62 (1990). 
830'Connor referred, at 2827, to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions as "objective 
factors," but contiguity is trivial, political subdivisions must be cut to satisfy the Court's population equality 
decisions, and no post-Shaw court has applied any objective or precise measure of compactness in its decision. 
Every judge, including O'Connor in Shaw v. Reno, has assumed that she knew noncompactness when she saw it. 
Why should such measures be considered better or more objective indications of the intent of a legislature than 
statements by legislators or extensive analyses of the facts by observers? 
84After the first decision in Hays v. Louisiana, the State legislature constructed a new majority opportunity 
district consciously patterned after a district drawn in the 1970s. Voting Rights Review (Summer 1994), map, at 25. 
Nonetheless, the three-judge panel, in a ruling from the bench, threw it out without hearing any evidence from 
plaintiffs about its compactness and substituted its own plan, which contained no minority opportunity district and 
a new open seat that former Klan leader and current Republican David Duke described as "tailor-made" for him. 
"After Modigliani," The Economist (Aug. 27, 1994), at 21; Elaine R. Jones, " . . . Black Lawmakers," New York 
Times, Sept. 11, 1994, at E19, c. 2. 
851n Karcher v. Daggett, . 103 S.Ct. 2653 ( 1983), . at 2663, a majority opinion in which O'Connor joined 
considered that several reasons (not compelling state interests) might justify population variances between districts: 
" . . .  making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding 
contests between incumbent Representatives." In Karcher, compactness was merely one of a number of legitimate 
redistricting principles, which included incumbency protection. 
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purposes of voting . . .  [2824 ]86 Oassifications of citizens solely on the basis of race . 
. . [2824] 'unexplainable on grounds other than race' . . .  [2825)87 could not be 
explained on grounds other than race . . . [2825] 'solely concerned with segregating 
white and colored voters . . .  '88 (2825] obviously drawn for the purpose of separating 
voters by race . . .  [2826] could 'be explained only in racial tenns . . . .  '89 [2826) not 
so bizarre as to pennit of no other conclusion . . . .  (2826) anything other than an 
effort to 'segregat[e] . . .  voters ' on the basis of race . . . .  90(2826) When a district 
obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial 
group . . .  (2827] rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to 
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race . . .  (2828) cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate voters by race . .  .
(2828] rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race . . .  . 
(2829) rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate 
citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race . . .  (2830) a reapportionment 
scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate 
voters into separate voting districts because of their race . . .  [2832) 
Did the Justice really mean that unless, upon further investigation, race remained the only reason for 
drawing lines the way they were, there was no constitutional violation?91 If partisanship or 
incumbent protection or the myriad compromises necessary to meet the often eccentric demands of 
86All passages are quoted from Justice O 'Connor's opinion in Shaw v. Reno, with page numbers in brackets after 
the passage quoted. Italics supplied. 
87This passage from Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, at 266 ( 1977) 
is quoted twice on the same page of Shaw. 
88Quoted from Gomillion v .  Lightfoot, 364 U.S . 339, at 341 (1960). 
89Quoted from Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, at 59 ( 1964). 
90Quoted from Gomillion, al 34 1 .  
91Compare her majority opinion in Croson, at 721 -22, condemning "a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion 
in an aspect of public decisionmaking." Italics supplied. In Richmond, race was the sole threshold qualification for 
gaining 30% of city contracts. Marylanders for Fair Representation , Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F.Supp. 1022 (D.Md. 
1 994), at 1 054 interpreted Shaw to mean that race had to be the legislature's sole consideration for a challenge to 
a reapportionment to succeed . .  Richard H. Pildes and Richard G.  Niemi ,  ."Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts,' and 
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw," 92 Mich. L.R. 101 ( 1993), at 1 19: "Under 
Shaw, race is not an impermissible factor that corrupts the districting process -- as long as it is one among many 
factors that policymakers use." Shaw comes into play, Pildes and Niemi assert, only when "race becomes the single 
dominant value." 
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politicians explain many of the twists and turns on a map, and if but for such drives, the districts 
would have been much more compact, is there still an equal protection violation?92 Or did 
O 'Connor, as the Louisiana court imagined, mean the opposite of what she said -- that if race played 
any role at all in shaping a district, the lines were illegal?93 Or perhaps race had to be the 
predominant reason for a boundary.94 How would one weigh various reasons? Should the weights 
be similar in " racial gerrymandering" and intent-based vote dilution cases? Surely, O 'Connor did not 
think that the mere shape of a district or its racial composition is the only sort of evidence relevant to 
determining whether a plan is a " racial gerrymander," for she invited a test, a further attempt at 
accounting for the lines: " [l]f appellants ' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on 
remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan 
satisfies strict scrutiny . . .  [2830) If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the 
District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest. " [2832]95 
Fifth, what would count as alternative explanations of district shape that would block the road to 
strict scrutiny by undermining the view that the redistricting amounted to a racial classification? 
O 'Connor mentions only "traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect 
for political subdivisions."96 But since contiguity is trivially attained, at least in a mathematical 
92The task of weighing competing values is surely one that is more fit for a legislature than for a court. 
Legislators are supposed to represent different values and interests, are supposed LO compromise and have to live with 
their deals, and are subject, if they perform badly, to rejection at the polls. Judges' roles are much more 
circumscribed -- LOO circumscribed to hand over the whole business of reapportionment to them, as some possible 
extensions of Shaw, such as that proposed by Daniel D. Polsby and Robert D. Popper, "Ugly: An Inquiry into the 
Problem of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act," 92 Mich. L.R. 652 ( 1993), at 679, would make 
certain .  
93Hays v. La. ,  supra, n. XX, at 1 202 stated that the standard for defendants to prevail under Shaw is  that the 
challenged redistricting plan must be able to "be explained entirely without reference to racial gerrymandering." 
Italics supplied. But Hays also inconsistently held, at 1 202, n. 46, that "Shaw requires only that race be an important 
factor." 
94Johnson v. Miller, cite, Mss. at 4 .  
95In Shaw v .  Hunt, 861 F.Supp. 408 ( 1994), at  427-34, Judges Phillips and Britt treated these apparent invitations 
lo gather more evidence of the legislature's purposes before assessing compelling interests as meaningless, although 
plaintiffs pressed the issue forcefully and presented plentiful evidence of other purposes. By excluding this evidence 
from their opinion, Phillips. and Britt made it difficult for the Supreme Court to determine whether it existed or not, 
and in effect conceded the issue, rather than taking the Supreme Court at its word. 
96Shaw v. Reno, at 2826-27. 
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sense,97 and since it was the lack of apparent compactness and observance of municipal boundaries 
that made out a prima facie case of racial gerrymandering in the first place, why remand the case and 
allow the state to rebut the racial classification thesis at all if these are the only acceptable reasons for 
drawing lines? Clearly, the implication of O'Connor's  opinion is that the civics textbook principles 
are not the only valid ones, even before one gets to strict scrutiny.98 
b. After Strict Scrutiny 
If no other explanation suffices and particular boundaries are ruled to be enough of a racial 
gerrymander to meet a court's standards, what constitutes a compelling state interest and what is 
narrow tailoring in the redistricting context? 
O 'Connor distinguished three possible compelling state interests, although she did not explicitly 
foreclose others. First, a state could be attempting to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 
the section that requires changes in electoral rules in the Deep South and certain other areas of the 
country to be precleared by the Justice Department.99 She cautioned, however, that according to Beer 
v .  U.SY KJ, compliance cannot justify going farther than preserving the racial status quo. "A 
reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State 
went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression. " 101 In this instance, since North 
Carolina in 1 990 contained no minority opportunity districts, it would appear that, under O 'Connor's 
analysis, Section 5 would not require it to draw any at all, even if such a district were maximally 
compact. H er interpretation would, therefore, freeze white supremacy and black exclusion in place 
and force the Justice Department to preclear electoral changes even if they would patently violate 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments -- surely not what the 
97Katerina Sherstruk, "How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis," (Caltech Social Science Working Paper 855, 
July, 1993). 
98Justice White implied (Shaw v. Reno, 284 1 ,  n. 10, and accompanying text) that incumbent protection and 
partisanship are two reasons that would obviate the necessity of imposing strict scrutiny.  It is instructive that White, 
who began the Court's recent plunge into intent analysis with Washington v. Davis, should dissent so strongly from 
O'Connor's Shaw opinion, which was decided on the basis of intenL. 
99This was emphasized as a compelling state interest in Shaw v. Hunt, supra, n. X, at 474. 
100425 U.S. 1 30 ( 1976). 
101Shaw v. Reno, at 2831 .  
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framers in 1 965 or the amenders in 1 982 had in mind . 102 Second, a state could be attempting to 
comply with Section 2, which, according to Gingles, requires that plaintiffs meet three conditions: that 
the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district," that there is racially polarized voting, and that minority-preferred candidates 
generally lose. 103 Whether these conditions held in the particular case, 0 'Connor announced, were 
empirical questions that could be answered on remand. 104 Third, under Croson and other cases, 
states have "a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. " 105 The 
only past racial discrimination that O'Connor seemed to have in mind here was racial bloc voting, and 
she specifically reserved the question of whether drawing a minority opportunity district would be the 
most precisely tailored way of remedying such discrimination. 106 What she did not consider at all is 
that this interest might arise because of a state's  desire to avoid a lawsuit under the Reconstruction 
Amendments because of past discrimination in redistricting itself. 107 If pre- 1 991  state action on 
redistricting that clearly violated the Constitution 's equal protection clause and the Fifteenth 
Amendment could be demonstrated, as I believe it can be in both North Carolina and Texas, then such 
102Department of Justice regulations 28 C.F.R. Sec. 5 1 .52 and Sec. 5 1 .55 (a)(2) prohibit preclearance under these 
circumstances. For the reasoning behind them, see Drew S .  Days III, "Section 5 Enforcement and the Department 
of Justice," in Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, Eds., Controversies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights 
Act in Perspective (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), at 57. Hays v. la., at 1997, n .2 1 ,  concluded that 
unless a plan were retrogressive, it could not have a discriminatory effect -- a holding that would constrain Section 
2 and the Fifteenth Amendment LO the narrowest interpretation of Section 5.  
103Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,  at 50-5 1 .  Note that all three of these are factual, not theoretical questions, 
typifying the fact-intensive nature of voting rights jurisprudence before Shaw v. Reno. 
104Although O'Connor did not mention other "Senate factors" (See Senate Report 41 7, supra, n. XXX, at 28-29) 
that Congress suggested were relevant in a "totality of the circumstances" inquiry under Section 2, the Shaw plaintiffs 
did develop these on remand. The opinions of the three-judge panel, however, largely ignored this argument. 
105The quotation is from Shaw v. Reno, at 283 1 ,  citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 49 1 -93, 5 1 8; Wygant, 476 U.S. ,  at 
280-82, 286. 
1cx,Shaw v. Reno, at 2832. 
1070'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 1 1 0 S .Cl. 2997 ( 1990), at 3032-33, calling for 
justification by "narrowly confined remedial notions," rather than reliance on general societal discrimination, suggests 
that O'Connor generally favors a factual, historical approach to the question of past discrimination -- an approach 
that defendants provided in the North Carolina, Texas, and Louisiana cases. S imilarly, see her majority opinion in 
Croson, at 730. Even Justice Scalia, id., at 738, agreed that states could adopt race-conscious remedies to overcome 
past discrimination. 
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an interest should count much more heavily than the private discriminatory actions of white voters. It  
would be bizarre for the Court to rule that a state could remedy this sort of constitutional violation 
only if it followed "sound districting principles,"108 principles that are themselves nowhere mentioned 
in the Constitution or in federal law and which, the analysis below will show, have never been 
consi stently followed by the states in question. 
0 'Connor nowhere clarified what "narrow tailoring" means when applied to redistricting, and 
parties on each side of subsequent cases have offered starkly different definitions. 109 On the one 
hand, plaintiffs have claimed that narrow tailoring requires the adoption of the most compact districts 
feasible, 1 10 or perhaps both the most compact and the most politically and ethnically 
competitive. 1 1 1  Since as argued above, 1 12 only minority opportunity districts are challengeable 
under O'Connor's holding in Shaw, the plaintiffs'  position erects a blatant double standard: Anglo 
districts can be as gangling and politically safe as convenient; districts in which African-Americans or 
Latinos have a dominant voice must have extremely tidy shapes and perhaps, their representatives can 
never be politically comfortable. On the other hand, some defendants suggest that any plan that 
creates an equal or smaller proportion of minority opportunity districts than the proportion that 
minorities represent in the population is narrowly tailored. 1 13 This would bring an effect standard 
back into Shaw and reconcile it, at least partially, with minority vote dilution law, and such an 
108Shaw v. Reno, at 2832. 
100In his dissent in Shaw v. Reno, at 2842, Justice White posed a series of questions and dilemmas, some 
expanded upon here, in order to show that the notion of narrow tailoring is unworkable when applied to redistricting. 
1 10Michael A. Hess, brief for Republican National Committee in Shaw v. Reno, al 10; Judge Vorhees in Shaw 
v. Hunt uses non-compacmess for three purposes: to trigger strict scrutiny, to deny narrow tailoring, and to rule out 
a potential Section 2 suit as a compelling state interest -- the last, because an undefined compactness notion is part 
of the " first prong" of the Gingles tesl. 
1 1 1Paul Hurd, "Post-Trial Brief in Vera v. Richards," at p.5, n.4 ; p.9; p. 17, n.11; p.23; and his "Proposed 
Conclusions of Law," in Vera v. Richards, at p. 6, pars. 20, 22; p. 10, par. 34. 
1 12Section II.C.3. 
1 13U.S. Post-Trial Brief in Vera v. Richards, at p.80; U.S .  Post-Trial Brief in Shaw v. Hunt, al pp. 63-65, n.22; 
Adam Stein, "Gingles Defendant-Intervenors' Pretrial Brief' in Shaw v. Hunt, at pp. 49-50; Shaw v. Hunt, supra, 
n. X ,  at 475. 
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interpretation certainly gains support from the Supreme Court's DeGrandy decision. 1 14 Other 
defendants and even the three-judge panel in Louisiana in Hays suggest that districts that are not 
overly packed with minorities are narrowly tailored. 1 15 For example, if it were possible to draw 
equally compact districts where one was 90% black and another was 55%, and 55% black was enough, 
given the level of normal majority and minority registration, turnout, and cross-over votes, to allow the 
African-American community a fair opportunity to elect candidates of its choice, then the 55% district , 
but not the 90% district might be narrowly tailored. Such a definition would be consonant with 
O'Connor's emphasis on the evils of "segregation," but to the e xtent that Shaw is taken to reflect 
simply a judicial preference for compactness, even the 55% district might not pass muster. 1 16 
Plaintiffs and defendants differ too, about the significance of more geographically compact alternatives 
that have similar minority percentages. Plaintiffs view them as evidence that the defendants' districts 
are not narrowly tailored, because they could have adopted more compact ones, and they ask courts to 
do so. 1 17 Defendants consider them proof that they acted not out of a desire to isolate minorities or 
insure safe districts for them, but for other reasons, such as partisanship. 118 Finally, plaintiffs often 
consider a plan narrowly tailored if it allows minority voters a fair chance to choose candidates of 
1 14Johnson v. DeGrandy, supra, n. XXX. 
1 15Department of Justice, "Post-Trial Brief' in Shaw v. Hunt, at pp. 3-4; Stein, supra, n.  XXX, at pp. 49-50; Hays 
v. La.,  at 1206-07; Shaw v. Hunt, supra, n. XXX at 475. Renea Hicks, "State's Post-Trial Legal Memorandum," 
Vera v. Richards, at p.38. If the problem with minority opportunity districts is that they burden whites, then the 
greater the packing of each race, the smaller the statewide proportion of whites "hurt" by being represented by the 
choice of the black community or by someone influenced by the black community. Thus, such an interpretation of 
narrow tailoring, which seems consistent with the usage in affirmative action cases, would lead to more, not less 
segregation. It is also worth noting that packing minorities into a small number of districts would risk a minority 
vote dilution case because it would deny them a chance for political influence equal to that of whites. 
1 16ln Shaw v. Reno, the State claimed simply that minority opportunity districts were narrowly tailored as 
remedies because no districts containing smaller percentages of African-Americans would give them an equal chance 
to elect candidates of their choice; i.e. , no "race neutral means," as called for in Croson, at 729, would work. 
Jefferson Powell, brief for State of North Carolina, Shaw v. Reno, at 48. As in Justice Brennan's long recitation of 
Congress 's attempts to promote programming diversity through race-neutral means in Metro Broadcasting, at 
301 7-23, North Carolina could be viewed as having experimented with means less favorable to electing the choices 
of the black community in a series of elections from 1968 through 1990. See below, Sec. III.B. 
1 17Thomas Farr, "Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff-Intervenors' Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
to Enjoin Further Election Proceedings for the Unites States House of Representatives from North Carolina Under 
the Existing Congressional . Redistricting Plan," Shaw .v� Hunt, al 24-26; Paul Hurd, "Plaintiffs [sic] Proposed 
Conclusions of Law," Vera v. Richards, at p.6, par.22. Hays, al 1208-09, accepted such arguments. 
118Penda Hair, "Post-Trial Brief of Lawson Defendant-Intervenors," Vera v. Richards, at p.14 .  
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their choice, while at the same time serving other legitimate state interests traditionally protected in 
redistricting, such as preserving communities or interest and protecting incumbents. 1 19 Defendants 
tend to believe those state interests illegitimate.120 
Although O 'Connor's m any ambiguities in Shaw have bedeviled lower coun judges and invited 
local authorities who wish to retain or revert to lily-white rule to file suits and resist compromises with 
voting rights forces, the Court's muddiness also affords it relatively painless escapes from the 
difficulties that the decision poses. 121 It also increases the importance of factual inquiries into 
questions that the opinion raises, but does not answer. To twist an old saying, when the law is 
unclear, we have no alternative but to argue the facts. 
III .  A S HORT HISTORY OF RACE, REPRESENTATION, AND REDISTRICTING IN 
NORTH CAROLINA 
A. HOW WELL DO WHITES REPRESENT BLACKS IN NORTH CAROLINA? 
1 .  Congressional Roll Call Behavior 
Although there may be some symbolic value to choosing a person of a particular gender, ethnic 
group, or occupation, and although elected officials put much of their time and effort into 
particularized constituency services,122 the principal purpose of electing a representative is to insure 
1 19Department of Justice, "Post-Trial Brief' in Shaw v. Hunt, at pp. 3-4; Stein, supra, n. XXX, at pp. 49-50. 
1�urd, "Post-Trial Brief' in Vera v. Richards, at ·p.5, n.4. 
121See Section V, below. 
1�very elected official, but perhaps particularly members of Congress, provide "casework" or "constituency 
services" for virtually anyone in their districts, and sometimes people outside their areas, whether or not they 
supported the member in the last election. See, e.g., Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, The Personal 
Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987). In this 
sense, most officials may be responsive to almost anyone, and the shape of the district, or the party, ideology, or race 
of the representative may not matter systematically to voters. A survey of constituent contacts during 1993, for 
instance, showed that whites were approximately twice as likely to contact newly elected North Carolina members 
of Congress Mel Watt and Eva Clayton, who are black, than African-Americans were. Allan J. Lichtman, "Report 
on Congressional Districts in North Carolina," (for Shaw v. Hunt), at Table 43, p.66. If constituency service is what 
Justice O'Connor had in mind when she warned in Shaw v. Reno, al p. 2827 that elected officials from deliberately 
created majority-minority districts "are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the 
members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole," then the evidence from North Carolina seems to 
refute her speculation. 
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that one 's views are represented. Have white and black members of Congress from North Carolina 
voted in the same way? Have whites reflected black interests so well that blacks do not need black 
faces to represent them, as Prof. Carol Swain has suggested is sometimes true in the nation as a 
whole?123 Is the black electorate, as such conservative pundits as Clint Bolick suggest, much less 
liberal than the black elite, in which case differences between the voting records of black and white 
members of Congress would prove that black interests would be better represented by white faces?124 
The most easily accessible and comprehensive index of ideological patterns of behavior in 
congressional roll calls is Congressional Quarterly's "Conservative Coalition Scores," which are based 
on 60- 100 roll calls per session on a wide range of subjects and are published annually. The scale 
varies from 0 to 100, with 100 being the most conservative, as CQ determines it.125 Figure I ,  which 
summarizes 23 years of data succinctly, demonstrates that black and white members of Congress from 
North Carolina do not vote similarly. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
123Swain, Black Faces, Black Interests. Much of Swain's book is based on interviews with members of 
Congress, in which they apparently told her what she seemed to wanl lo hear, and she believed them. When more 
quantifiable or systematic data disagrees with her interview impressions, as in the section on North Carolina con­
gressman Tim Valentine, pp. 159-68, Swain trusts her impressions. 
12ABolick, "Ask the Tough Questions on Civil Rights," Los Angeles Times, Feb. 22, 1 993, p. BS. 
12.S-J'he advantages of the index over those of the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education, the Americans for 
Conservative Action, the Americans for Democratic Action, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, etc. are that 
i l  contains more roll calls and that it is on a larger range of issues. A few deviant votes will have little effect on 
the CQ index. Its advantage over one that is invented especially for a particular piece of research is that the inventor 
might consciously or unconsciously bias her index to fit the needs of the moment, or make some error in calculating 
it. Anyone can recheck the CQ scores. 
To test whether the Conservative Coalition (CC) scores of members of Congress from North Carolina were similar 
to those on interest group indices, I correlated the CC scores for 1 987, 1 988, 1 990 and 1 992 for the 1 1  North 
Carolinians on their ratings from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), the AFL-CIO (AFL), the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (CCUS), and the American Conservative Union (ACU). The matrix of Pearson r's below 
indicates that the indices are generally rather closely related. 
Index 
CC, 1 987 
CC, 1 988 
CC, 1 990 
CC, 1 992 
ADA 
.66 
.75 
.83 
.85 
AFL 
.78 
.58 
.83 
.92 
Index 
. ccus 
.81 
3 1  
. 7 1  
.69 
.93 
ACU 
.76 
.77 
.78 
.89 
The members of Congress from the state have been grouped into three categories and the scores 
for each category have been averaged: 126 Republicans, Democrats from the two most heavily black 
districts (the First and Second until 1 993, then the First and Twelfth), and Democrats from other 
districts. The pattern is striking. Republicans consistently scored about 90% conservative. Other 
Democrats averaged around 70%, but varied from the low 60s to the low 80s in particular years. The 
two white Democrats from districts One and Two acted like Republicans until 1 980, and then 
somewhat more like other Democrats. 127 The huge anomaly in the figure came when two black 
Democrats, Eva Clayton and Mel Wan, replaced whites in the two "black districts" after the 1 992 
election. Suddenly, a conservative index that had been nearly 90% in 1 99 1  and 60% in 1 992 became 
1 1  %.128 In North Carolina, the color of the member of Congress makes a major d ifference in roll 
call voting. To repeal the 1 992 redistricting is to exclude the voices of the black community from 
Congress. 129 
In her opinion in Shaw v. Reno, Justice O'Connor suggested that representatives from 
majority-minority districts may be "more likely to believe that their primary obligation is  to represent 
only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. "130 Blacks who have run 
for Congress in North Carolina have often denied this uncharitable presumption. To take merely one 
example, in a 1 983 article with the title "Black lawmakers don't want to be just spokesmen for 
126Because some members were present for different numbers of the relevant roll calls, I divided each member's 
conservative score by the sum of his conservative and anti-conservative scores. For instance, a congressman who 
joined the conservative coalition on 80% of the total roll calls, opposed it on 5%, and was absent on 15% would be 
credited with a score of 94 (80/85 = 94). I then averaged these scores over the number of members who fell into 
the category. 
min particular, Tim Valentine's Conservative Coalition score from his first election in 1 982 through 1993 was 
very similar to that of his predecessor, L.H. Fountain. 
128This was not just an effect of a new Democratic administration and two first-term members of Congress. The 
1993 scores of Mel Wall and Eva Clayton are almost identical to the average of the Conservative Coalition scores 
of all other African Americans elected to Congress from the eleven ex-Confederate states for every session since 
1 972. This implies that if districts in which African Americans had an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice 
had been drawn earlier in North Carolina, the people elected would have voted very differently from other 
representatives from the state. 
129In her concurring opinion in Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S.Cl. 2797 (1986), al 2820, Justice O'Connor suggested 
that individual members of traditionally protected minority grmips could be protected as group members against 
political discrimination if '.'the racial .minority group can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political 
process.'" (citation omitted) Figure I would seem to constitute such proof. 
1301 1 3  S.Ct. at 2827. 
32 
minority group," Kenneth Spaulding, then head of the Black Caucus in the state legislature, declared 
that "The benefit minorities have in the General Assembly is they can express views for people, black 
or white, who have not had opportunities to be a pan of the American dream . . . .  When you represent 
a district, you represent everyone in that district."131  But even if this was mere rhetoric, even if 
aspiring African-American politicians in a state that was three-fourths white catered only to their small 
minority constituency, Figure I suggests that the statement would apply at least as strongly if one 
substituted "majority-majority" for "majority-minority" and white representatives for black. That is, as 
observers noted and as their roll call behavior indicates, white politicians in North Carolina have 
overwhelmingly considered their "primary obligations" to be to whites, while they have largely ignored 
the opinions of the black parts of their constituencies, opinions which the following section shows are 
very different from those of the white electorate. 
2. ATTITUDES OF THE ELECTORATE 
But was this just the behavior of white and black elites, which might differ markedly from the 
opinions of the masses of white and black voters? Drawing on the University of Michigan National 
Election Studies, as well as on the most extensive survey of black political opinion yet made, the 
National Black Election Study, Katherine Tate documents the marked divergences in beliefs and 
opinions between blacks and whites and the relatively few systematic differences on these opinions 
within the black community. 132 In 1988,  for instance, 55% of whites, but only 28% of blacks in the 
nation as a whole opposed a guaranteed jobs program; 54% of whites, but only 26% of blacks opposed 
federal aid to minorities; 34% of whites, but only 1 5 %  of blacks believed social services spending 
should be cut.133 In 1984, blacks were substantially more liberal than whites on the issues of jobs, 
food stamps, medicare, federal aid to education, capital punishment, and defense spending. 134 The 
relatively slight divisions among African-Americans could only rarely be explained by differences in 
1 31Gene Wang, "Black lawmakers don ' t  want to be just spokesmen for minority group," RN, Jan. 30, 1983. 
132From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1 993). See, similarly, Michael C. Dawson, Behind The Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics 
(Princeton, N .J .: Princeton Univ. Press, 1 994), especially Table 8. 1 ,  pp. J 83-84. 
133Id., at 34. 
134Id., at 36-39. 
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incomes, genders, or regions. Middle class and working class, male and female, southern and 
non-southern blacks largely shared the same attitudes with each other, but not with whites.135 
Blacks also differ significantly from whites in their perceptions of the degree of prejudice and 
discrimination in American society and in their beliefs about the causes of inequality, perceptions and 
beliefs that have a profound influence on the political programs that people favor. In Black 
Americans' views of racial inequality: The dream deferred,136 Lee Sigelman and Susan Welch 
catalogue a series of disturbing and profound divergences between whites and blacks. For instance, in 
1 989, 26% of blacks thought that over half of the whites in America "personally share the attitudes of 
groups like the Ku Klux Klan." Only 4% of whites considered the KKK mainstream. 137 In the 
same year, the percentages of blacks and whites who perceived the existence of discrimination against 
blacks in education were 37% and 1 1  %, respectively; in housing, 52% and 20%; in getting unskilled 
labor jobs, 49% and 1 0%;  in getting skilled labor jobs, 53% and 15%; in getting managerial jobs, 6 1  % 
and 23%; in wages, 57% and 14%.138 In a word, the vast majority of whites do not perceive that 
there is much racial discrimination in any area of American life, while the majority of blacks see it 
everywhere. And such divergences in perceptions lead to differences in policy preferences. 49% of 
blacks, but only 9% of whites in 1 984 thought that past discrimination against blacks justified giving 
blacks preferences in getting jobs over equally qualified whites. 139 
A 1 993 survey on racial attitudes in North Carolina sponsored by the Z. Smith Reynolds 
Foundation, Inc. of Winston-Salem suggests that citizens of the state mirror national trends. In Table 
I ,  I have excerpted a few of the answers to the large number of questions asked of the respondents, 
divided them into four categories, and listed the percentages of each race holding the indicated 
attitudes. Panel A shows thal whiles and blacks differed in their beliefs aboul the extenl of prejudice 
and racial discrimination in North Carolina in 1 993. One in five blacks, bul only one in twenty whites 
considered race relations or discrimination one of the most important problems facing the state. More 
than twice as m any blacks as whites considered racial discrimination in the state very serious and 
increasing. Nearly twice as high a percentage of blacks as whites agreed very strongly that most 
135Id. ,  at 38-45. 
1 36Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 199 1 .  
137ld., at 53.  
138ld., al 57. 
1 39Id. ,  at 1 29. 
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whites in the state are prejudiced,  and nearly three times as many thought most whites "want to keep 
blacks down. " 
(Table 1 about here) 
Panels B and C demonstrate even wider racial differences concerning the degree of private and 
public discrimination in contemporary North Carolina. African-Americans were three to four times as 
likely as whites to believe that there is anti-black discrimination in jobs, housing, education, public 
accommodations, scholarships, local government, and law enforcement. Whites were more likely than 
blacks to perceive anti-white discrimination in jobs and scholarships by nearly a seven to one margin, 
and to think that the federal and state governments have done "too much to help blacks achieve 
equality" by thirty to one. Five times as high a proportion of blacks as whites considered "equal 
justice for minorities in North Carolina" a major problem. Panel D shows that members of the two 
races differed markedly on important governmental policies: banning housing discrimination, 
affirmative action in college admissions or employment, and busing schoolchildren for integration. In 
sum, in North Carolina, as in the nation as a whole, whites and blacks see entirely different worlds. In 
the white view, there is little remaining prejudice or public or private discrimination, and there is 
consequently little need for government programs to do something about it. In the black view, 
prejudice and discrimination are pervasive, and governments at all levels should act to remedy this 
serious plight. It is not a large inferential leap to connect constituents ' attitudes revealed in these 
surveys with the congressional voting patterns portrayed in Figure 1 .  
While it is true that both communities generally agreed on such issues as crime, and that whites in 
1 993 rarely assented to statements that exhibit traditional white supremacist or segregationist attitudes, 
the gulfs between blacks' and whites' perceptions of discrimination and bias and the resulting wide 
differences in policy preferences are dramatic. Observers, including legislators and judges, may decry 
the separation of attitudes and deplore or disagree with the differences in perception, but it is surely 
not irrational to act as if the differences existed.140 These are not stereotypes, but very real 
disparities of view. Even if  legislators in 1991 -92 did not know the exact results of the 1 993 survey, 
they must be assumed to be generally aware of their constituents ' opinions through personal contacts, 
the news media, and their own experiences. Unless districts are drawn with an eye to reflecting the 
opinions of the 22% of North Carolinians who are black, those opinions, which deviate so markedly 
from those of the white majority, will be disproportionately unrepresented or even silenced in 
legislative bodies. 
140As Justice Souter pointed out, Shaw v. Reno, at 2845, n .2 .  In Batson, supra, n. XXX, at 1 727, Justice 
Marshall explained carefully that the equal protection clause "prohibits a State from taking any action based on crude, 
inaccurate racial stereotypes" -- not accurate generalizations. Italics supplied. 
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B .  DISCRIMINATORY DISTRICTING AND ELECTORAL PRACTICES BEFORE 1 99 1  
1 .  THE "BLACK SECOND," 1 872- 1 901 
The racial and partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts in North Carolina did not begin 
in 1 99 1 ,  nor were the 1 990s the first time that the shape of congressional districts in the state has 
attracted widespread adverse comment. In  fact, less than two years after the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment in 1 870, the Democrats, who attained a majority in the legislature through 
extensive violence and intimidation against black and white Republicans, packed African-Americans 
into the "Black Second," the only congressional district in the South during the era to have its own 
published biography.141 The compact southeastern Second District drawn by the Republicans in 
1 867 contained a small white majority, a total population that was eight percent below that of the ideal 
in the state, and had only twenty percent more black citizens than could be expected if the state 's 
black population had been divided equally in the nine congressional districts. 142 From the 
Democratic reapportionment of 1 872 until disfranchisement in 1 900, the district contained substantial 
black majorities, from ten to eighteen percent more total population than the average district in the 
state and, most important, it had approximately twice the number of blacks as an equal division would 
have dictated. Since the other districts were "stacked" to insure that there was no black majority, the 
apportionment effectively confined black control in a state thatwas approximately a third 
African-American to a maximum of one district in eight or nine (depending on the total population in 
the decade), and minimized black influence and Republican representation in all the other 
congressional d istricts. Republican Governor Tod Caldwell described its shape as "extraordinary, 
inconvenient and most grotesque. " 143 Nineteenth century transportation and communication made 
the district much less accessible than any district in North Carolina today. 
141Eric Anderson, Race and Politics in North Carolina, 1872-1901 : The Black Second (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 198 1). Other notorious discriminatory racial gerrymanders of congressional districts 
in the South after Reconstruction included the "shoestring district" in Mississippi, the B lack Belt Fourth District in 
Alabama, and the "boa constrictor" Seventh District in South Carolina. On these districts, see Kousser, "How to 
Determine Intent," supra, n. XXX, at 598-606. 
142Data from Stanley Parsons et al., United States Congressional Districts and Data, 1843-1883 (1986); Parsons 
et al., United States Congressional Districts, 1883-1 913  (1990). Congress enfranchised southern blacks in 1867 in 
the Reconstruction Act. Eric Foner, Reconstruction (New York: Harper and Row, 1 988), at 276. 
143Quoted in Anderson, Black Second, 3. 
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It was only after the violently racist "White Supremacy Campaign" of 1 898 and the fraudulent 
passage in 1 900 of the disfranchisement amendment, with its literacy test, poll tax, and temporary 
grandfather clause, that the vast majority of blacks were excluded from politics and from a fairly equal 
share of the benefits that the state and local governments provided.144 At that point, it was safe for 
the Democrats to reduce the Second District's population, and especially the number of blacks in it, to 
a more compact size and a population more nearly equal to that of the state 's other congressional 
districts. 
What distinguished the redistricting of 1 99 1 -92 was not that it was motivated by race or parti­
sanship, for these motives had determined the composition of districts 1 20 years before. What was 
different in 1 99 1 -92 was that, for the first time in the long history of racial and partisan 
gerrymandering in North Carolina, blacks, not whites benefited, and some whites concluded that now 
the rules needed to be changed. 
2. RACIAL SUPPRESSION, 1 900-68 
For a state in the "Rim" or "Border" South with a cherished progressive self-image, North Carolina 
suppressed black political activity thoroughly during the period of the "nadir" of race relations in the 
first half of the twentieth century and only slowly, grudgingly, and partially liberalized thereafter. 
Only 15% of the state 's blacks were registered to vote in 1 948, and only 36% in 1 962. Because of 
low overall voter registration and its continued use of a literacy test, 40 of the state 's counties were 
subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in 1 965. A year later, black registration finally 
surpassed 50% for the first time since 1 900. While Tennessee elected its first black of the century to 
the General Assembly in 1 964 and abolished multimember districts in urban counties in 1 965 on the 
grounds that they discriminated against blacks, North Carolina did not elect a black state legislator 
until 1968, and it refused at that time to abolish multimember districts for the state legislature, even 
though it was advised that they might be challenged in court on the grounds of racial discrimination. 
It simultaneously passed a numbered post system with an anti-"single shot" provision, subsequently 
outlawed as racially discriminatory, over the protests of blacks and white Republicans who charged 
that it would have a discriminatory impact. The same legislature that adopted the multimember 
district/numbered post system also refused to add black activist Durham County to the Second 
Congressional District, reportedly to prevent a rise in black influence in that district. 145 
144Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 
1880-1910 (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1 974), 1 82-95. 
145Harry Watson Testimony, Gingles v. Edmisten (1983), 242, 255, 300-07; Plaintiff-Intervenor's Exhibit 25 in 
Shaw v. Hunt; Kousser, "Was Memphis's Electoral Structure Adopted or Maintained for a Racially Discriminatory 
Purpose?" Caltech Social Science Working Paper 807 (Aug. ,  1992), at 45-47. The anti-single-shot Jaw was declared 
unconstitutional in Dunston v. Scott, 336 F.Supp. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1972). 
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3. CLAYTON AND LEE RUN FOR CONGRESS 
1 968 was not only the year when Henry Frye of Greensboro became the first African-American 
elected to the General Assembly, but also the year when Dr. Reginald Hawkins, a black Charlotte 
dentist, received 129,808 votes for the Democratic nomination for governor and when Eva Clayton 
became the first black since 1 898 to run a serious campaign for Congress. 146 When Clayton, who 
had never previously held public office, began her campaign, blacks made up approximately 40% of 
the population of the Second District, but only 1 1  % of the voters. Although her poorly financed and 
rather amateurish campaign lost 70-30 to eight-term incumbent L.H. Fountain, the most conservative 
Democrat in the state' s  congressional delegation, Clayton and her cadre of black activists managed to 
raise black registration to 26% of the district's voters. 147 
Four years later, in 1 972, Howard Lee became Fountain's second and much more serious black 
challenger. The son of a Georgia sharecropper, Lee had come to Chapel Hill to anend graduate school 
in social work at the University of North Carolina in 1 961  and stayed on in a job at Duke University. 
He had been narrowly elected to the largely ceremonial office of mayor of the majority-white town of 
Chapel Hill in 1 969 and reelected in 1 97 1 ,  and as the first black mayor in the state during the 
twentieth century, had been named vice-chairman of the state Democratic party in 1 970. An 
i mpressive speaker with an ability to appeal to whites, he had flirted with the idea of running for 
Lieutenant Governor, but when the legislature added Orange county to the Second District in its 
principal change in congressional district boundaries in 197 1 ,  Lee decided to follow in Clayton' s  path. 
Expecting to capitalize not only on increased black registration, but on an appeal to white youths 
newly able to register after the institution of the 1 8-year-old vote, Lee hoped that whites would look 
beyond his race. Blacks in politics, he declared, needed to be "concerned about people on the basis of 
character rather than skin color." "I have been working awfully hard," he said on another occasion, 
" to establish a relationship between myself and members of the white community." 148 
146"This Political Hint No S urprise," Raleigh Times (hereinafter "RT,") Sept. 4, 1970; RN, Nov. 8,  1970; Baran 
Rosen, "Mayor Howard Lee Campaigning Hard to Unseat Rep. Fountain," RN, Mar. 13,  1972. 
1 47Baran Rosen, "Mayor Howard Lee Campaigning Hard to unseat Rep. Fountain," RN, Mar. 13, 1972 . 
148"Mayor Advises 'People Power,"' RN, April 29, 1970 (first quotation); RN, July 16, 1970; "This Political Hint 
No S urprise," RT, Sept. 4, 19'.ZO;;'Under The Dome: Lee, Futrell said eyeing lieutenant governor race -- Is Lee using 
threat to run as lever to get party post?" RN, Sept. 6, 1970; "Party Names Lee As Vice Chairman," RT, Nov. 16, 
1 970; "Wide Margin Re-Elects Lee As Mayor of Chapel Hill," RN, May 5, 1 97 1 ;  "Under The Dome -- Chapel Hill' s  
Howard Lee may run against Fountain," RN, Sept. 21 ,  1 97 1 ;Baran S .  Rosen, "Lee Announces 2nd District Bid," RN, 
Jan. 1 1 ,  1972; Rosen, "Youth, Black Voters Boost Lee's Race," RN, Feb. 20, 1972; Rosen, " Mayor Howard Lee 
Campaigning Hard to Unseat Rep. Fountain," RN, March 13, 1972 (second quotation). 
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Optimistically, Lee proposed a budget of $75 ,000 in his campaign and aimed at raising black 
registration from 26% to 35% of the total eligible to vote in the district. For the first time since his 
initial election in 1 952, L.H. Fountain appointed campaign managers in every county, ran radio and 
television advertisements, and handed out bumper stickers. Termed by Tom Wicker of the New York 
Times "an archetypical Southern conservative, whose large black constituency has had little if any 
effect on his unyielding position on racial and social issues," Fountain still wore white linen suits and 
· white shoes on the floor of Congress in 1 972 and had no blacks on his staff. Despite his vigorous 
campaign, which represented the "toughest challenge" of Fountain's  career, Lee raised the black 
registration percentage only to 30%, and he lost in the primary, 59% to 4 1  %. According to Daniel C. 
Hoover of the News and Observer, "Although [Lee] got some white votes, especially in his own 
traditionally liberal Chapel Hill area, the balloting generally was along racial lines." Being "a highly 
skilled campaigner with strong appeal not only to blacks but to liberal urbanites as well" was not 
enough to win an overwhelmingly rural Second District in which voting was widely understood to be 
m arkedly racially polarized. 149 
4. THE 1 98 1  REDISTRICTING: FOUNTAIN'S FISHHOOK 
The 1 98 1  congressional redistricting is worth studying in detail because it  illustrates four important 
facts : First, before 1 99 1 ,  white congressmen openly manipulated redistricting to buttress their 
positions against candidates who might appeal to black voters. Second, racial, partisan, and 
incumbent-protecting goals interacted, often producing unlikely coalitions because of the "ripple 
effects" of changes in one district on the shape of another. Third, the Voting Rights Act, as 
interpreted at the time by the Department of Justice, constrained racially discriminatory legislative 
actions -- but not very much. Fourth, although committees paid lip service to the value of 
compactness, legislators did not hesitate to sacrifice it to what they obviously considered the more 
important ends of protecting racial, partisan, and incumbent interests. This represented no change 
from previous de facto state policy. As Republican Congressman James T. Broyhill commented: 
"One only has to look at the outline of the North Carolina congressional districts to know that 
149"Howard Lee Running Short On His Campaign Funding," RN, March 3 1 ,  1972; Baran S. Rosen, "Rep. 
Fountain Is Running Hard," RN, April 9, 1972; Wicker, "Lee vs. Fountain in Second District," RN, April 19, 1972; 
"Rep. Fountain weathers toughest challenge," RT, May 8, 1972; "Fountain Victorious," RN, May 8, 1 972; Daniel C. 
Hoover, "Lee Hints Sanford . .  Support," RN, .May . 11,. 1972 . (first quotation); "Under the Dome -- Lee slates 
announcement of entry into No. 2 contest," RN, Mar. 2, 1 976 (second quotation). In 1976, a black former World 
Bank official, Elbert G.  Rudasill , joined two other challengers to Fountain and received only 9% of the vote in a 
minor campaign. Fountain's chief opponent, six-term state legislator J. Russell Kirby, nearly managed to force the 
incumbent into a runoff. Martin Donsky, "Fountain Faces Unusual Competition," RN, July 22, 1976. 
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compactness has not been a consideration in the past. " 150 During the 1 950s and 60s, the state's 
congressional districts were derided as "bacon strips" with "tortuous" boundaries. The Fourth District 
in 1 966 was contiguous only at a pinpoint. 151 
Unless the standards of redistricting, the population distribution, partisan control, or the number of 
seats in the body shift markedly from one decade to the next, redistricting begins with the status quo 
and generally ends close to it. It was a sign of how much was at stake in relatively small changes that 
it took six months to reach agreement on how to revise the state 's eleven districts. During the bitter 
protracted conflicts, a joint committee collapsed, a "super subcommittee" came to nothing, an 
agreement on a plan by five Democratic congressmen was ignored, committees of both houses stalled 
and reversed themselves, a committee-endorsed proposal was shelved on the floor, the majority party 
lost control of the process, and the final plan was then vetoed by the Department of Justice. 152 
B asically, the controversy involved three districts: In the Second, L.H. Fountain's friends sought to 
protect him against adding activist blacks and some liberal whites in Durham to his rural district, and 
even sought to reduce the black percentage in order to diminish any potential challenge from someone 
whose political views resided in the ample space to Fountain 's left. In the Sixth, Richardson Preyer's 
allies wanted to overturn his 1 980 upset by Republican Eugene Johnston and return the state' s  most 
l iberal congressman to Washington. But since increasing the proportion of Democrats in Preyer's 
district would inevitably reduce that in the Fifth, where Stephen L. Neal never had an easy contest, 
Neal 's  backers attempted to forge an alliance with Republicans to bolster the Democratic m ajority in 
his district by shifting Republican areas into the Sixth and Democratic counties into the Fifth. The 
desperate Preyer ended up trying to arrange a tacit agreement with Fountain, the state's most 
conservative Democrat. 153 
The principal controversy in 1 9 8 1  was over whether to move Durham county into Fountain's 
Second District or to move Orange out of it and join Durham , Orange, and Wake counties into a new 
1�royhill to Helen R. Marvin and J.P. Huskins, Feb. 20, 198 1 ,  in files of the Joint Redistricting Committee 
(hereinafter referred LO as "JCR files"). The committee's files contain a copy of a 1981 congressional bill that sought 
to mandate that districts be "compact in form." It is instructive to note that the bill, which did not pass and which 
the North Carolina took no recorded action on, states in paragraph (h) that "Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to supersede any provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965." 
151Douglas Milton Orr, Jr., Congressional Redistricting: The North Carolina Experience (Chapel Hill, N.C.: 
Department of Geography, Univ. of North Carolina, 1970), 55, 63-64, 69-70. 
1 52For a barebones overview of the process, see Terrence D. Sullivan to Alex K. Brock, "Legislative process 
resulting in enactment of congressional redistricting act," Sept. 1 1 , 198 1 ,  in JCR files. Newspaper stories, to be cited 
individually at appropriate points, flesh out the skeleton. 
153A.L. May, "Most redistricting plans seen as hurting Fountain," RN, May 16, 198 1 ;  "Under the Dome: 
Redistricting forcing strange alliances," RN, May 3 1 ,  198 1 .  
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"Research Triangle" district. 154 Nearly every time Durham 's name came up during newspaper 
discussions of redistricting, which was in nearly every story for several months, the papers ' writers 
reminded readers, who naturally included congressmen and state legislators, that (to take a typical 
example) "The likely political impact would be to assure Fountain of tough Democratic primary 
opposition from Durham Democrats, including black candidates. " 155 
The first preference of black leaders who testified in hearings, as well as two of the three black 
legislators who served on the large committee, Daniel T. Blue, Jr.(D-Wake), Kenneth Spaulding 
(D-Durham), and Henry E. Frye (D-Forsyth) seems to have been to keep Orange county in the Second 
District and add Durham. 156 When Willie C. Lovett and Lavonia Allison of Durham testified in 
favor of such an arrangement, Raleigh News and Observer capital correspondent A.L. May noted that 
"While Lovett and Ms. Allison didn't mention it, black leaders have said that a new district with 
Durham and l iberal-voting Orange might give blacks a good chance to elect a black 
congressman." IS7 Spaulding drew up a map with both Durham and Orange, but not Fountain's  home 
county, Edgecombe, in the Second District. 158 
Many white legislators and congressmen agreed with the move to add Durham to the Second 
District because of the ripple effects elsewhere. In fact, four of the first five major plans that the Joint 
Committee on Redistricting considered placed Durham in Fountain' s  bailiwick. Putting Durham in the 
Second would necessitate shifting rural territory to Walter Jones 's  First District, a prospect that he 
liked, and it would probably pull the Sixth District east or south, enabling Stephen Neal 's Fifth 
District to pick up Democratic areas, especially Rockingham county, from the Sixth. Early attention 
thus centered on a plan by Neal ally Rep. Ted Kaplan (D-Forsyth) , which gained the endorsement of 
Jones and Neal and picked up three more southeastern congressmen, Bill Hefner, Charles Rose, and 
Charles Whitley, by changing their districts as little as possible. "From the outset," noted the News 
154 Although there was no legal necessity to keep counties intact in drawing congressional districts, the state had 
done so by convention before 198 1 .  
155A.L. May, " 5  officials back plan on districts," RN, May 1 4 ,  1 98 1 .  
156Henry E .  Frye (D-Forsyth) presented a map that put Durham into the Second District, but deleted Orange. 
Frye appears to have been more concerned with making the Sixth District, where he lived, winnable by a liberal 
Democrat than with the exact composition of the Second District. Senate Congressional Redistricting Committee 
Minutes, June 1 ,  198 1 ;  "Under the Dome: Redistricting forcing strange alliances," RN, May 3 1 ,  1 98 1 .  For Blue's 
preference, see Steve Tomkins, "Triangle district appears certain," RT, July 2, 198 1 .  
157A.L. May, "Wake, Durham voting split urged," RN, April 1 7, 198 1 .  
1 58JCR files, May 15,  198 1 .  
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and Observer's capital insider column, "Kaplan's  purpose was to protect the interest of his 
congressman, Stephen L. Neal, a Winston-Salem Democrat." To break the momentum of the Kaplan 
Plan, which reportedly had solid commitments from majorities of both the Senators and the House 
members on the Joint Committee, Sen. Dallas L. Alford, Jr. (D-Nash) proposed to join Durham, 
Orange, and Wake in a Research Triangle district and to stretch Fountain's  Second halfway across the 
top of the state from Caswell county in the middle to Dare county on the coast. Kenneth Spaulding 
protested that this violated one of the subcommittee's criteria, compactness. As A.L. May noted, 
"Alford is one of several lawmakers from Fountain's district who is trying to protect the 
congressman's  interests. The major fight is over whether to put Durham in the Second and probably 
placing strong Democratic primary opponents, including black candidates, against the conservative 
Fountain. " 1 59 
As the Joint Committee on Redistricting and its various subcommittees sputtered, Fountain's staff 
drew up a proposal to abandon the state's  long tradition of not splitting counties, and Preyer and his 
allies joined in the effort. When the Co-chair of the Joint Committee, Sen. Helen Marvin (D-Gaston) 
submitted a plan liberalizing the Sixth District by adding Orange to it, thereby increasing Preyer' s  
chances to regain the seat, even the Republicans, who controlled 2 0  percent of the seats in the 
legislature, began considering alliances with the different Democratic factions . 160 With Kaplan's 
plan drawing support from Republicans and from Democrats outside the Second and Sixth Districts, 
House Speaker Pro-Tern Allen C. Barbee (D-Nash), a Fountain supporter, took advantage of the illness 
of the committee chairman to adjourn a May 28 meeting before Kaplan's plan could be voted on, 
thereby so angering the Senate members that they completely abandoned the Joint Committee, leaving 
each house to draw its own plan. 161 
When the Senate committee five days later approved the Kaplan plan over the objection of 
Fountain ally Alford, the Raleigh Times explained that "Fountain's supporters in the House want 
counties split so the Second can avoid being lumped in with Durham 's large black population. 
Legislators from the area have said privately that they're afraid a black candidate could defeat 
159walter Jones, Charles 0. Whitley, Stephen L. Neal, Charles Rose, and W.G.  Hefner to Sen. Helen Marvin and 
Rep. J.P. Huskins, May 1 3 ,  1 98 1 ,  in JCR files; A.L. May, "5 officials back plan on districts," RN, May 14,  1 98 1 ;  
May, "Most redistricting plans seen as hurting Fountain," RN, May 16, 1981 ; May, "Panel tosses out 2nd District 
plan," RN, May 19 ,  198 1 ;  "Under the Dome: Redistricting forcing strange all iances," RN, May 3 1 ,  198 1 .  
160A.L. May, "Backers of Fountain want districting tradition ended," RN, May 20, 1 98 1 ;  "Dividing counties may 
break deadlock over redistricting," RT, May 2 1 ,  1 98 1 ;  William M. Welch, "Dealing: GOP lurking in shadows of 
redistricting fight," RN, May 25, 1 98 1 ;  Paul T. O'Connor, "Plan would put townships in 2nd District," RT, May 27, 
1 98 1 ;  A.L. May, "Proposed plan on redistricting splits counties," May 27, 198 1 ,  RN; "Under the Dome: Redistricting 
forcing strange alliances,".RN, May 31 , 1 981.; Richardson Preyer to Sen; Helen Marvin, May 29, 1 98 1 ,  in JCR files. 
161"Congressional redistricting decision derailed," RT, May 28, 198 1 ;  A.L. May, "Redistricting panel split by 
walkout," RN, May 29, 1 98 1 ;  "Committee OKs plan to split Wake, Durham," RT, June 2, 1 98 1 .  
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Fountain in the Democratic primary. They say that would lead to defeat in the general election, 
however. " 162 On the Senate floor, Majority Leader Kenneth C. Royall, Jr. (D-Durham), another 
Fountain friend, blocked acceptance of the committee proposal. "Not only would urban Durham 
disturb the rural nature of the Second District," A.L. May remarked in the News and Observer, "but 
the Fountain supporters are worried the county would present Fountain with serious Democratic 
primary opponents, including strong black candidates." As the newspaper stories, based on interviews 
with often unidentified legislators, make clear, race, partisanship, incumbent protection, and preserving 
a rural community of interest inspired Royall and Barbee to propose a plan removing Orange from the 
Second District, keeping Durham out, and moving more Republican voters into the Sixth District to 
attract Republican legislators and followers of Fifth District Congressman Neal. 163 Explicitly noting 
that their scheme reduced the black population proportion in the Second to 37%, Royall contended that 
such a change was not large enough to count as retrogressive. 164 A directly parallel process took 
place in the House: After a long deadlock and a rejection of several split-county plans, the 
Redistricting Committee voted out a plan that put Durham into the Second District and buttressed 
Democratic support in the Sixth District, only to be overcome on the floor by a coalition of supporters 
of Democratic Congressmen Fountain, Neal, and Hefner and all the Republicans. The final proposal 
was similar enough to that of the Senate that slight compromises in a conference committee brought 
the six-month struggle to what legislators hoped was an end. 165 
162"Committee OKs plan to split Wake, Durham," RT, June 2, 198 1 .  Apparently torn between his desires to have 
the Sixth District  tailored to Preyer's interest and to make it more likely that a candidate favorable to blacks would 
be elected in the Second, Sen. Henry Frye abstained on the roll call. A.L. May, "Proposal to shift Durham to 
Fountain's area advances," RN, June 2, 198 1 .  
163May, "Fountain backers stall redistricting plan," RN, June 4, 198 1 ;  May, "Consensus grows for Triangle 
district," RN, June 5, 198 1 ;  untitled story, RT, June 5, 198 1 .  
164A.L. May, "Senator says plan violates guidelines," RN, June 6, 1 98 1 .  
165A.L. May, "House is key to redistricting compromise," RN, June 7 ,  198 1 ;  untitled story, RT, June 10, 198 1 ;  
May, "Panel abandons county-splitting boundary plan," RN, June 12, 198 1 ;  JCR Files, House Subcommittee on 
Congressional Redistricting Minutes, June 15, 1 7, 198 1 ;  May, "Proposal would split 5 counties," RN, June 16, 198 1 ;  
"House panel rejects split-county district proposal," RT, June 1 7 ,  198 1 ;  May, "House panel rejects county-splitting 
redistricting plan," RN, June 1 8, 198 1 ;  May, "Splintered counties, Triangle district in new plan," RN, June 19, 198 1 ;  
"Redistricting plan rejected i n  House unit," RT, June 23, 1 98 1 ;  May, "Panel rejects proposal to split counties," RN, 
June 24, 198 1 ;  May, "After redistricting drafts, pressured panel backs plan," RN, June 26, 198 1 ;  "Congressional 
district proposal voted dow11," .RT, June.26, 198 1 ;  May, '�Four plans ordered in search for district realignment," RN, 
June 27 , 1981 ; "Panel OKs plan to cut Durham from 4th," RT, June 30, 198 1 ;  May, "House panel breaks redistricting 
deadlock," RN, July 1 ,  1 98 1 ;  Steve Tomkins, "Triangle district appears certain," RT, July 2, 1 98 1 ;  May, "Redistricting 
plan OK'd by House keeps Durham out of 2nd District,'.' RN, July 2, 1981 ;  untitled article, RT, July 3, 198 1 ;  
"Conferees O K  Triangle district," RT, July 8 ,  198 1 .  
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Since the Second District favored by Fountain 's  defenders curved around Durham and picked up 
Alamance and Chatham counties, it became known as the "fishhook" district. Rotated ninety degrees, 
the Second bore a striking resemblance to the original 1 8 1 2  Massachusetts district that made Elbridge 
Gerry 's name notorious, as the News and Observer pointed out in an editorial criticizing the district as 
"clearly not compact. It shows that in drawing districts for a specific political purpose, 20th century 
North Carolina legislators are not much different from their counterparts in 1 9th century 
Massachusetts." "The Legislature," the paper noted in another editorial a few days later, "has given 
the state districts that are hooked, humped, and generally ungainly -- in a word, gerrymandered -- to 
protect incumbents."166 But the solons, including most especially the Republicans, rejected calls 
from House members Patricia S. Hunt (D-Orange) and Daniel T. Blue to create more compact districts 
that crossed county lines, and they voted down Hunt's  plan to do so in a manner that would assist 
Richardson Preyer in regaining his congressional seat. As finally passed, the bill was a bipartisan 
gerrymander which, the News and Observer noted, "helped [Eugene] Johnston, a conservative 
Republican, and Fountain, an old-time conservative Democrat who frequently votes contrary to the 
Democratic m ajority in the House. " 167 In a report on redistricting in 32 states, Common Cause 
named the North Carolina Second District as one Of the two "infamous gerrymanders" of the year. 168 
16611 1 8 1 2  critter resurfaces," RN, June 6, 198 1 ;  "Political protectionism," RN, June I O, 1 98 1 .  
167 A.L. May, "Splintered counties,. Triangle district .in .new plan," RN; June 19, 198 1 :  "Redistricting plan rejected 
in House unit," RT, June 23, 198 1 ;  "Political protectionism," RN, July 10, 1 98 1 .  
168"Under the dome: Group cites 2nd District gerrymandering," RN, Sept 1 5 , 198 1 .  
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5. REMOVING THE FISHHOOK 
The NAACP-LDF sued the state and lobbied the Department of Justice. In the name of Ralph 
Gingles, LDF local counsel Leslie Winner charged the legislature with adopting a congressional plan 
that had both the purpose and the effect of diluting black political strength. In addition, the suit 
challenged the degree of population inequality in both the congressional and legislative plans and the 
continued use of multimember districts on the state level. Asked why the body had allowed 
population variations of up to 24% between the largest and smallest districts in the General Assembly, 
Daniel T. Liley (D-Lenoir), co-chair of the House Legislative Redistricting Committee, replied that 
" We were simply hoping nobody would challenge it. "169 
In  December, 1 98 1 ,  before the suit could be heard by a three-judge panel, the U.S. Department of 
Justice rejected the congressional plan. In his Section 5 letter to Alex K. Brock, Director of the State 
Board of Elections, Asst. Attorney General for Civil Rights William Bradford Reynolds declared that 
the Justice Department "received allegations that the decision to exclude Durham County from 
Congressional District No. 2 had the effect of minimizing minority voting strength and was motivated 
by racial considerations -- i .e. ,  the desire to preclude from that district the voting influence of the 
politically-active black community in Durham." Reynolds found "particularly troublesome the 
strangely irregular shape" of the Second District and was also disturbed by the pattern of decreasing 
black population in the Second District, from 43% in 1 970 to 40.2% after the 1 97 1  reapportionment to 
36.7% in the plan submitted -- this despite a rise in the black population percentage over that period in 
the state as a whole. 170 
Editorially chiding the legislature for its long record of racial discrimination in redistricting, the 
Raleigh Times remarked: 
From here on, legislators will be prudent to include, among their standards for 
drawing districts, not only fair population representation but a fair chance for racial 
representation. That change is overdue. Until now, districting plans ' impact on 
minority political clout and vice versa has been a behind the scenes concern of the 
powerful people who draft the plans -- but rarely an on-the-record one. 
For example, legislative protectors of 2nd District Congressman L.H. Fountain 
said privately they backed a 'fishhook ' district (now thrown out) because they feared a 
169 "Information on N .C. redistricting asked," RN, Sept. 9, 1 98 1 ;  A.L. May, "Suit seeks Lo invalidate districting 
plan," RN, Sept. 1 7 , 1 98 1 ;  May, "Legislators deny charges in district suit," RN, Sept. 18, 198 1 ;  May, "Legislature 
may need Lo redraw districts," RN, Oct. 9, 1 98 1 ;  May, "Legislative leaders OK new session on districts," RN, Oct. 
1 0, 1 98 1 .  
17°Reynolds Lo Alex .K. Brock, Dec. 7, 198 1 .  _ .The letter was reported in-full in Paul T. O'Connor, "Justice nixes 
N.C. Senate, Congress map," RT, Dec. 8, 1 981 . For comments, see editorial, "LegislalOrs on Lhe hook," RN, Dec. 
10, 1 98 1 .  A week earlier, the Department had ruled LhaL the 1968 amendment Lo the stale constitution requiring that 
whole counties be used in state legislative districts was il legal under the Voting Rights Act. A.L. May, "Ruling due 
on N .C. redistricting plans," RN, Dec. 8, 1 98 1 .  
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more compact one including heavily black Durham County would boost black 
candidates ' chances. In public, they merely said they wanted to keep the 2nd District 
rural. 11 1  
Rejecting calls to sue the Justice Department to overturn its denial of preclearance, the legislature 
decided to redraw its plans. The all-but-fonnally declared black candidate Mickey Michaux, according 
to the Raleigh Times, "has drawn a map that puts Durham and Orange into the 2nd District. It's a 
district he believes he 'd win." Black leaders in Durham constructed three other, similar maps, which 
were introduced, along with Michaux 's, by Rep. Kenneth Spaulding. 172 But the legislature rejected 
these efforts of Spaulding's,  as well as his repeated attempts to require single member districts in 
urban areas that contained large black populations. Spaulding correctly predicted that the federal 
courts would reject the legislature's  refusal to remedy the discrimination completely.173 
Although it did not go as far as black leaders wanted -- it did not keep Orange county in the 
Second District or eliminate Edgecombe county -- the legislature did add Durham county and 
eliminate the ungainly projection through Alamance and Chatham counties. As House Redistricting 
Committee Co-chair J.P. Huskins put it, "We have taken the hook off the fishhook." 174 But the 
struggle was not easy. As News and Observer reporter Daniel C. Hoover noted, 
white, conservative eastern legislators fought tenaciously to preserve the traditional 2nd 
district . . .  
Unspoken publicly by some of the legislators were these fears: 
-- That when Fountain retires, a black Democrat will be nominated, triggering a 
white backlash that will deliver the 2nd to the Republicans and form the nucleus for 
gradual erosion of the Democratic power base there. 
-- That Durham 's black political activists will fan out over the district and begin 
registering heretofore apathetic rural blacks, kindle their political awareness and upset 
the district's grassroots sociopolitical balance." 175 
171"DisLrict change coming," RT, Dec. 14 ,  1 98 1 .  
172Paul T. O'Connor, "Politicians don' t  know where to run," RT, Dec. 28, 1 98 1 ;  A.L. May, "2nd, 4th dislricts 
to undergo change in congressional redistricting plan," RN, Feb. 4 ,  1 982. 
173"State lawmakers expect approval of redisLricting plan," RT, Feb. 6, 1 982. 
174Editorial, "Last chance. for. legislators,'.'. RN, Feb. 9, 1982; Daniel C. Hoover, "Pleas fail Lo keep Durham from 
2nd," RN, Feb. 1 1 , 1982. 
175Hoover, "Dislricting woes may have cost Democrats chance to oust GOP," RN, Feb. 14 ,  1 982. 
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In other words, even if it were unsuccessful, a black campaign for Congress might result in the 
overthrow of the racial and political status quo. The stakes in the redistricting decision could hardly 
have been higher. 
Why, then, did the legislature, which after all numbered only four blacks elected through 
single-shot voting and apparent private agreements on slates, 176 and 34 Republicans among its 1 70 
members, take the action it did? Pressed explicitly by the Justice Department either to justify its 
decision to exclude Durham or modify its plan, legislators had no choice, since they knew that a 
working majority of them had intended to keep Fountain safe from a challenge and since they had so 
often been reminded of the racial effect of their plan for the Second District. Since changes could be 
made to Fountain's district without affecting other incumbents ' chances significantly, it was easier and 
less potentially disruptive to comply than to fight. Some were also angry at the tactics of Fountain's 
confederates. As Joint Redistricting Committee Co-chair Helen Marvin put it ,  "Time after time it was 
Congressman Fountain who was trying to dictate to us." 177 
Although the Department of Justice precleared the new plan, which met the criticisms of the 
fishhook scheme that were specifically raised in Reynolds's  objection letter, the LDF did not imme­
diately move to dismiss the congressional portions of the Gingles suit. "It 's  a lot better," commented 
Leslie Winner, "but it 's not good enough." The plan, she said in papers filed with the federal court, 
perpetuates "the effects of past discrimination against black citizens. " 178 Only reluctantly did the 
LDF two months later drop its challenge to the Second District, contending that although "the districts 
as apportioned do not allow the black citizens of North Carolina to select representatives of their 
choosing," the plan "does not appear to violate the United States Constitution or the Voting Rights Act 
as currently construed. " 1 79 
176Referring unmistakably to Rep. Daniel T. Blue's election to the House in 1 980, the RT remarked that "Wake 
and other big multi-seat counties have elected black legislators partly via swapped-support agreements among white 
and black candidates." Editorial , "District change coming," Dec. 14,  1 98 1 .  
177May, "Legislative panels back plan Lo shift Durham to 2nd," RN, Feb. 1 9 , 1 982. 
178Daniel C. Hoover, "Legislature enacts new redistricting plan, adjourns," RN, Feb. 1 2, 1982; "Congressional 
disuict plan gets Justice Department OK," RT, Mar. 1 2, 1 982; Hoover, "Congressional districting plan OK'd," RN, 
March 12, 1 982; "Fight renewed against redistricting plan," RN, Mar. 1 8, 1 982. 
179"Motion for Partial Voluntary Dismissal," Gingles v. Edmisten, April 2 1 ,  1982. The principal Section 5 
precedent at the time, Beer v. U.S. , 425 U.S. 1 30 (1976) would have .denied relief unless there was demonstrable 
"retrogression" in potential black political tnfluence, and the legislature had carefully designed the Second District 
to have the exact same percentage of blacks, to a tenth of a percentage point, in its population in 1 982 as in 197 1 .  
The 1 980 Bolden plurality opinion, under strenuous attack in 1 982, but not formally modified as of April,  required 
plaintiffs in Voting Rights Act or constitutional challenges to prove that the statute in question had been adopted with 
a racially discriminatory motive and, more important, seemed to adopt an incoherent approach to evaluating evidence 
of such intent. See Kousser, "How to Detennine Intent," supra, n. XXX, at 699-703. The renewed Voting Rights 
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6. MICHAUX, VALENTINE, AND THE "BLOC VOTE" 
Asked for comment about the Justice Department's rejection of the "fishhook" plan in December, 
L.H. Fountain's spokesman Ted Daniel denied that the Congressman had exercised much influence on 
the legislative decision. "The congressman said repeatedly that he would have been happy with any 
district -- including Durham or not. " 180 For a month and a half after the legislature turned down his 
desperate followers ' final move to suspend the new plan for thirty days and ask the Department of 
Justice to reconsider the old one again, Fountain continued to go through the motions of running. Six 
days after the formal announcement of what promised to be a vigorous and well-funded campaign by 
Mickey Michaux and the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People, however, the 1 5-term 
congressman announced his retirement. An unidentified colleague of Fountain's summed up his 
reasons: "He sort of felt he was let down by (the Legislature) putting Durham County in his district, 
which he had a lot of apprehension about." 1 8 1  
After a brief shakeout of prospective candidates, the contest settled down to a two-white-man race 
to determine who would face Michaux in the runoff, which, as one candidate put it, "has been the 
name of the game since day one." Former state House Speaker James E. Ramsey positioned himself 
in the middle, between the liberal Michaux and Tim Valentine, who had been a state legislator in the 
1 950s and state chairman of the Democratic party in the 1 960s and who sought and won most of the 
_ 
Fountain supporters. Neither Ramsey nor Valentine raised race as an issue in the first primary. 1 82 
Act with its anti-Bolden amendment to Section 2 was signed into law only on June 29, and the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.  613 ,  which sidestepped Bolden, was issued on J uly 1. In April, 1982, 
however, the statutory and judicial precedents were considerably less promising. · Therefore, dropping the 
congressional redistricting from the first Gingles case is no sign either that the LDF approved the 1981 districts or 
that they believed them in accord with the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution. Rather, their decision was a 
matter of legal strategy that might well have been different if it had been taken 75 days later. 
•l!Opaul T. O'Connor, "Justice nixes N.C. Senate, Congress map," RT, Dec. 8, 1 98 1 .  
181 "Legislature approves congressional remap," RT, Feb. 1 1 ,  1 982; "Under the dome - - Fountain may face two 
primary foes," RN, Feb. 20, 1982; "Under the dome -- Michaux expected Lo reveal candidacy," RN, March 15,  1982; 
"Under the dome -- Labor aids Michaux in quest for funds," RN, March 1 8, 1982; A.L. May, "Michaux lo announce 
plans today to challenge Fountain in primary," RN, March 22, 1 982; A.L. May and Rob Christensen, "Fountain says 
he won't  seek re-election," RN, March 28, 1 982. 
1 82A.L. May and Rob Christensen, "Fountain says he won' t  seek re-election," RN, Mar. 28, 1982 suggested in 
their story on Fountain's retirement that Michaux would finish first in the primary, but would be forced into a runoff. 
See similarly May, "Candidates seek runoff, second shot al Michaux," RN, June 27, 1 982; William M. Welch, 
"Turnout may decide 2nd District runoff," RN, July 19,  1982. 
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Michaux, who said from the beginning that he "hoped race would not be an issue," acted as 
though he knew better, deciding not to use billboards with his picture on them and putting most of his 
early effort into a drive to register black voters. With blacks running for local offices in every county 
in the Second District, the percentage of the registered voters who were black rose from 27 .6% to 
30%. 1 83 The son of an affluent businessman from a well-known Durham family, Michaux had run 
for the legislature three times in "liberal" Durham county from 1964 to 1 968 before finally winning a 
seat in 1 972. After three tenns in the legislature, he was rewarded for his early support for Jimmy 
Carter for President with appointment as U.S. Attorney. Raising more money from labor unions than 
any other congressional candidate in the state and eventually loaning his own campaign $69,000, 
Michaux had a sizable staff, as well as assistance in preparing speeches from such notables as Duke 
political scientist James David Barber. 184 Highly visible and personable, experienced in campaigning 
among and cooperating with whites, Michaux was as promising a candidate as black North Carolina 
could produce. To the vast majority of whites in the Second District, however, only one of his 
characteristics -- his race -- made any di fference. Turnout in the first primary was high and voting 
was racially polarized. Although noting that Michaux 's campaign had been geared not only to register 
more blacks, but to "appeal to while liberals and moderates," A.L. May of the News and Observer 
suggested that the candidate received "a share of the white vote" only in Durham. 185 Statistical 
analysis by Prof. Richard Engstrom substantiates contemporary newspaper accounts. According to 
Engstrom, Michaux received 88.6% of the black vote, but only 1 3 .9% of the white vote in the first 
primary. 1 86 As became well known all across the country during Jesse Jackson 's presidential 
campaign in 1 984, Michaux finished first with 44. 1 % of the vote, to 32.9% for Valentine and 23% for 
Ramsey. Overall Democratic turnout in the Second District was 53%, quite high for a primary. 187 
There was only one issue in the runoff. "The veteran politicos tell it simply," A.L. May reported. 
"Get a black candidate against a white in a runoff primary in rural Eastern North Carolina, and the 
183A.L. May, "Michaux to announce plans today to challenge FounLain in primary," RN, March 22, 1 982; May, 
"Democrats gird for dogfight in new 2nd district," RN, May 23, 1982; RN, untitled article based on report of the Joint 
Center for Political Studies, Nov. 26, 1 983. 
184"Michaux tends LO keep race out of campaign ," RN, June 27 , 1982; Daniel C. Hoover, "Michaux reports strong 
financing by labor committees," RN, July 16, 1982; Hoover, "Valentine trails Michaux in funds," RN, July 17,  1982; 
"PACs pumped $ 1 .8 million into North Carolina races,"  RT, Feb. 14, 1983. 
185May, "Michaux, Valentine runoff appears likely," RN, June 30, 1982. 
186Defendant-Intervenor's Exhibit 13, Table 1 ,  Shaw v. Hunt. 
187 A.L. May, "Michaux says chances in runoff 'about even,"' RN, July 1 ,  1982. 
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white will win every time." A dozen Democratic leaders whom he interviewed told May that "the July 
27 runoff will boil down to racial bloc voting throughout the district." "I 'm afraid it 's  going to be 
straight down racial lines," May was told by a Wilson county Democratic leader who, May said, 
"asked not to be identified." 188 But the conservative Valentine, who had pledged on the evening of 
his first primary victory not to make race an issue in the runoff, left nothing to chance. Using the 
code words " bloc vote," a phrase made famous throughout the South by Georgia's Hennan Talmadge 
in his 1 948 gubernatorial campaign, Valentine sent a letter to white voters, over his own signature, that 
warned: " If you and your friends don 't  vote on July 27, my opponent's bloc vote will decide the 
election for you."  Another target-mailed letter, employing another code word, coyly noted that "My 
opponent will again be busing his supporters to the polling places." Whites got the message. As one 
said, leaving the polls, "There wasn't  but one choice, Valentine, because he is white. " 1 89 
With turnout at 57%, even higher than in the first primary, V alentine won by a 53.8%-46.2% 
margin, the voting "strongly following racial lines," according to the News and Observer. Prof. 
Engstrom ' s  statistical analysis confinns newspaper impressions of "widespread bloc voting," as he 
estimates that 9 1 .5% of the blacks, but only 1 3. 1 %  of the whites voted for Michaux.190 Angered by 
his opponent 's  resort to a racial appeal, Michaux grudgingly endorsed him a month after the runoff, 
remarking that Valentine 's  "only single qualification is that he 's a Democrat." Even less conciliatory, 
the Durham Committee on the Affairs of Black People urged its supporters to write Michaux 's name 
in on the November ballot, rather than voting for the Democratic nominee. Michaux received 14 .6% 
of the votes . 191 
188A.L. May, "Racial support expected Lo decide 2nd District runoff," RN, July 1 1 , 1 982. 
1 89Ferrel Guillory, "North Carolina still nol color-blind -- 2nd District candidates run as symbols," RN, July 23, 
1 982; A.L. May, "Turnout widely considered deciding factor in race," RN, July 25, 1982; May, "Valentine wins in 
2nd District," RN, July 28, 1 982; "More blacks move into city jobs," RT, Feb. 20, 1 984. 
190A.L. May, "Valentine wins in 2nd District," RN, July 28, 1 982; editorial, "Race a key in runoff," RN, July 29, 
1 982; A.L. May, "Valentine seeks unity in party," RN, J uly 29, 1 982; Daniel C. Hoover, "Write-in vote suggests 
action in future races, Michaux says," RN, Nov. 4, 1 982; Defendant-Intervenors' Exhibit 1 3, Table 1 ,  Shaw v. Hunt. 
1 9 1 "Under the .dome .. ,: Michaux reluctant to back Valentine.�· RN, Aug. 1 1 ,  1 982; A.L. May, " Michaux backs 
Valentine because 'he's a Democrat,"' RN, Aug. 28, 1 982; "Michaux endorses V alentine," RT, Sept. 18 ,  1 982; 
"Michaux write-in votes urged by black caucus," RN, Oct. 5, 1982; Daniel C. Hoover, "Marin win would defy voting 
pattern," RN, Oct 3 1 ,  1 982; Hoover, "Write-in vole suggests action in future races, Michaux says," RN, Nov. 4,  
1 982. 
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7. POLARIZED ENCORE: VALENTINE BEATS ANOTHER BLACK CANDIDATE 
In the legislature in 1 973, Michaux had cosponsored a bill to eliminate runoff elections as costly 
for the state and unfair to blacks. The bill failed. In the wake of Michaux 's loss in 1 982, Rep. 
Kenneth Spaulding, another young black lawyer from a prominent Durham family, renewed the effort 
in a way that was typical of his more moderate and conciliatory stance. Instead of trying to abolish 
the runoff completely, which he favored, but was sure wouldn 't have a chance of passing, Spaulding 
proposed to require a candidate to obtain only 40%, instead of 50%, to become the nominee for a 
statewide or federal office. When a subcommittee killed this bill, he modified it again and again, 
requiring in one version that any first-place finisher who got less than 50% had to beat the 
second-place finisher by more than five percent to avoid a runoff, and then that the winner had to get 
41 % and beat his closest opponent by t'1ree percent. Both of these measures died, too . 192 It was 
symbolic of Spaulding 's fate. No matter how moderate he tried to become,  no matter that he was not 
as flamboyant as Michaux, no matter that he stressed "fiscal conservatism" in his legislative career and 
his 1 984 congressional campaign, to most whites in the Second District, he was merely another black 
candidate. 
When he opened his campaign against the freshman Valentine in November, 1 983, Spaulding 
made "a plea for biracial support. . . . Minorities side by side with non-minorities should lead this 
state in a meaningful, open manner. " By March, 1 984, he was still pushing "an appeal to whites to 
ignore color . . . .  I think the voters, black and white, have moved forward, beyond flesh tone. " 193 
But like Michaux, Spaulding knew that he could not expect to get many white votes, and that the keys 
to success lay in registering and turning out blacks. Less well known and less well financed than 
Michaux and facing an incumbent, instead of running for an open seat, Spaulding had one huge 
advantage that Michaux had not had: He was on the same ballot as Jesse Jackson. The first black 
candidate for President in American history with any chance to win a major party nomination, Jackson 
made a prodigious effort to register enough new black voters to carry the North Carolina primary, 
192A.L. May, "Racial support expected to decide 2nd District runoff, " RN, July 1 1 , 1 982; Sherry Johnson, 
"Legislation would restrict runoffs, pare vote share to win primaries," RN, Feb 10, 1 983; "Legislation would eliminate 
need for most runoff primary elections," RT, Feb. 10, 1 983; "Support solicited for elimination of second primaries," 
RT, Feb. 1 8, 1983; "Valentine opposes bill to reduce runoff races," RN, Feb. 22, 1983; "Valentine hits bill to cut 
primaries," RT, Feb. 22, 1 983; "Second primaries," RN, March 16, 1 983; "Bill on primary election law turned aside 
by House panel," RN,-March 1 8, 1983; ':Primaries," RN, March 25, 1983; "Primaries," RN, April 1, 1 983. 
193Ginny Carroll, "Spaulding launches bid for Valentine's House seat," RN, Nov. 30, 1 983; A.L. May, "Increase 
in black voters makes primary a tussle for Spaulding, Valentine," RN, March 19, 1 984. 
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especially emphasizing the Second District. 194 While Democrats in the slate were less enthusiastic 
than blacks in choosing between Jackson, Walter Mondale, and Gary Han. 
A markedly smaller proponion of blacks than whites registered to vole in both the First and 
Second Congressional Districts up through 1 982. Although the proportion of blacks in the population 
in the Second District in 1 972 was 40. 1 %, the African-American population was disproportionately 
young, so that the percentage of the voting age population that was black was only 34.2%. Whether 
because of the l ingering effects of past discrimination or apathy, the estimated proportion of blacks 
among registered Democrats was even lower - 30.5%. 195 Over the years, the proponion of blacks 
who were registered slowly increased and the proportion of whites who were Democrats slowly 
declined, but the largest jump before 1992 took place in 1984 ,  especially in the Second District. 
During Michaux's  campaign, only an estimated 32.9% of the Democrats in the Second District were 
black; during Spaulding 's,  40.6% .  
The major effon that went into registering 1 3,000 new black voters moved Spaulding only 1 .7% 
closer to Valentine than Michaux had been. With no third candidate in the contest, Valentine's  52. l  % 
to 47.9% victory was enough to guarantee his nomination and easy election in November. The first 
sentence of the News and Observer's election story emphasized racial bloc voting: "U.S. Rep. I.T. 
'Tim ' V alentine, in voting that generally followed racial lines, turned back a strong challenge from 
state Rep. Kenneth B.  Spaulding . . .  " Again, Engstrom 's statistical analysis confinns observers' 
reports. He estimates lhal Spaulding received 89.7% of the black vote and 1 4 . 1  % of the white, 
percentages that are nearly identical lo Michaux 's two years earlier. As a Raleigh business lobbyist, 
V .B .  "Hawk" Johnson, summed it up, "That's the story, there are still more whiles than blacks." 196 
194A.L. May, "Increase in black voters makes primary a tussle for Spaulding, Valentine," RN, Mar. 19, 1 984; 
Elizabeth Leland, "New black voters in 2nd District outnumber whiles nearly 2-LO- l ," RN, April 18, 1 984; Ginny 
Carroll, "Cobey outspends Democrat opponents 2-1 ," RN, April 2 1 ,  1984; Daniel C. Hoover, "Mix of racial support 
sought," RN, May 6, 1 984. 
195Allhough iL keeps some records of registration cross-classified by both race and party, the stale of North 
Carolina does not make lhem available for all counties. My estimates are based on lhe figures for 53 North Carolina 
counties in 1 993, supplied as part of lhe supplementation LO Thomas Hofeller's  deposition in Shaw v. Hum. In lhese 
counties, the proportion of black registrants who were Democrats was 94% .  Other, scattered mentions of the party 
affi liation of blacks in the newspapers are very similar. To arrive al lhe partisan percentages in the text, I simply 
mul liplied lhe total black registration in each district by 0.94 and divided lhe result by the number of Democrats. 
196Daniel C. Hoover,"Valentine holds off Spaulding in tight 2nd District race," RN, May 10, 1984; 
Defendant-Intervenor's Exhibit 1 3 ,  Table 1 ,  Shaw v. Hunt. In a much less heated contest for the Democratic 
nomination in the Fourlh Congressional District,. incumbent Ike-Andrews held off Howard Lee and John Winters, 
a minor black candidate, in lhe first primary. Lee raised only $8 195, compared Lo Andrews's $24,042, Spaulding's  
S72,585, and Valentine's S 1 88,781 . Ginny Carroll, "Cobey outspends Democrat opponents 2- 1 ," RN, April 21 ,  1984. 
Engstrom estimates thal Lee received 24.3% of the white vole in the nearly invisible contest My textual discussion 
reflects lhe focus of the media and the voters, as indicated by their increased registration and turnout, on the 
Spaulding-Valentine race. 
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With considerable foresight, News and Observer reporter Daniel C. Hoover predicted as soon as 
the 1984 primary results became known that "The latest victory could serve to deter future black 
opponents, leaving Valentine generally secure from serious primary challenges. " Announcing that he 
would not challenge Valentine in 1 986, Michaux echoed Hoover, saying that "many black voters have 
lost their enthusiasm for another primary challenge against Valentine after having worked hard in 
losing causes in 1982 and 1984. " 197 Valentine had no primary opponents from 1 986 through 1992. 
8. THE RECORD ON THE EVE OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT OF THE 1 9905 
If members of the North Carolina legislature in 1 99 1  had contemplated drawing districts that were 
essentially similar in their racial composition to those of the 1 980s, they could not have expected to 
prevail if an intent case were filed against them under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 198 The discriminatory racial and partisan concerns that so 
notoriously underlay the formation of the "Black Second;" the well-known history of other discrimi­
natory electoral devices such as the poll tax, the literacy test, at-large voting for the state legislature, 
and the anti -single shot law; the immediate historical context to the 1 981  redistricting; 199 the lines of 
the 1981 redistricting, particularly the fishhook, and the diminution of the black percentage in the 
Second District, which was noted both on the floor of the legislature and by the Justice Department in 
its Section 5 objection letter; the widely noted failure of black political candidates for Congress in the 
1 97Hoover, "Valentine holds off Spaulding in tight 2nd District race," RN, May 10, 1 984; "Under the dome -­
Valentine may skate through primary," RN, Dec. 27, 1 985. 
198ln his dissent in Shaw v. Hunt, supra, n. X, at 482, Judge Vorhees rejected the contention that blacks could 
have won a Section 2 effects case because, in his view, they could not prove the second part of the "first Gingles 
prong" -- that they were geographically compact enough to form a majority of a congressional district. Whatever 
the validity of Vorhees 's  informal eyeball standard of compactness, it is irrelevant to a hypothetical challenge on the 
basis of intent, which Vorhees conveniently ignored even though it was repeatedly and explicitly raised as a 
possibility in various papers that the defendant side submitted to his court. 
My analysis here is patterned on the nine "intent factors" that I identified in my testimony in the Garza case 
(discussed more fully in "How to Determine Intent," supra, n. xxx). The proof of intent in Garza involved much 
more than quick glances at maps, and, unlike whites in North Carolina, Latinos in Los Angeles were clearly injured. 
They had not been able to elect a Latino supervisor since 1 874. 
199Howard Lee's surprising showings in the 1 972 congressional- and 1 976 Lieutenant Governor's primaries 
suggested that a better funded black candidate might be a threat, especially if Durham were added to the Second 
District. In 1 98 1 ,  Michaux had all but declared for Congress when the legislature was considering redistricting. See 
" Michaux is likely candidate," RT, July 2 1 ,  1980; Beverly Shepard, "Michaux may run for public office," RN, July 
2 1 ,  1980. 
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state since 1 900;200 the universally understood pattern of racial bloc voting in election campaigns; 
the actions of the legislature on other racial issues, such as the continuation of at-large elections for 
the state legislature in 1 98 1 ,  in the face of charges of racial discrimination; and the deviation in 198 1  
from the traditional state policy o f  not splitting counties, which was not forced by population equality 
concerns, but by the desire to preserve L.H. Fountain from challenge by a candidate of the black 
community -- all these factors would have established an overwhelming case of racially discriminatory 
intent. North Carolina spent half of the 1 980s in an unsuccessful effort to stave off racial change in 
the state legislature.201 The almost certain prospect of losing another such case gave the State a 
clear and compelling interest in remedying past discrimination202 by drawing a district in which 
African-Americans would have a fair opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice.203 
�ntitled article, RN, Jan. 1 2, 1 972 quoted Congressman George White's farewell address in 1 90 1  as the last 
southern black (until 1 973) to serve in Congress. 
201See Thornburg v. Gingles, supra n .  XXX. 
202ln his dissent in Shaw v.  Hunt, supra, n.  X, at 488, Judge Vorhees asserts that Phillips and Britt found that 
"the State has failed to demonstrate any basis in evidence for a conclusion that such remedial action was necessary." 
What they in fact found was that the number of North Carolina legislators who acted purely from a motive of 
remedying past discrimination did not constitute a majority of both houses. Id., at 1 4 1 ,  finding 3 .  The majority 's  
rather casually drawn conclusion would perhaps have been more difficult for Judge Vorhees to misstate if  their 
opinion had discussed the evidence for that conclusion in more detail. This paper supplies that missing discussion. 
Moreover, since in any legislative body, most issues are decided by coalitions of legislators, the intentions of any 
large or important subgroups are hardly irrelevant to the final outcome of a bill. Thus, the motives of 
African-American and liberal white legislators, many of whom no doubt sincerely wished to redress past 
discrimination in redistricting, are quite pertinent to determining whether such redress constituted a compelling state 
interest. 
203The repeated efforts by highly qualified black candidates in the Second Congressional District served, in effect, 
as experiments about the conditions under which black candidates could be elected to Congress in North Carolina. 
Clayton' s  and Lee's campaigns against Fountain in 1 968 and 1 972 proved that blacks could not beat an entrenched 
incumbent; Michaux 's, .againsLValentine in 1982, that . they .. could not win an open seat; Spaulding's, in 1984, that 
they could not win with the aid of a massive registration effort, even if the candidate were running at the same time 
as a primary campaign by the first serious African-American candidate for President in history. After 1 984, it was 
clear that blacks needed more, probably considerably more than 40% of the population in a congressional district 
in North Carolina Lo be able to elect a candidate who was their first choice. 
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C. REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S: A PARTISAN CIRCUS 
1 .  A CHANGED CONTEXT 
Legally and politically, the context for redistricting in North Carolina in 199 1  differed a great deal 
from that of 198 1 .  Nationally, the 1 982 amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as 
elaborated in the Supreme Court's decision in Gingles, had been interpreted to mandate the drawing of 
majority-minority districts wherever possible, but the definition of "possible" was vague and 
unsettled.204 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Rogers v. Lodge and lower federal courts in such 
cases as the remand decision in Bolden205 and the mixed motive case of Garzd-06 had shown that it 
was possible to prove a racially discriminatory purpose to the satisfaction of many judges. Even 
before the 1 990 elections, then House Speaker Josephus L. Mavretic, D-Edgecom be, warned his col­
leagues of the likelihood of legal challenges to the upcoming redistricting, including suits under the 
Voting Rights Act, and indicated his desire to avoid them if possible.207 In part no doubt to 
circumvent such litigation, the House Redistricting Committee hired Leslie Winner, the Gingles 
lawyer, as its consultant. Along with her brother, State Senator Dennis Winner, D-Asheville, Chair of 
the Senate Redistricting Committee, Leslie Winner would be inside the tent this time.208 
Not only had the Gingles litigation cost the state money and pride, it had also added to the number 
of African-American and Republican legislators, as at-large systems in several counties gave way to 
single-member districts. In 1 98 1 ,  only 20% of the legislators were Republicans; whereas, in 199 1 ,  
3 1 %  were -- 1 4  o f  the 50 state senators and 39 of the 1 20 members of the House. While in 1 98 1 ,  
there had been only 4 blacks in the legislature, by 1 99 1 ,  there were 1 9, a full 1 1  % or half of their 
204Congressional Quarterly, CQ's Guide 10 1990 Congressional Redistricting, Part 2 (Washington, D .C. :  
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1 993), xi i i .  
205City of Mobile v. Bolden, 542 F.Supp. 1 050 (S.D. Ala. 1 982). 
206Garza v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, 756 F.Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1 990), aff'd 9 1 8  F.2d 763 
(9th Cir. 1 990) , cert. denied, 1 1 1  S .Ct. 68 1 ( 1 99 1 ). 
207"Under the Dome ---Mavretic maps '9.I. redistricting," RN, OcL. 14, 1 990, p. C l .  
208"Under the Dome - - Legislature's legal bills near $60,000," RN, Jan. 8 ,  1992, p .  B l ;  Yan Denton, "House, 
Senate district plans advance -- Panisan splits mark debates on proposals," RN, Jan. 14, 1 992, p. A l .  
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proportion in the state 's population -- larger, but much too small to dictate to anyone.209 It was true 
that blacks occupied important leadership positions in the legislature, as Dan Blue ascended to the 
Speakership in that year and Milton F. "Toby" Fitch became one of three co-chairs of the House 
Redistricting Committee. But with power went partisan responsibility,  as Blue, Fitch, and the others 
owed their positions to the support of a predominantly white party, with the good fortune of which 
their own fortunes were inextricably intertwined. Moreover, any aspirations that they had for higher 
office were subject to the will of an electorate that was three-quarters white. Their positions 
eliminated any possible use of the "balance of power" strategy that members of minority groups have 
often been urged to employ, particularly, in the recent past, in redistricting. As people who shared 
power in the Democratic party, they could not make deals with Republicans or use the threat of doing 
so to pressure white Democrats for more black seats.210 Thus, until the Justice Department's refusal 
to preclear their first plan, Speaker Blue and the other black legislators finnly supported a proposal to 
create only one black-majority congressional seat out of twelve. 
2. PARTISAN WARFARE 
From the beginning to the end of the 1 990s cycle of redistricting in North Carolina -- indeed, 
continuing in the Shaw v. Hunt suit -- the partisan strife was bitter and brutal. At one of the first 
meetings of the House Redistricting Committee, Republican members proposed a guideline that "would 
prohibit the drawing of new districts that would dilute the voting strength of political parties or that 
are designed to protect incumbent legislators" -- a rule so obviously impossible to achieve that its 
suggestion could only have been meant to embarrass the majority party.2 1 1  Every plan produced on 
the legislature ' s  computer instantaneously linked partisan registration data, as well as returns from 
three recent statewide elections, to population and racial percentages for each district, giving 
unmistakable cues to all participants and observers about the partisan and racial consequences of any 
plan or changes in it. Newspaper articles pointed out that the first Democratic proposal decreased 
Republican percentages in four districts, possibly endangering one or two Republican incumbents and 
209ln her majority opinion in the Croson case, supra n. XXX, at 723, J ustice O'Connor stressed that the majority 
of the Richmond City Council was African-American. 
210Van Demon, "Party loyalty,.black gains clash in redistricting," RN, Jan . 7, 1 992. 
21 1Yan Denton, "Parties squabble over redistricting -- Panel can 't agree on ground rules," RN, May 2, 1 99 1 ,  p. 
83. 
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strengthening Democrat David Price in the Fourth District.212 When the plan was made fully public, 
the News and Observer summarized the purposes of its authors as "to simultaneously equalize district 
populations, tum 1 1  districts into 1 2, protect incumbent Democrats, inflict maximum carnage on most 
incumbent Republicans and construct one district with a black majority."2 1 3  
Republicans retaliated by playing the race card in a manner different from the famous Jesse Helms 
"white hands" television commercial of 1 990.214 State House member David Balmer proposed a 
plan with two districts that, he contended, contained a majority of minori ties, not in an effort to 
convince his colleagues to adopt it, but in an attempt to get courts to intervene. As he said on the 
floor of the House when he offered i t, "We would hope that i f  it is possible to draw two congressional 
districts with high minority percentages that the federal courts would come in and encourage the North 
Carolina legislature to draw two minority congressional districts. This district simply shows that it can 
be done." Even before the legislature officially adopted a plan, the state 's four Republican 
congressmen sent a letter to Asst. Attorney General for Civil Rights John Dunne asking the 
Department to intervene in the process on the grounds that the legislature had not adopted the Balmer 
plan. A skeptical Mickey Michaux, now returned to the legislature, remarked "l ain 't  never known no 
Republican trying to help anybody black," while African-American State Senator Frank W. Ballance, 
Jr. , D-Warren, commented that "When people who have been kicking me all over town propose a 
plan, it raises questions. "215 
3 .  COMMUNITIES OF INTEREST AND POWER 
The rise in the number of Republicans in the legislature and the expectations of African-Americans 
that the amended Voting Rights Act and the increased power of black legislators would make black 
voices more audible than in 198 1  simplified and structured the redistricting process. No longer would 
intraparty strife such as that between L.H. Fountain and five more moderate Democratic congressmen 
determine the agenda and endlessly deadlock the legislature. Democrats could afford few defections, 
212Van Denton, "GOP, black congressional disuicts proposed -- Redistricting plan LO be presented to panels 
today," RN, May 29, 1 99 1 ,  p. B l .  
213Editorial, "A map to boggle minds," RN, June 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p. A l 2. 
214The notorious spot pictured the hands of a white male tearing up a letter rejecting him for a job for which he 
allegedly was qualified, but which he lost because the job had to be given to an anonymous and dehumanized 
"minority. "  
215Yan Denton, "Redistricting plan defended, derided," RN, May 30, 1 99 1 ,  p.B l ;  Denton, "GOP congressmen 
blast Democrats' redistricting plan," RN, June 14, 199 1 ,  p. B3; "Under the dome -- B lack legislators cool to district 
idea," RN, June 1 9, 1 99 1 , p. B l .  
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because the Republicans might take advantage of them to force through one of their own plans. Just as 
important, it was no longer possible to insist on preserving county, city, town, township, or even 
precinct boundaries, because the absolute population equality interpretation of Karcher v. Daggett 
required that all of these give way.216 This development gave more power to the technicians who 
had to fix up every plan in order to reduce population deviations to nearly zero, and it prevented 
people from adamantly refusing to transfer a well-recognized entity, a whole county, from one district 
to another. Taken together, these two developments removed the focus of redistricting from 
geography and local attachments and put i t  instead on partisan poli tics and social groups that 
transcended localities. In this sense, 1 99 1-92 was the first "modern" redistricting in the history of 
North Carolina. 
A process run by lawyers seeking to avoid legal missteps or obvious bias, the redistricting effort 
of 1 991 was comparatively short and predictable. There were public hearings at which everyone could 
speak and where perhaps the most notable calls were those from black citizens and representatives of 
the NAACP and ACLU for more seats for minorities, including one or two in Congress. Computers 
with efficient redistricting software were made available to all members, along with training on how to 
use them.217 Both Republicans and African-Americans were well represented on the redistricting 
committees and at the hearings. Plans were developed quickly and offered for public discussion. 
Within a few weeks of its public unveiling, "Congressional Base Plan #1 " or "CB 1 "  for short, had 
evolved into CB6 and been passed by both houses of the legislature, which rejected proposals by 
Republican Representatives David Balmer of Charlotte and Larry T. Justus of Hendersonville. 
Balmer's 6.2 plan, which contained one black majority district and another approximately equally 
divided between blacks and whites of voting age, with Lumbee Indians holding the balance of power, 
attracted the most attention of any of the non-Democratic plans. On the day the House took its final 
vote, Balmer introduced another plan, known as Balmer 8 . 1 ,  which did not rely on black-Indian 
cohesion for a majority, but the legislature never fully considered this proposal. CB6, passed as 
Chapter 601 of the 1 99 1  Session Laws, contained a single black majority district in the northeast rural 
and small-town section of the state, but stretching into the city of Durham.218 
The addition of a twelfth congressional seat and the announcement of the retirement of the 
77-year-old Walter Jones of the First District allowed CB6 to fulfill two goals without inconveniencing 
216Joint Senate and House Commiuces on Congressional Redistricting, "Redistricting Criteria For Congressional 
Seats," April 17 ,  1 99 1 ,  Plaintiff's Exhibit 14,  Shaw v. Hunt. 
217Gerry F. Cohen deposition, Nov. 1 2, 1 993, at 45-57, Shaw v. Hunt. 
218Yan Denton, "Congressional district plan advances in House," RN, June 26, 1 99 1 ,  p. B3;  Denton, "Remap takes 
odd twists - - redistricting aids blacks, incumbents," RN, June 27, 1 99 1 ;  Denton, "New congressional districts enacted 
-- Plan still faces legal hurdles," RN, July 9, 1 99 1 ,  p. B3; Denton, "ACLU asks government to reject stale 
redistricting," RN, Sept. 28, 1991 , p. B4. 
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any Democratic incumbents. Territory from the current First and Second Districts could be joined to 
create a district with a small majority of African-Americans, 5 1 .3%, in the voting age population. 
Legislative opinion reflected the widely-shared belief among voting rights lawyers that states and 
localities that could create majority-minority d istricts had the legal responsibility to do so, and that the 
indicator of such a district in the minds of judges was the presence of a voting-age population 
majority.219 The new district, which could be conceded to the Republicans and located in the 
Piedmont, could be made useful to the Democrats i f  it absorbed troublesome Republicans from 
m arginally Democratic districts in the area. The only district with a majority of registered Republicans 
in the state, the CB6 Twelfth was in fact a landslide Republican district, since Republican percentages 
typically ran 15-30% ahead of the pany 's registration in congressional contests. 
When the Depanment of Justice on December 1 8  rejected the state 's congressional plan and 
suggested the possibility of drawing a second majority-minority district in the southeast, seeming to 
hint at Balmer's Charlotte-to-Wilmington formulation that gutted the districts of Charles Rose and Bill 
Hefner, the Democrats ' first reaction was, as Speaker Blue put it, that "The entire thing is political."  
This was not reduced when Republican State Chairman R. Jack Hawke Jr. boasted that any new plan 
would give Republicans a majority of the congressional delegation.220 Within a week, five 
Democratic congressmen u rged Blue and the state to file a Section 5 case in Washington. But before 
the end of the year a Rose aide, John Merritt, was in Raleigh shopping a new plan that he hoped 
would avoid both court and a party debacle, particularly for his boss. Starting from the Republican 
"Balmer 8. 1 ," the scheme had been modified by a legislative staff member at the request of Rep. 
Thomas C. Hardaway, a black Democrat from Halifax county, to make it less favorable to the GOP. 
Hardaway brought what was now called "Optimum II-Zero" to Merritt's attention in Washington, and 
Merritt immediately took the concept to the nearby office of the National Committee for an Effective 
Congress,  a liberal political action group with a well-known competence in the technical aspects of 
redistricting and poli tics, where a complete map was drawn over a weekend with the help of people 
from the staffs of other Democratic congressmen. Merritt, who had good contacts in the legislature, 
then took 30 copies of the plan to Raleigh, where he met with Leslie Winner and Gerry Cohen, as 
well as a number of legislators. He also talked in person and by phone with state and national leaders 
of the NAACP in an ultimately successful effort to interest them in the plan. On Jan. 8, ten days after 
219Cohen deposil.ion, al 75-77, Shaw v. Hunt. 
22l\lan Denton, "GOP Learned up for victory -- Redistricl.ing ruling debated," RN, Dec. 20, 1 99 1 ,  p. Al; Denton, 
" House, Senate leaders produce similar redistricl.ing proposals," RN, Jan. 20, 1 992, p. Al . 
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Merritt had come to Raleigh, Mary Peeler of the NAACP presented something very close to Merritt's 
plan at a legislative hearing.221 
Reaction to the new plan was often harsh. Utterly forgetting the state's long history of racial and 
partisan gerrymandering, discrimination, and disfranchisement, the News and Observer denounced 
every congressional plan thal contained a majority black district as based on a "profoundly 
un-American principle" that will "radically change our system of government." Republican Chairman 
Hawke more simply charged the Democrats with " trying to get rid of Republicans and protect 
Democratic incumbents. "222 Although some Democrats referred to the proposed Twelfth as "the 
urban black district," one that would have "a strong urban agenda," the media seemed to favor a new 
plan proposed by the League of Women Voters.223 The LWV plan's districts looked compact on a 
map, but would almost certainly nol have had a large enough black population to elect a black 
candidate. The L WV northeastern district had approximately a 45% black population, and no doubt a 
smaller proportion of the voting age population and registered voters. The Michaux and Spaulding 
contests proved thal racial bloc voling was too strong to elecl a black candidate in such a district.224 
The LWV southeastern district, with a combined black and Indian population of 43.7%, was even 
farther from offering minorities an opportunity to elect candidates of their  choice. Moreover, State 
Presidenl Claudia Kadis 's  comments in a newspaper column pushing the LWV plan make clear how 
far fair representalion for African-Americans was from her organization 's concerns. The proposed 
First District, she sneered, "consists mainly of rural areas with little in common but minority 
populations and poverty." Such groupings did not amoum to "communities of interest," deserving of 
representation, in her view. In fact, the only examples of communities of interests that she gave were 
" television markets, newspaper delivery areas, highway and rail networks, [ and] chambers of 
221Ferrcl Guillory and Yan Demon, "Assembly urged to fight -- Democrats want state in court over districts," 
RN, Dec. 3 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p. A l ;  Gui l lory, "GOP seeks change in district map -- Congressmen want no action in court," 
RN, Jan. 9, 1 992, p. B l ;  Denton, "2 black districts urged -- Proposal favors N .C. Democrats," RN, Jan. 1 0, 1 992, 
p. A l ;  Gerry F. Cohen deposition, Shaw v. Hunt, Nov. 1 2, 1 5 ,  1 993 (herein after "Cohen depo."), pp. 264-65; Merritt 
deposition, Dec. 22, 1 993, Shaw v. Hum (hereinafter "Merritt depo."), pp. 21 -34. 
2�ditorial, "I-85 no route to Congress," RN, Jan. 1 3 ,  1 992, p. A8; Van Denton, "Plan could cost GOP -- New 
seat would be Democratic," RN, Jan. 1 7, 1 992, p. B l .  
223Yan Demon, "House Democrnts offer districting plan -- Map similar to congressional proposal," RN, Jan. 19 ,  
1 992, p. A l ;  "Under the Dome: Ganu ally eyeing U.S.  House seat," RN, Jan. 21 ,  1 992, p .  B l . 
224 Although the L VW claimed that 40% would be sufficient, because the majority-vote requirement had been 
relaxed to allow a winner to be declared if she got 40% or more of the vote, the organization ignored the fact that 
50% was still required in a two-person comest like the Valentine-Spaulding race. The LYW proposal was also quite 
technically flawed , lacking contiguity in some areas, failing to assign others to any district at all, and consequently 
not properly balancing the census population figures. Cohen depo., 270-76. 
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commerce. "225 When il endorsed the L WV proposal while denouncing the legislators for being 
"driven by a wrongheaded determination to protect incumbent Democratic congressmen," the News 
and Observer did not go so far as to argue that the LWV plan gave blacks a fair opportunity, only that 
it " improves blacks ' victory chances."226 
There were two motives behind the relatively minor, but numerous changes in the Menitt/Peeler 
plan before it was adopted as CB IO (or "Chapter 7", in the official parlance of state law): one was to 
make District 12  more consistently urban, and, therefore, more of a homogeneous community of 
interest, and the other was to accommodate various political and idiosyncratic wishes of influential 
politicians. As Gerry Cohen, the legislative technician who actually performed the changes noted, 
parts of two cities, Winston-Salem and Gastonia, were added to District 1 2, and rural parts of four 
counties were deleted in a successful attempt to raise the proportion of the population in that district 
who lived in places of greater than 20,000 from 60% to 80%.227 Politically, modifications were 
made in District 1 aimed, Cohen said, at " improving the chances of incumbent congressmen in the 
Second, Third and Eighth Districts to be elected. "  John Merritt simply sent Cohen faxes of precincts 
to be moved. In the Piedmont, Cohen recieved a similar list from a staffer of Congressman Steve 
Neal, and he moved Republican Randolph County from the Fourth to the Sixth District in an effort to 
benefit both Fourth District Democrat David Price and Sixth District Republican Howard Coble. 
Other alterations improved the reelection chances of Eleventh District Republican Charles Taylor, 
moved the home of Rep. Walter Jones, Jr. , who wished to succeed his father in Congress, into the new 
First District, and shifted lines marginally to put staff aides or campaign managers of various members 
of Congress in their bosses '  districts.228 The legislature adopted the plan on a largely party-line 
vote. Before the vote, Sen. Frank W. Ballance, Jr. ,  endorsed CB I O  as a "remedial piece of legislation. 
There may come a time when we can come back here and do away with these black districts and elect 
people based on their qualifications. "229 But the time, as the history of black attempts to elect 
. candidates of their choice to Congress in the 1980s proved, had not yet anived. 
225Kadis, "Let sound principles shape new dis.tricts," RN, Jan. 23, 1992, p. A 1 5. 
226Edilorial, "Rule, redistrict and ruin," RN, Jan. 24, 1 992, p. A 1 6. 
227Cohen depo., 1 77-84, 2 1 5 .  
228lbid., 1 7 1 ,  2 1 1 -24, 230, 240. 
229Van Denton, "House OKs new districts -- Congressional plan has two black seats," RN, Jan. 24, 1 992, p. B3; 
Denton, "Senate enacts new district plan -- Vote tracks party lines," RN, Jan. 25, 1 992, p. A l .  
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4. A PARTISAN SCORECARD 
Despite the fact that participants in the North Carolina reapportionment of 1 99 1 -92 were more open 
about discussing the partisan aspects of their handiwork than is often the case in redistricting episodes, 
they did disagree publicly about the effects of the very numerous proposed plans. To make sense of 
the process, it is useful to have a standardized and objective means of assessing their partisan effects. 
Although predicting future elections is a somewhat inexact process because voters m ay shift their be­
havior, economic and other socioeconomic conditions may change, and different candidates may run 
for office, it is  possible to make fairly precise estimates based on patterns from the immediate past for 
the offices at issue. In a paper based on an analysis of congressional and state House elections in 
California from 1970 through 1992, I showed that a very simple statistical technique can account for 
about 90% of the outcomes in those elections.230 
Essentially, one perfonns an "ordinary least squares regression" of the percentage of the total vote 
for each party on the percentage of the total number of voters who are registered with each of the 
m ajor parties, or with some other index of core partisan voting strength. The resulting estimates can 
be used for two purposes: First, by multiplying the registration proportions in each district by the 
coefficients from the regression equations, detennining the victor in each district in this hypothetical 
election, and then comparing the hypothetical with the actual results, one can test how well the model 
predicts winners and losers. Second, once the method is validated, it can be applied to plans that were 
not put into effect to detennine the likely outcomes if they had been adopted. The advantage of using 
data based on congressional elections to predict the results of future congressional elections ought to 
be plain: There may well be different dynamics operating in elections for different offices. Naturally, 
as with any other index, there are problems with this one, the most important being that it assumes 
that voters from each party defect to the other party at the same rate throughout the state. It does, 
however, give outsiders a sense of the political consequences that insiders know of, but seldom discuss 
in public in full candor. 
Table 2 presents the equations for North Carolina congressional elections from 1980 through 1992. 
The R2's  for the equations, or percentages of the variances in the voting percentages explained by the 
registration percentages, are quite respectable, although not very many of the individual coefficients 
are statistically significant at conventional levels. Graphs not shown here indicate no striking 
nonlinearities in the relationships. Table 3 shows how well the equations do at predicting winners for 
each party. The row for 1 980, for example, shows that the separate equations for Democrats and 
Republicans for that year correctly predicted 8 of the 1 1  outcomes. Democrats won one seat that 
statewide trends predicted that they would lose, while Republicans won two seats that statewide trends 
suggested that they would lose. In general, the equations predict about 80% of the contests correctly, 
generally missing only in the marginal contests concentrated in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Districts. 
230"Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans -- S imply," (mimeo., California Institute of 
Technology, Jan . ,  1 994, revised July, 1 994). 
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In 1 992, the equations called 1 1  of the 1 2  contests correctly, slightly underestimating Democratic 
strength in the Fifth District in a very good year for the Democrats. 
(Tables 2 and 3 about here) 
Table 4 applies the same technique used in Table 3 to nineteen plans that were never put into effect 
and the one that was, CB 1 0. In order to indicate what legislators, members of Congress, and their 
staffs expected the partisan effects of their plans to be, predictions from equations relating to the two
immediately succeeding elections, one a presidential year and one an off-year, are included. The last 
column suggests what might have happened under the conditions of the 1 992 election. 
(Table 4 about here) 
The most obvious point that the table makes is that the partisan effects of a plan are easy to 
predict, once one knows the party of the person or persons who drew it. The nine Republican plans, 
including the first one Republican consultant Tom Hofeller drew for Shaw v. Hunt, almost uniformly 
split the congressional delegation in half no matter which party is favored by overall trends in a 
particular election year. In fact, the vast majority of the districts in the Republican plans were, by this 
measure, uncompetitive. If the Flaherty Plan had been in place in 1992, for instance, the smallest 
predicted margin of victory in any district would have been 6.5%. Under the same conditions, only 
three of the races in Hofeller's proposed districts would have been closer than 1 0%, with the closest of 
them a 4.7% victory for a Republican. By contrast, all of the Democratic plans were estimated to 
produce from seven to nine Democrats in the twelve-person delegation, and more of the contests 
would be expected to be somewhat closer. Had CB9 been adopted in 1 992, for instance, the estimate 
is that two of the races would have been decided by less than 4%. Looking at the table and imagining 
that the Democrats projected the most recent patterns, those from 1990, into the future, it is easy to 
see why they were dismayed when the Department of Justice rejected CB6, why Republicans, who 
hoped that the action of the Department would force the legislature to adopt one of their plans, were 
jubilant, and why Democrats welcomed the proposal worked out by Merritt and presented to the 
legislature by Mary Peeler. This table suggests more graphically than any district map possibly could 
why the Democratic majority in the legislature chose to respond to the Justice Department's call to 
establish two m ajority-minority districts by adopting CB 10, instead of one of the Republican alterna­
tives: On the basis of the best information available at the time, the stakes were two Democratic 
members of Congress.231 
231For a precisely similar estimate by Republ ican State Chairman R. Jack Hawke, Jr., see Van Denton, "GOP 
teamed up for victory -- Redistricting ruling debated," RN, Dec. 20, 1 99 1 .  
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5 .  INTENTION IN 199 1 -92 
A close reading of the activities of legislators in North Carolina in 1 99 1 -92 shows that they 
adopted the districts they did for many reasons: First, to satisfy an extremely precise definition of the 
equal population standard that legislators believed was implied by Karcher v. Daggett and other cases. 
If the solons had believed that districts only had to be within five percent of the ideal population size, 
as they believed was the standard for state legislatures, they could have drawn much more compact 
districts with political effects similar to those that they drew. Second, to satisfy the standards of the 
Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice. Third, to protect Democratic 
incumbents and more generally, the interests of the Democratic party. As Gerry Cohen commented 
during the Shaw v. Hunt trial, "All lines drawn in this case were politically driven."232 Or as the 
Co-Chair of the Redistricting Committee, Toby Fitch, put it, "Politics" is "what . . .  redistricting is all 
about."233 Fourth, to make it possible for African Americans, for the first time this century, to elect 
one or two candidates of their choice to Congress from the state , an action that remedied nine decades 
of discrimination. Fifth, to avoid the litigation that the legislators knew would certainly otherwise 
ensue, l itigation similar to that which had embroiled the state in a half-decade of turmoil, expense, and 
embarrassment during the 1 980s.234 Sixth, in the case of what became the Twelfth District, to 
construct an urban district that would share similar problems and proclivities and would be relatively 
easy to traverse. In sum, just as in 198 1 ,  the motives of the legislature were mixed. 
There is no question, and, indeed, the state openly acknowledged that the First and Twelfth 
Districts were drawn with a consciousness of race. But a desire to comply with federal court decisions 
and those of the Justice Department in a manner that obviously does not disadvantage protected 
minorities can hardly be seen to have a racially discriminatory intent, although it obviously does take 
race into account. As I have argued above, taking race into account for remediation and compliance is  
compatible with Justice O'Connor's Shaw opinion, and i t  is the central holding of the majority in 
Shaw v .  Hunt. If the shape or placement of districts is of particular importance, then the principal 
question is why the legislature chose to draw the First, and particularly the Twelfth, as it did, and not 
elsewhere or in a manner that some might consider more aesthetically pleasing. And the answer, as 
232Editorial, "Redistricting's soft underbelly is exposed," Greensboro News and Record, March 30, 1 994. 
233Dennis Patterson, "Lawmaker says ugly districts serve a purpose," RN, April 1 ,  1 994, p. 3A, c.2. 
234ln his deposition, pp. 254-55, Gerry Cohen says that during committee meetings on redistricting, he heard three 
reasons for drawing majority/minority districts in North Carolina in 1 99 1 -92: "One was that the Voting Rights Act 
required it; second, that it was the right thing to do. The third was that districts had been deliberately drawn in the 
1 980 plan so as to reduce the ability of minorities to be elected, and that the legislature -- and had been so since the 
tum of the century -- and that the legislature in response to a past pattern of discrimination had some duty to remedy 
this wrong. "  
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Table 4, comments at the time, John Menitt's deposition, the Republican suit in Pope v. Blue,235 and 
a good deal of  comment in journals and news articles all agree, is partisanship and incumbent 
protection. If the legislature could have drawn the Twelfth District in other ways that would have 
made it possible for blacks to elect a candidate of choice, and it chose this way because the I-85 
district hurt no Democrats, then the decision to draw the "ugly" Twelfth District could not 'logically 
have been taken for racial reasons at all. 
V. PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND RACE IN THE REDISTRICTING OF TEXAS, 1971 -1991 
A. TEXAS -- THE B IGGEST POLITICAL THICKET 
Although in size and demographic variety, Texas would appear much more complex than North 
Carolina, the Lone Star State 's incomparably brutal politics236 reduced the history of recent 
redistricting there to the same simple factors that accounted for the outcomes in the Tarheel State: 
partisanship, incumbent protection, ideology, and race. Two and a half times as large in population as 
North Carolina in 1 990, Texas was also much more urban. In fact, the two consolidated metropolitan 
statistical areas of Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston/Galveston by themselves contained 1 7% more 
people than the entire state of North Carolina in 1 990. While North Carolina 's one substantial ethnic 
minority, African Americans, accounted for 22% of its population, Texas had two major ethnic 
minorities -- Latinos constituted 26% of the population and blacks 1 2%.237 Since blacks were 
predominantly concentrated in Houston and the Dallas/Fort Worth "Metroplex," it was easy, in 
principle, to draw congressional and state legislative districts that urban black voters could control 
while keeping districts within the same metropolitan areas. The rural Latino population in South 
Texas was so overwhelming in numbers that it required considerable craftsmanship not to draw several 
rural Latino congressional districts. In Houston, however, the high proportion of non-citizens among 
Hispanics, the dispersion of the population in the unzoned city, and the fact that Hispanics and 
African-Americans lived interspersed with each other made it difficult to establish congressional 
districts that gave both fair opportunities to elect candidates of choice. 
235Supra, n. XX. 
236The besl introduclion lo recenl Texas polilics is Chandler Davidson, Race and Class in Texas Politics 
(Princelon, N.J . :  Princelon Univ. Press, 1 990). 
237Statistics computed from figures in U .S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
1993 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), Tables 3 1 ,  32, 42. Native Americans accounted for one percent of the 
population of North Carolina and much less than one percent of thal of Texas. 
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B .  REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS BEFORE 197 1 
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr, rural conservatives in the state 
maintained power by denying urban areas anything close to the representation that their population 
proportion merited, and even by refusing to reapportion altogether. There was no reapportionment of 
the state legislature from 1 92 1  until 195 1 ,  and no congressional reapportionment between 1 933 and 
1 957. Since 1 962, the state has been in court almost continuously over issues of population equality, 
multimember districts, charges of partisan gerrymandering and anti-minority racial discrimination, and 
in the 1 990s, compactness and allegations of discrimination against Anglos.238 In 1 966, for example, 
the redistricting of the state House of Representatives was challenged on the grounds not only of 
unequal population, but also, according to a standard account, because of "the political and racial 
gerrymandering that was evident in the new plan, the disenfranchisement of Negroes, and the overall 
crazy-quilt irrationality of the apportionment."239 Since courts plunged into the political thicket, 
more headlong in Texas, perhaps, than in any other state, the normal pressures of political compromise 
have been relaxed (because no agreement is final until every court says it is) and each line has been 
drawn with attention to what might attract the critical eye of a judge. Until recently, lawsuits have 
protected the rights of discrete and insular ethnic and racial minorities much more than they would 
have been protected in the normal political process. In the legislature during the 1 960s and 70s, for 
instance, "Proposals by minorities to shape districts to their liking were generally rejected in 
redistricting committees or after floor challenges to committee reports. "240 Before the 199 1  
legislative session, i t  was only the courts that moved Texas minorities toward equal access to  the 
political process. After 199 1 ,  it was the courts -- Judge James Nowlin's court for the State Senate and 
Judge Edith Jones 's court for Congress -- who moved Texas minorities away from equal access to the 
political process.241 
238A good overview is Steve Bickerstaff, "State Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment in Texas: A 
Historical Perspective," Public Affairs Comment, 37, #2 (Winter, 1 991 )  (LBJ School, UT Austin). 
239Ronald G. Claunch, Wesley S. Chumlea, and James G. Dickson, Jr., "Texas," in Leroy Hardy, Alan Heslop, 
and Stuart Anderson, Eds., Reapportionment Politics: The History of Redistricting in the 50 States (Beverly Hills: 
Sage, 1981) ,  3 1 1 - 16. 
2AOJbid. 
241Terrazas v. Slagle, supra, n. XXX; Vera v. Richards, supra, n. XXX. 
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C. THE 1 970S: CONTROVERSY, CORRUPTION, AND COURT-ORDERED REFORM 
1 .  197 1 :  Mutscher's Melodrama 
The 1 97 1  redistricting in Texas was like a Renaissance melodrama -- deeply flawed and 
Machiavellian leading characters, complicated and noisy intrigues, and a sanguinary finale. As at 
Elizabethan plays, the poorer sort were largely confined to being spectators in the "pit" -- and the real 
players worked hard to continue the separation. Although African-Americans, Latinos, Republicans, 
and liberal Anglos in the state had long contended that multimember state House districts 
discriminated against them, and although the U.S. Supreme Court mandated single-member districts for 
Mississippi in the midst of the Texas legislature's consideration of its own plans, the conservative 
Lone Star body adamantly refused to abolish multimember plans in the large urban counties.242 The 
state Senate plan substituted conservative for liberal whites in the only district that had elected an 
African-American in this century, insuring retrogression in minority representation in the upper 
house.243 Abjuring elaborate pretense about committee hearings or open consideration of 
alternatives, House Speaker Gus Mutscher (caught up already in the Sharpstown Bank scandal), Lt. 
Gov. Ben Barnes (soon to be tainted by a loan from the same bank), and a few of their allies drew the 
lines.244 Besides disadvantaging African-Americans and Hispanics, the plans were also designed to 
punish Mutscher's critics, a vociferous, but outvoted coalition of twenty liberal Democrats and the 
150-member House 's ten Republicans known as the "Dirty Thirty. "245 On the regular session's  last 
day, a raucous gallery cheered as one of the House's two blacks, "Dirty Thirty" leader Curtis Graves 
of Houston, blasted Mutscher. At least fourteen of the thirty, including the only announced challenger 
to Mutscher's Speaker post, found themselves paired against other incumbents under the new district-
242"0ne-Member State House Districting in Mississippi Decreed," Houston Chronicle (hereinafter referred to as 
"HC"), June 4 ,  1 97 1 ,  p. l .  
243House Study Group, "Redistricting, Part Four: The Voting Rights Act," Special Legislative Report No. 60, 
in 1981  Texas Section 5 Submission, U.S. Dept. of Justice, pp. 30-3 1 .  
244Robert A .  Calvert and Arnoldo De Leon, The History of Texas (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 
1990), pp. 395-97. 
245"Blacks Lobbying Here," Austin American-Statesman (hereinafter MS), May 20, 1 97 1 ,  p. 1 O; Glen Castlebury 
and George Kuempel, "Special Session Ordered," ibid. , June l ,  197 1 ,  p. 1 ;  Reid Beveridge, " Mutscher Foes Wipe 
Out 102 Bills in House," HC, June 1 ,  1 97 1 ,  p . l ;  "Smith Calls Legislature Back," ibid., June 1 ,  1 97 1 ,  p. l . 
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ing arrangement.246 Announcing a suit demanding single member districts in the state House the day 
after the passage of the reapportionment scheme, State Republican Party Chairman Dr. George 
Willeford remarked that " We will no longer stand idly by while a clique of political demagogues doles 
out the state' s  1 50 House seats to suit its own vested interest."247 
Personal, ideological, racial, and partisan motives also played major roles in the 1 97 1  redistricting 
for Congress, a task too full of conflict to be completed during the legislature 's regular session. In 
West Texas, Mutscher paired Republican Bob Price with Democrat Graham Purcell in order to save 
the underpopulated seats of three other Democrats, Omar Burleson, Clark Fisher, and Abraham Kazen, 
while Redistricting Committee Chairman Delwin Jones wanted to sacrifice any or all of them to 
protect his friend George Mahon.248 In East Texas, two legislators who were on the conference 
committee that was trying to reach final agreement on congressional lines, Rep. Clyde Haynes and 
Sen. Charles Wilson, sparred over which one of them a new district would be tailored for.249 In 
burgeoning Houston, Barbara Jordan, the first African-American to serve in the Texas State Senate in 
this century, a forceful woman who somehow always managed to stay in the good graces of the party 
and legislative leadership, was allowed to draw her own congressional seal. She subsequently won the 
1 972 Democratic primary, defeating the more stridently reformist Curtis Graves, and easily swept the 
general election to become the state 's first black member of Congress in the century.250 A third new 
district, the 24th, spanning Dallas and Tarrant counties, was widely ridiculed. Republican Rep. Fred 
Agnich described it as "preposterous," liberal Democratic Rep. Dick Reed termed it a "kind of 
_ monster," and the ever-colorful state Sen. Oscar Mauzy declared that "A 1 -cycd 1 -legged justice of the 
peace in Langtry would know more than to draw something up like that. " All agreed that it was not 
246George Kuempel, " Mutscher Critics Proposed Targets," AAS, May 27, 197 1 ,  p. 1 ;  Richard M. Morehead, "Smith 
Calls Special Session: Legislature Fai ls  to Act on Redistricting," Dallas Morning News (hereinafter DMN), June I ,  
1 97 1 ,  p. l .  
247George Kuempel, "Redistricting Plan Debate Set Today," AAS, May 28, 197 1 ,  p. 1 .  
248"Redistricting Bill  Ignores Difficult Houston Issues," AAS, May 1 3 ,  1 97 1 ,  p.2; Reid Beveridge, "Legislators 
Worked Down to Wire, Didn't Finish Districting Bill," HC, June l ,  1 97 1 ,  p. 1 .  
249Reid Beveridge, "Legislators Worked Down to Wire, Didn ' t  Finish Districting Bill," HC, June 1 ,  1 97 1 ,  p. l ;  
Beveridge, "East Texans Have Panel i n  a Snarl On Redistricting," ibid. ,  June 3 ,  1 97 1 ,  p . l . The opening for drawing 
a new district came with the bribery indictment and illness of Congressman John Dowdy, which left him defenseless 
against being paired with a stronger incumbent, Wright Patman. " Will iamson County No Longer Pickle's," AAS, 
June 5,  1 97 1 ,  p. l ,  c . l .  
2.SO"Pending Plan would Deny County an Extra Senator," HC, June 1 ,  1 97 1 ,  p. 24; Art Wiese, " Minorities increase 
number in legislature," Houston Post (hereinafter "HP"), May 9 ,  1 97 1 ,  p. 6/A, c. l .  
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"compact," and many noted the jagged edge caused by shifting ten black precincts in South Oak Cliff 
from the Fifth District, a move apparently designed to preserve conservative control of the Fifth.251 
Reflecting the rural conservative dominance of the process, the underpopulated districts of rural 
congressional and state Senate incumbents were preserved by adding small parts of the urban counties, 
severely fraying the boundaries of Houston, Bexar, Dallas, and Tarrant counties.252 
Race-conscious, discriminatory motives, oddly-shaped districts tailored for personal, partisan, 
ethnic, or ideological purposes, covert designs and closed processes permeated the 1 97 1  redistricting in 
Texas. These traditional Texas districting principles would continue to be followed and elaborated on 
over the next two decades. 
2. Judicial Epilogue 
Although in 1 965, a Texas state court had refused to overturn multimember districts as racially 
discriminatory per se,253 Curtis Graves carried his legislative attack on such districts into federal 
court as soon as the redistrictings for both houses had been completed in 1 97 1 .  Appropriately suing 
Lt. Gov. Ben Barnes, Graves 's lawyers succeeded in convincing a federal court to outlaw 
multimember State House districts in Dallas and Bexar counties. When Graves v. Barnes was 
appealed to the U.S.  Supreme Court, it became the landmark White v. Regester, still the fountain of 
voting rights law in the United States.254 Nonetheless, the state did not submit willingly. Another 
Graves decision in 1 974255 was necessary to impose single-member districts in seven more counties, 
and even though the legislature in 1 975 acceded to abolishing the remaining multimember seats, i t  
drew what the U.S.  Department of Justice ruled were racially discriminatory lines in Tarrant, Nueces, 
251Reid Beveridge, "Court Decision May Threaten Redistrict Bill," HC, June 5, 197 1 ;  "Redistricting Plan Draws 
Fire," DMN, June 6, 1 97 1 ,  p. 6A; Tom Johnson, "Dallas Short-Changed in Districting," ibid. , June 6, 1 9 7 1 ,  p. l ;  
"Comment on the Texas Congressional Redistricting Submission by Black and Hispanic Members o f  the slate 
Legislature," Oct. 1 9, 1 98 1 ,  p. 4 ,  in Texas 1 981  Section 5 File, U.S.  Dept. of Justice. 
252"Redistricting Bill  Said Unfair to City," AAS, May 23, 1 97 1 ,  p.9; "Pending Plan Would Deny County an Extra 
Senator," HC, June 1 ,  1 971 , p. 24; Tom Johnson, "Dallas Short-Changed in Districting," DMN, June 6, 1 97 1 ,  p. 1 ;  
"Congressional Districting Confined to Rural Guideline," ibid., June 6, 197 1 ,  p. 6A. 
253Hainsworth v. Martin, 386 S.W. 2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Austin, writ ref'd n .r.e.), vacated as moot, 382 U.S. 
1 09 ( 1 965). 
254Graves v.  Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D.Tex. 1 972); White v. Regester, 4 1 2  U .S .  755 ( 1 973). 
255Graves v. Barnes, 378 F.Supp. 640 (W.D.Tex . 1 974). 
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and Jefferson coumies .256 It was not until 1 978 that an unchallenged election was finally held in the 
state.257 
Although the 1 97 1  congressional arrangement did not suffer such wholesale alterations as the state 
legislative plans did, it was challenged in court and significantly amended. Finding a constitutional 
violation in a variation of 4 . 1  % between the most heavily and least heavily populated districts, a 
federal court attempted to order into effect a set of lines that differed markedly from those that the 
legislature had adopted. After the U.S. Supreme Court scolded the three-judge panel for not showing 
sufficient deference to the legislative will, the panel adopted a scheme that more closely tracked the 
state ' s  choices.258 One of its most important changes moved ten black Dallas precincts from the 
24th District to their original home in the 5th before the 1 976 elections, a change that led directly to 
the replacement of 5th District Republican congressman Alan Steelman by liberal Democrat Jim 
Mattox and indirectly to the principal controversy of the 1 98 1  redistricting. 
D. THE 1 980s: PARTISANSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND INFLUENCE259 
1 .  The Changed Political Context 
By ending the career of the heir-apparent of the John Connolly wing of the Democratic party, 
Ben Bames 's entanglement in the Sharpstown imbroglio created a vacuum in Texas government. 
After Barnes finished third in the 1 972 Democratic gubernatorial primary and Connolly bolted the 
party altogether, the colorless Dolph Briscoe did not so much fill as personify the empty space left by 
�he Justice Department was involved because in 1 975 Texas became a "covered jurisdiction" under the Voting 
Rights Act. As a consequence, under Section 5 of the Act, every change in district lines had to be precleared by 
the Department, a development that provided all sides in 1 980 with a further strategic tool. 
257Bickerstaff, "State Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment," 2-4. 
258Bickerstaff, "State Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment," 3-4. The principal decision was White 
v. Weiser, 4 1 2  U.S. 783 ( 1 973). 
259Since she had been chief counsel for the Republican S tate Committee of Texas during the political and legal 
struggle over reapportionment from 1 981 -83 ,  Judge Edith H. Jones must have been fully cognizant of the connection 
between partisanship and race during Texas r.edistrictings prior to 1 99 1  and of charges of "racial gerrymandering" 
during the 1 981 reapportionment. In the circumstance, some judges would have recused themselves from deciding 
Vera v. Richards. Certainly, one would not have expected Judge Jones to ignore evidence of past discrimination 
in redistricting as a possibly compelling state interest when it was presented to her, and she knew of a great deal of 
it from personal experience. 
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the departure of the state 's strong men.260 Into that gulf in 1 978 marched Dallas businessman 
William Clements, a staunch conservative, even by Texas standards, who eked out a bare margin over 
Democratic nominee John Hill, who had beaten Briscoe in the Democratic primary.261 The veto 
power held by Clements, the first Republican governor in Texas since Reconstruction, radically 
changed the game of redistricting in 1 98 1 .  
The most visible symbol o f  the rise of the GOP i n  Texas, Clements was not the only Republican 
with an influence on redistricting in the 1 980s. Instead of ten Republicans in the lower house of the 
legislature, as there were in 1 97 1 ,  there were 38 in 1 98 1 .  Although most of the additional 28 replaced 
conservative Democrats, that wing of the party, led by House Speaker Billy Clayton and Lt. Gov. B ill 
Hobby, was still dominant in both houses of the legislature, and conservative Democrats still filled 
m ost congressional seats. But the liberal wing, personified by John Bryant, chairman of the House 
Study Group, could not be ignored, and the Democrats as a whole organized a party caucus, a tactic 
that had not been necessary since the days of Populism in the 1 890s. Thus, 1981  was the first 
redistricting of the twentieth century in which more than one partisan interest played an active 
role.262 
Paralleling developments in the legislature were party and ideological bifurcations in the 
congressional delegation. In Dallas, liberal Jim Mattox of the 5th District was joined in 1 978 by 
moderate-liberal Martin Frost in the adjacent 24th, while in the Houston area, Republican Ron Paul 's  
1 978 victory was followed by that of Jack Fields, who rode Ronald Reagan 's 1980 coattails to defeat 
perhaps the most liberal Anglo Democratic congressman from the South, Bob Eckhardt. In Corpus 
Christi , moderate Democrat Bill Patman enjoyed strong Hispanic support in his successful campaign to 
replace his conservative fellow party member Joe Wyan in 1980. The principal objectives of the 
Republican/conservative Democratic coalition during the 198 1 redistricting were to strengthen Fields, 
to weaken Patman and Paul (who had by far the most liberal voting record of any Texas Republican in 
the 1981  Congress),263 and to destroy Frost and Mattox. 
260State legislator and "Dirty Thirty" member Frances Farenthold 's effort to substitute a strong woman for a 
strong man fell short in the 1 972 Democratic runoff. 
261Calvert and De Leon, History of Texas, pp. 435-36. 
262Anne Marie Kilday, "Redistricting battle: Democrats joking about putting Gov. Clements in county district 
dominated by minorities," HC, Aug. 9, 198 1 ,  section 1 ,  p. 12 ,  c. 1 ;  Robert Harmcl and Keith E. Hamm, "Development 
of a Party Role in a No-Party Legislature," Western Political Quarterly, 39 ( 1986), 79-92. 
263 Although popularly considered a right-winger, Paul only voted with the Congressional Quarterly "conservative 
coalition" 62% of the time in 1 98 1 ,  far below the 94% average of the other four Texas Republicans in that session. 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac ( 198 1 ), p. 39-C. 
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2. The First B attle of Dallas
The feisty Clements, still inexperienced in Texas state government after a couple of relatively 
unproductive years in office, held two major weapons besides his veto and his de facto alliance with 
Speaker Clayton and Lt. Gov.  Hobby: wealthy lobbyists and the Voting Rights Act. An organization 
of big businessmen formed the morning after a $2.8 million Clements fund raiser, "Texans for a 
Conservative Congress"264 spent $76,000 organizing many of the chief patrons of Texas legislative 
campaigns to lobby the objects of their past donations to vote for districts that helped Republicans in 
particular and conservatives in general . B ankers, perhaps half-jokingly, threatened to call in the loans 
of legislators who did not cooperate.265 Another group, the "Texans for Fair Redistricting 
Committee" (reported to be a front for oil and business political action committees) sent a letter to 
legislators promising to base future contributions on whether legislators supported the redistricting plan 
that Gov. Clements favored.266 Money m ay well have determined the outcomes of a series of 
extremely close votes in both houses of the legislature. 
At the same time that Republicans in Congress were scathingly attacking "proportional 
representation" for minorities during the debate over the renewal of the Voting Rights Act, 
Republicans in Texas were insisting on proportional representation of minorities in Dallas to weaken 
liberal Democratic congressmen. Noting that the total black population of Dallas County amounted to 
54.6% of that of an ideal congressional district and that if all were put into one district -- a difficult 
task, for despite continuing prejudice and discrimination, not all Dallas blacks were segregated into a 
compact area -- they would drain enough Democratic votes from Jim Mattox'  Fifth District to make it 
solidly Republican, Gov. Clements professed a conversion to black empowerment, promising to veto 
"any plan that did not create a minority district in Dallas County and restrict all of Democratic 
Congressman Jim Mattox' Fifth District to the county. "267 "The black community of Dallas wants 
264Ruben Bonilla, fonner National DirecLor of LULAC, quipped LhaL Lhe organizaLion should be named "Texans 
for a B igoted Society . "  Corpus Christi Caller-Times, June 26, 1 98 1 ,  quoLed in "Comment on the Texas 
Congressional RedisLricting Submission by Black and Hispanic Members of the SLaLe LegislaLUre" (Oct. 19 ,  1 98 1), 
in 1 98 1  SecLion 5 submission, Justice Department, p. 20. 
265Sam ALLlesey, "A sLunning vicLory for conservatives," Texas Business, Ocl., 1 98 1 ,  pp. 1 05- 1 1 .  
266John C.  Henry, " House members react angrily to remap LhreaL," AAS, Aug. 9 ,  1 98 1 ,  p .  B l 3 ,  c . 1 . 
267The senLence is a reporter?s paraphrase in SaraLee Tiede, "RedisLricLing impa-;se goes down Lo wire," Dallas 
Times-Herald (hereinafter DTH), June 1 ,  198 1 .  Clements's  insisLence on confining the district to Dallas county is 
another sign of his partisan purpose, for the Democrats' obvious counter-ploy to an attempt LO carve an 
African-American disLrict out of disLricts 5 and 24 was to exLend each inLo rural and small Lown Democratic areas 
in surrounding counties. 
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its own representative and they are not better served by two liberal white Democrats," he 
announced.268 Although the Governor testified under oath to his devotion to the election of a black 
member of Congress and his lack of involvement in the detail s  of the process. and although he once 
assured skeptical reporters that he had never calculated the political effect of any changes in 
congressional districts, Clements refused to support a plan that would create a majority/minority 
district in Dallas without turning another district Republican, declaring that the choice "comes down to 
whether the conservatives will hang together and do what's right for Texas, which is a conservative 
state, or whether we 're going to let the tail wag the dog and let these l iberals carry the day. "269 This 
was tantamount to an admission that it was ideological and partisan conservatism, not racial l iberalism, 
that explained Oements 's stance. Dallas African-American leader Isaac Johnson echoed the charges of 
many other Democrats, white as well as black, when he contended that Oements "does not care about 
blacks and browns in Dallas, only about the political fortunes of the Republican party."270 
The African-American community in the state was deeply split  over whether to attempt to create a 
"black district" in Dallas in 198 1 .271 An ad hoc "Coalition for Minority Representation," led by 
former Dallas City Councilwoman Lucy Patterson, former state House member Eddie Bernice Johnson, 
Progressive Voters League officers Jesse Jones and John Wiley Price, and Dallas City Councilman 
Fred Blair, contended that it did not matter how liberal the voting records of Jim Mattox and Martin 
Frost were272 or how much effort they devoted to their black constituents, they should be replaced 
268"Redistricting plan irks Clements," HP, Mar. 2, 1 982, p. 22C, c . l .  Similarly, see Sam Attlesey, "Poll shows 
Frost leading challengers," DMN, Nov. 5, 1 98 1 ,  p. A3 1 .  
�elton West, "Clements answers queries about redistricting plan," HP, Dec. 5, 1 98 1 ,  p.6A, c . l ;  Ann Arnold, 
"Opponents of redistricting bill prepare challenges," Ft. Worth Star-Telegram (hereinafter FWSD. Aug. 12, 1 98 1 ;  
Anne Marie Kilday, "Clements says he' l l  veto redistricting bill," HC, Aug. 7,  1 98 1 .  Victoria Loe, "The Deal That 
Didn't Work," Texas Monthly (Aug., 198 1) ,  p.222, paints Clements as extremely involved in detailed redistricting 
deal-making. 
27°Richard Fish, "2 redistricting bills advancing in Senate," HC, July 1 5, 1 98 1 .  For similar statements, see 
George Kuempel, "Panel urges black district in Dallas," DMN, July 16, 1 98 1 ,  p. 34A; Anne Marie Kilday, 
"Tug-of-war: Ogg blocks Democratic redistricting plans, has own compromise tabled," HC, July 2 1 , 1 98 1 ,  section 
I ,  p.8; Sam Attlesey, "Political supporters of minority districts crusade in churches," DMN, J uly 27, 1 98 1 ,  p. 1 3A; 
Dave McNeely, "Democrats try to corner Clements with minority district," AAS, Aug. 6, 198 1 .  
271William K. Stevens, "Texas Redistricting Plan Splits Black Leaders," New York Times, Dec. 20, 1 98 1 ,  p .  1 5 .  
In  1 970, there were only 220,4 12  African-Americans in  Dallas county, or 47.2% of  the population needed for a 
congressional district, even ifall could somehow have been included. 
272ln 1 98 1 ,  Mattox and Frost were the two most liberal Anglo congressmen in Texas. On the Congressional 
Quarterly "conservative coalition" index, Mattox scored 25 out of 100 on the roll calls on which he was present, 
second in the delegation only to black congressman Mickey Leland's 9%. Henry Gonzales of San Antonio was third, 
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because, as whites, they were incapable of truly representing African-Americans. "Congressman 
Mattox is Anglo, and Congressman Frost is Jewish," declared Lucy Patterson, and therefore, "They 
cannot fully understand the needs of the black community."273 Chris Reed Brown of Dallas told a 
meeting of  the Democratic State Executive Committee that Frost owed it to blacks to leave the district, 
move to College Station, and run against conservative Democrat Phil Gramm.  Brown and her fellows 
joined Gov. Clements, Speaker Clayton, Lt. Gov. Hobby, and House Redistricting Committee274 
chairman Tim Von Dohlen (D-Goliad) in backing S.B. 1 ,  a bill carried in the Senate by conservative 
Democrat John Wilson of La Grange.275 Somewhat unselfconsciously, "Coalition" members, who 
had drawn their map with the help of the county Republican chairman, accused African-Americans 
who disagreed with them of "selling out to the white power structure," or, more picturesquely,  of 
being "water boys" for "political slave traders" -- i .e. , white moderate and liberal Democrats. 
Disagreements became so heated once that a security guard had to restrain a "Coalition" member from 
assaulting a minority legislator.276 
Thirty-three of the thirty-four minority legislators, though probably not most black leaders in 
Dallas, backed the approach of the principal contending bill, S.B.3,  sponsored by Senators Oscar 
Mauzy (D-Dallas) and Peyton McKnight (D-Tyler), but principally drafted by Democratic congressmen 
Jim Wright of Ft. Worth and Martin Frost.277 S.B.3 preserved the districts of Frost and Mattox and 
with 32%, and Frost fourth, with 56%. The average for the five Texas Republican congressmen in the same session 
was 88% conservative. CQ Annual ( 1 98 1 ), at 39-C. In the rankings of the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights 
for the 1 980 session, Frost and Mauox both scored 7 1 ,  ranking behind only Gonzales, Leland, Jim Wright of Fort 
Worth, and Bob Eckhardt of Houston. Black and Hispanic Members of the Texas Legislature, "Retrogressive Effect 
of Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan: Reduced Ability of Minority Groups to Elect their Choices to Office," 
in 1981  Texas Section 5 Submission to Department of Justice, pp. 6-7 .  
273" Minorities need safe district, coalition tells state Senate," DMN, July 14 ,  1 98 1 ,  p .  1 9A; Alan Ehrenhalt, 
"Pulling Away from the Racial Gerrymander," Perspectives 83 (Winter-Spring, 1 983). 
274Although formally the " House Committee on Regions, Compacts and Districts," the committee was uniformly 
referred to as the Redistricting Committee. I will adopt that usage here. The Senate conducted its redistricting 
business in the Committee of the Whole, rather than through a smaller standing or special commiuee, apparently to 
give Lt.Gov. Bill Hobby the right to vote on bills, a right that he as presiding officer would not have had in a regular 
committee. Richard Fish, "Senate tentatively OKs redistricting proposal," HC, July 1 6, 1 98 1 .  
275Sam Attlesey, "Redistricting showdown puts political futures on the line," DMN, July 20, 1 98 1 ,  p. 1 9A. 
276Erenhalt, "Racial Gerrymander;" Victoria Loe, "The .Deal that Didn ' t  Work," Texas Monthly (Aug., 1 98 1) ,  p.
2 1 5 ;  Sam Aulesey, "Ragsdale caught in middle," DMN, Aug. 2, 198 1 ,  p. 29A. 
m"Minorities need safe district, coalition tells state Senate," DMN, July 14 ,  1 98 1 ,  p. 1 9A. 
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split Dallas blacks at the Trinity River, as they had been split in the White v. Weiser court-ordered 
plan in 1 973.278 Although Sen. Wilson charged that S.B.3 was "only based on protecting 
incumbents,"279 its black and white defenders, led by the chainnan of the legislative Black Caucus, 
Rep. Craig Washington (D-Houston), combined high principle with practical politics in pressing for i t. 
On the one hand, Washington argued that "Anything that packs blacks to guarantee that a black is 
elected while minimizing black political influence is patronizing and we should fight it." "The 
ultimate goal ," he said in a deposition, " is not to elect black and brown faces but to insure whoever is 
representing those black and brown people who vote represents their best interests. "280 Challenging 
S.B. l with an elaborate analysis that showed stark differences between the voting records of Anglo 
members of Congress from Texas whose districts contained significant percentages of minorities and 
those who did not, black and Hispanic members of the legislature concluded in a letter to the Justice 
Department that "a Congressman does not have to be Black or Hispanic in order to be responsive to 
the needs of minority communities."281 On the other hand, Paul Ragsdale, a black state 
representative from Dallas who, like Washington, was a member of the House Redistricting Comm ittee 
in 198 1 , pointed out that it was virtually impossible to draw a congressional district in Dallas that 
would have an actual majori ty of black voters. S.B. 1 's "black district" was less than 47% black in 
population and no doubt even less in voting-age population,282 blacks registered and turned out to 
vote at disproportionately low levels, compared to Anglos, and Hispanics, minority legislators showed 
278Richard Fish, "2 redistricting bills advancing in Senate," HC, July 1 5 , 1 98 1 .  
279Richard Fish, "Senate tentatively OKs redistricting proposal," HC, July 1 6, 1 98 1 . 
280Sara Lee Tiede, "Redistricting impasse goes down to wire," DTH, June 1 ,  1 98 1 ;  Craig Washington deposition 
in Seamon v. Upham (Nov. 24, 198 1 ), p. 66. 
281"Retrogressive Effect of Texas Congressional Redistricting Plan: Reduced Ability of Minority Groups to Elect 
their Choices to Office," in 1981  Section 5 submission, Justice Department, pp. 6-7. The contrast with North 
Carolina is presumably because of the more urban nature of Texas. Urban Anglo Democratic voters appear to be 
less generally conservative than those from rural areas. In North Carolina, the district of the least conservative white 
Democratic members of Congress were usually centered either in Greensboro/High Point or the Research Triangle. 
282Although the 287,54 1 blacks constituted 18 .5% of the total population in Dallas county in 1 980, the 1 80,640 
over the age of 1 8  represented only 16.3% of the total voting age population in the county. I f  the same ratio of 
voting age to total population held in the S .B . 1  "black district," then blacks would constitute only 4 1 -42% of the 
voting age population . .  If they registered and turned out at levels comparable to the whole state, they might have 
constituted only about 35-38% of the total electorate in the district, even if almost no Hispanics voted. S ince the 
district was packed with Democrats and there was no requirement that one be a long-time member of a particular 
political party to vote in its primary, blacks could probably not hope to constitute much more than 40% of the 
Democratic primary electorate in the district. 
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in a letter to the Justice Department, did not generally support black candidates against Anglos in 
Democratic primaries in Dallas. "You can't get a majority black district in Dallas County even with 
gerrymandering," contended Ragsdale, who had drawn the state House districts for the county. "If you 
could do it, I 'd  already have done it," he concluded. What good did it do, m inority legislators who 
opposed S .B . 1  on final passage asked, to draw a 47% black district containing the homes of Frost and 
Mattox when Frost, who had already collected $200,000 in campaign contributions and who had long 
carefully cultivated black support, would almost certainly beat any black opponent?283 If Frost won, 
all the bitter struggle would have accomplished was the substitution of a conservative Republican for 
Mattox, whose views were far closer to those of the vast majority of blacks, and increased antipathy 
between blacks and their day-to-day white allies -- another reason, of course, for Clements and other 
conservatives to support S.B. 1 .  
When S.B. 1  passed, "Coalition" African-Americans cheered, Frost prepared to run for Congress in 
the "black district" anyway, Mattox bounced into the race for State Attorney-Genera}; and minority 
legislators and their allies lobbied the Justice Department and sued in federal court. The suits were 
partially successful, as a three-judge court, and, in 1983, the legislature, restored virtually the S.B.3 
boundaries in Dallas.284 Frost and John Bryant, whose voting record closely paralleled Mattox 's ,  
filled the 24th and 5th District seats for the rest of the 1 980s. But what Paul Ragsdale called a "blood 
283Sam Atllesey, "Political supporters of minority districts crusade in churches," DMN, July 27, 1 98 1 ,  at 1 3A; 
"Comment on the Texas Congressional Redistricting Submission by Black and Hispanic Members of the State 
Legislature" (Oct. 19 ,  1 98 1 ) ,  in 1981  Section 5 submission file, Justice Department, at 1 2- 1 5. According to this 
"Comment," the Southwest Voter Research Institute "reported that in 1 980, 68.4% of the Anglos, 60% of the Blacks, 
and 57% of the H ispanics of voting age were registered. In the Democratic primary in 1980, 68.4% of the registered 
Anglos, 1 7.3% of  the registered Hispanics and 1 7.69% of the registered Blacks Look part. In  the general election, 
60.9% of the Anglos, 52% of the Hispanics and 50.5% of the Blacks turned out. " (at 1 7) Although a spirited black 
campaign might have spurred African-American voters LO turn out at much higher levels in a primary, it seems very 
doubtful that they could have closed the 50% gap between black and white participation rates. 
On Frost's campaign fund, see Arthur Wiese, " Blacks' chances," HP, Dec. 6, 1 98 1 ,  at 6D. In November, 1 98 1 ,  
with the "black district" newly established by S .B . 1  and with the momentum generated by their public lobbying for 
it, highly visible black candidates Lucy Patterson and Eddie Bernice Johnson trailed Frost by approximately 2- 1 in 
trial runs in public opinion polls. Sam Attlesey, "Poll shows Frost leading challengers ," DMN, Nov. 5 ,  1 98 1 , p. A3 1 .  
In a district redrawn by the three-judge panel in Seamon v. Upham, which approximated the division in S.B.3,  Frost 
crushed Patterson, who switched parties Lo run against him as a Republican in 1 982. Patterson is estimated to have 
received only about 6% of the black votes in overwhelmingly African-American precincts. Ehrenhall, "Racial 
Gerrymander" ; testimony of Prof. Larry Carlile before Texas House, May 1 6, 1 983, cited in John W. Fainter, Jr. to 
William French Smith, July 2 1 ,  1 983, in 1 983 Texas Section 5 submission, Justice Department. 
284Seamon v. Upham, 536 F.Supp. 93 1 (E.D.Tex. 1 982); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S .  37 ( 1982); Seamon v. 
Upham, 536 F.Supp. 1 030 (E.D.Tex. 1 982); Seamon v. Upham(Civil Action No. P-8 1 -49-CA, E.D.Tex.,  slip opinion, 
Jan. 30, 1 984); Ron Calhoun, "White's mixed signals," DTH, June 27, l 983; "U.S. court upholds Texas redistricting," 
HP, July 3 1 ,  1 984. 
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bath" within the black community and between blacks and liberal Anglos, reverberated into the next 
decade.285 In 1 99 1 , Republicans would try again to divide liberals along racial lines, and Democrats 
would try not to make the same mistakes twice. 
3. South of Houston 
The shoot-out over Dallas was not the only reason for the long, bitter, and closely-contested 
struggle over congressional reapportionment in 198 1 .  Because of population growth during the 1 970s, 
Texas gained three new congressional seats after the 1980 census. Everyone agreed that one of the 
three should be a safe Republican seat in the Dallas suburbs, and that another should be somewhere in 
Harris county, with a district in the northern suburbs helping the Republicans, one in the south prob­
ably Democratic, and one in the center city possibly endangering the only district held by an 
African-American, Mickey Leland, who had succeeded B arbara Jordan when she retired from office in 
1 978. Latinos wanted the third to be in South Texas, and during the Special Session, Hispanic 
legislators Matt Garcia and Al Luna unsuccessfully pressed for a plan that balanced the Hispanic 
percentages in the existing 1 5th District, represented since 1 964 by the conservative 
Mexican-American Eligio De La Garza, and a new 27th District, instead of packing Hispanics into the 
15 th. Under S.B.  l and S.B.3 (both of which followed an earlier MALDEF proposal), the Hispanic 
population proportion in the 15 th District would be 8 1  %, while that in the 27th would be 55-56% -­
probably not enough for Mexican Americans to elect a candidate of their choice. The Garcia-Luna 
amendment, which was in effect later adopted by the three-judge federal court in Seamon v. Upham, 
after the Justice Department had objected to the packing in District 15 under S.B. 1 ,  made the 
percentages 7 1  and 65, respectively.286 The point is that neither Republicans nor Democrats were 
fully responsive to expressed Hispanic interests in South Texas. This was a record that might be used 
in a Section 2 or constitutional challenge against a 1991  plan if redistricters in the latter year again 
proved unresponsive. 
Instead of inserting a new district in South Texas, House Redistricting Committee Chair Tim 
Yon Dohlen split Corpus Christi and twisted the 14th District into a shape that reminded state House 
member Hugo Berlanga (D-Corpus Christi) of a dragon, keeping only 40% of the previous District 
14  's population.287 One of the reasons that the relatively moderate Bill Patman had won the 14th 
District contest in 1 980 was that the minority percentage in the district was 45.4%. S .B. 1 reduced that 
285Transcript of Floor Debate in Texas House of Representatives on S .B.480, May 26, 1 983, p.5. 
286William Bradford Reynolds to David Dean, Jan. 29, 1982, in Texas 198 1  Section 5 submission file, Justice 
Department; Judy Wiessler. and Bo Byers, '.'.U.S. balks ·at Texas proposal for congressional redistricting," HC, Jan. 
30, 1 982, p. l ,  c .3;  "U.S.  Judges Al ler Districts in Texas Congressional Map," New York Times, Feb. 28, 1982. 
287Jose Comacho el al., "Brief of Imervenors Matt Garcia, el al., in Seamon v. Upham, p.30, n.5.  
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lo 3 1 .6%,  halving the proportion of H ispanic voters who had, observers claimed, so strongly supported 
Patman. Thal was not enough for Yon Dahlen, who reportedly planned to run against Patman if the 
new district were suitable, or for the Anglo businessmen of Corpus Christi , who argued and lobbied 
the legislature long and hard to divide their city along ethnic lines, putting Anglos into one 
congressional district and Mexican-Americans in another.288 According to Ruben Bonilla, the past 
president of LULAC, what he termed this "malevolent scheme to promote selfish personal economic 
vested interests" had been proposed because Patman and Sen. Carlos Truan, rather than the candidates 
favored by the "Anglo establishment" in Corpus Christi, had won in 1980.289 
An opponent of Republican congressman Ron Paul, as well as of Patman and the Hispanic 
community 's interests, Yon Dahlen eventually abandoned his effort to split Corpus Christi and came 
up with the scheme of shifting Democrats into Paul 's marginal district and Republicans into Patman 's, 
attacking both congressmen with a simple swap that even moved Paul 's  house into Patman 's district, 
forcing Paul either to run against Patman or to leave his Brazoria County home.290 If Paul refused 
to move, either he or Patman would lose; if Paul followed his old district into Fort Bend County, that 
would open up the 14th for Von Dohlen 's  Republican friend, state House member Brad Wright, who 
would then, Von Dohlen hoped, eliminate Patman, whose district had been weakened. (Earlier, Von 
Dohlen had proposed to tailor a new district for Wright, but the Brazoria switch threw more stones 
and promised to knock off a pair of hated birds.)291 By alienating both Paul 's and Patman's friends 
in the lower house, however, Von Dohlen had overreached himself. The House rejected his proposal, 
8 1 -64, on the day that it finally adopted a congressional plan. Emphasizing Yon Dohlen's  failure to 
288Sara Lee Tiede, "Redistri.cting impasse goes down Lo wire," DTH, June 1 ,  1 98 1 ;  Hearing in House Commiuee 
on Redistricting, July 2 1 ,  1 98 1 ,  pp. 1 -226. 
289"Hispanic leader blasts reapportionment plan," DMN, J une 26, 1 98 1 ;  Dave McNeely, "Congressional 
redistricting plan goes Lo House commiuee today," AAS, July 23, 1 98 1 ,  p.B4; Anne Marie Kilday, "New plan for 
Harris County stalls redistricting action in House," HC, July 24, 1 98 1 ,  section 1 ,  p.9, c. 1 .  
2�hile no stale or federal law requires members of Congress Lo live in their districts, most d o  so, at least 
formally, for fear of being labeled "carpetbaggers" otherwise. 
291Anne Marie Kilday, "Houstonians' political ambitions tangle House redistricting plans," HC, July 1 7, 1 98 1 ;  
Dave McNeely ,  "Von Dohlen stalls redistricting baule," AAS, July 24 , 198 1 ,  p.82, c.2; Kilday, "Von Dohlen's  
redistricting plan OK'd by House commiuee," HC, July 28 ,  198 1 ,  section 1 ,  p.9; McNeely, "House panel okays 
redistricting plan," AAS, J uly 28, 1 98 1 ,  p. B2, c .2; Kilday, "House urged to OK alternate redistricting plan," HC, July 
29, 198 1 ,  Section 1 ,  p. 12; Mark Nelson and Sam Kinch, Jr. ,  "GOP lawmaker denies favoring district split," DMN, 
July 29, 1 98 1 ,  p. 28A, c. J .  
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insure Patman's immediate defeat by himself or one of his friends, House Democratic Caucus 
Chairman Bob Bush asserted that Yon Dahlen had "won the battle, but lost the war."292 
4. Did Minorities Influence the 1 9 8 1  Redistricting? 
Although Speaker Billy Clayton put five members of minority groups on the House Redistricting 
Committee (Bob Valles of El Paso and Reby Cary of Fort Worth, as well as Washington, Ragsdale, 
and Berlanga), the minority comment to the Justice Department argued that minorities were "run over 
at every turn by the conservative White majority, the presiding officers of the House and Senate, and 
the Governor. We had l i ttle real impact on the final plan. We understand the sham that took place. 
The State systematically attempted to create the impression of minority legislators ' participation when 
the truth is that there was none. "293 
The facts support the contentions of the 1 98 1  "Comment." There were no blacks and only four 
Latinos in the Senate in 1 98 1 ,  and none played a role in framing S.B. 1 .  Nor were the five House 
minorities on the Redistricting Committee consulted until Von Dahlen presented his plan. In fact, they 
did not receive data on the ethnic composition of the proposed districts until the day before the 
committee was first scheduled to vote on plans, and when Ragsdale tried to make a motion for delay, 
Yon Dahlen ignored him and minority members stalked out in order to break the committee 's 
quorum.294 When the amended S .B.  l reached the floor, Ragsdale offered an amendment basically 
restoring the balance of the black population between districts 5 and 24, and when this lost, joined 
Carlyle Smith (D-Grand Prairie) in offering an amendment that dcsi!,>nated district 5 as the 
majority-minority district and extended district 24 south into rural counties in an effort to preserve it 
for the Democratic party, i f  not for a moderate like Martin Frost. These and a similar proposal by 
Craig Washington lost by identical three-vote margins.295 
292Garth Jones, "Texas congressional redistricting plan up for final House vote," HC, July 30, 1 98 1 ,  section 1 ,  
p.23 , c. l ;  Anne Marie Kilday, "GOP's redistricting approved by House," ibid., J uly 30, 1 98 1 ,  section 1 ,  p. 1 0, c. l ;  
Mark Nelson, "House approves new districts," DMN, July 30, 1 98 1 ,  p. A l ,c. l ;  "House adjourned in bid to reach 
redistricting consensus," HC, July 3 1 ,  1 98 1 ,  section 1 ,  p.3, c. 1 ;  Sam Attlesey,  "Final vote on congressional 
redistricting delayed," DMN, July 3 1 ,  198 1 ,  p. 22A, c. l ;  Dave McNecley, "Final vote delayed on remap plan," AAS, 
July 3 1 ,  1 98 1 ,  p.86, c. l .  
293"Comment on the Texas Congressional Redistricting Submission by Black and Hispanic Members of the State 
Legislature" (Oct. 19 ,  1 98 1 ), in Texas 1 98 1  Section 5 Submission File, p. J .  
294ld., at 23. 
295"Ragsdale plans district fight on House floor," DMN, July 29, 198 1 ,  p. 28A, c.4. 
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At this point, for the only time in the session on the redistricting issue, Gov. Clements and 
Speaker Clayton lost control. In a decision described by an observer as "potentially devastating" for 
the conservative leadership, a momentarily unified Democratic caucus sent the reapportionment issue 
back to Yon Dohlen' s  committee, apparently hoping that the group would amend the bill in line with 
the Ragsdale-Smi th amendment, the effect of which would be to create the majority-minority district 
that Gov. Clements claimed to want, but to prevent Republicans from winning another seat in Dallas 
county. Demonstrating that partisan concerns really motivated him ,  Clements promised to veto 
Ragsdale-Smith. As another reporter put i t, "The battle over congressional reapportionment reached 
full -scale partisan warfare . . .  "296 After both sides lobbied intensely, Speaker Clayton extracted the 
bill from the CO!Ilmittee by threatening to refer i t  to another committee, amended S .B . 1  to punish 
moderate Democrats even more and, after minority and other Democratic caucus members absented 
themselves to break a quorum, sent out Sergeants-at-Arms to arrest members in lobbies and hotel 
rooms, bring them back to the House at 4 :45 am, and count enough of them as present to pass the 
congressional redistricting bill .297 I l  was a classic exercise of strong-arm tactics by a powerful Texas 
Speaker out to preserve conservative control at practically any cost, and it came, as before, at the 
expense of moderate Anglo Democrats and over the vehement protests of black and Hispanic 
legislators. 
5. The Conservative Attack on Minority Voters ' Influence over Members of Congress 
As passed , S.B . 1  was a severe blow to minority influence on the congressional delegation. As 
Tony Bonilla, President of LULAC, put it picturesquely, "We've been raped again. The Republicans 
who ran under the Democratic banner have joined forces with the other Republicans to do a hatchet 
296Anne Marie Kilday, "Texas House stalls redisLricLing bill; action may force 2nd special session," HC, Aug. 
4, 1 98 1 ,  section 1 ,  p. 6, c. 1 ;  Mark Nelson, "Democrats back redistricting bill," DMN, Aug. 4, 1 98 1 ,  p. l A  (firsl 
quote); Nelson, "House panel LO go back Lo work on redisLricLing bill," ibid. , Aug. 5, 198 1 ,  p. 2 1 A; Dave McNeely, 
"Democrats try Lo corner Clements with minority disLrict," MS, Aug. 6, 1 98 1 ;  Anne Marie Kilday, "Democrats stall 
redisLricting bil l  Lo regroup legislative support," HC, Aug. 6, 198 1 ,  section 1 ,  p. 12; Mark Nelson, "Democrats lobby 
senators on redistricting," DMN, Aug. 6, 1 98 1 ,  p. 30A; Anne Marie Kilday, "Clements says he ' I I  veto redistricting 
bill," HC, Aug. 7, 1 981  (second quote). 
297 Anne Marie Kilday, "Clayton threat gels redistricting bill oul of committee," HC, Aug. 8, 1 98 1 ;  Mark Nelson, 
"Panel OKs district plan," DMN, Aug. 8, 198 1 ,  p. 40A; Kilday, "House approves congressional districting," HC, Aug. 
1 0, 1 98 1 ;  Sam ALLlesey and George Kuempel, "Democrats lambaste Clayton's Redistricting plan," DMN, Aug. 10, 
1 98 1 ,  p. 20A; Dave McNeely, "Remap plan clears House, goes Lo Senate," MS, Aug. 10, 1 98 1 ,  p. l A; "Comment 
on Lhe Texas Congressional Redistricting Submission by Black and Hispanic Members of Lhe S tale Legislature," p.29. 
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job on four of our fine progressive congressmen and have diluted and minimized the Hispanic 
vote. "298 During the 1 980s, approximately 90% of blacks and 72% of Hispanics in Texas were 
Democrats . On the other hand, 90% of the Republican voters were Anglo.299 Thus, any actions that 
substantially reduced the probability that a Democratic member of Congress could be elected 
disproportionately damaged the almost certain choices of minority voters. 300 In Dallas, the minority 
percentage in the 5th District was reduced from 29% to 1 2%, and the Democratic party 's prospects in 
the district became hopeless. In Houston, the minority percentage in the 8th, which had been 
represented for more than a decade by the extremely l iberal Bob Eckhardt, dropped from 40% to 29%, 
effectively guaranteeing the seat to the Republicans for the foreseeable future. In the 14th, Patman 
had not been damaged as much as Von Dohlen threatened to do, but the reduction in his minority 
percentage by nearly a third allowed Republicans to defeat him in 1 984. The 22nd, the seat that Ron 
Paul had won after see-saw battles with moderate Democrat Bob Gammage during the 1 970s, also saw 
a decline in minority percentage from 3 1  % to 23%, and a consequent shriveling of Democratic 
chances. Overall,  as black and Hispanic members of the legislature pointed out in a comment to the 
Justice Department, under the court-ordered plan from the 1 970s, minorities could control 3 of the 24 
seats and influence 9 others; under S .B . 1 ,  they still could control no more than 3, but they could only 
influence 7 of the expanded total of 27 . This, they said, was retrogressive.301 
298Ann Arnold, "Opponents of redistricting bill prepare challenges," FWST, Aug. 1 2, 1 98 1 .  
299Arnold Vedlitz, James A .  Dyer, and David B .  Hill, "The Changing Texas Voter," i n  Robert H. Swansbrough 
and David M. Brodsky, eds. ,  The South's New Politics: Realignment and Dealignment (Columbia, S.C.:  Univ. of 
South Carolina Press, 1 988), Figure 4.4, at 49. 
3<X1 am not arguing here that voting for the Democratic party is in a normative sense in the best interests of 
African-Americans or Latinos, but only that their actions indicate that they believe that it is. I t  is certainly true, 
however, that public opinion polling data shows that on the vast majority of issues, blacks are substantially more 
l iberal than whites, as are the records of such African-American members of Congress as Barbara Jordan, Mickey 
Leland, and Craig Washington. Sec section III .  A., supra. Evidence on Latino opinion is sparser. The point is that 
Republicans win despite the votes of the vast majority of blacks and Hispanics, and that therefore, Republican 
members of Congress are essentially outside of their influence. 
301Black and Hispanic Members of Texas Legislature, "Retrogressive Effect of Texas Congressional Redistricting 
Plan: reduced Ability of Minority Groups Lo Elect Their Choices Lo Office," in Texas 1981  Section 5 Submission 
File, Justice Department. 
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6. Review and Preparation for a Rerun
Texas politicians ritually repeat "good government" rhetoric less during redistricting than 
officeholders in other states do, and lack conviction when they do. As the 197 1 experience did, the 
1 98 1  reapportionment only further demonstrated that the raw struggle for partisan, personal, and ethnic 
power rarely lies far below the surface of Texas politics. The attempt by the conservative Anglo 
legislature, only partially reversed by the courts in Seamon v. Upham, to buttress the electoral strength 
of conservative Congressmen and reduce that of moderates, the half-hearted and unconvincing use of 
the Voting Rights Act ploy by Governor Clements to cover a partisan power play, the strenuous efforts 
by Democratic incumbents Frost and Mattox to save their seats at the expense of principle or party, 
the dogged and partially successful effort by Von Dohlen to savage Patman and Paul, the blatant 
packing of Hispanics into the district of a well-established Hispanic incumbent, the exclusion of 
minority legislators from the real power to shape plans -- all of these facts would tilt the judicial scales 
even more against the State if the legislature were not more sympathetic to minority concerns in 1 99 1 .  
With the 1 982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, interpreted b y  many political activists to require 
creation of majority-minority districts whenever possible,302 and with the increase of Hispanic 
population in Houston and South Texas and the lesser, but still appreciable rise of the black percentage 
in  Dallas, minorities had an even stronger weapon than they had had available in 1 98 1 .  The 
Republican strategy of forming a temporary alliance of convenience with minorities so as to weaken 
Democratic strength in adjacent districts had been so well rehearsed that by 199 1 ,  everyone knew their 
lines perfectly. All that was required for a revival of the stage production was an expected Republican 
victory in the 1 990 gubernatorial election and an uncontroversial count in the 1990 census. 
302Thus, during debates over reapportionment, Sen. Teel Bivins (R-Amarillo), one of Lhe Republican leaders on 
the issue, remarked, in a reporter's summary that " I f  it is possible Lo create a minority district, the [Voting Rights] 
act requires that one be drawn." Emily Alice Robbins, "West Texas lawmakers face tough redistricting battle," 
Amarillo Sunday News-Globe, Aug. 18 ,  1 99 1 .  In an article on Texas redistricting, Thomas B. Edsall of the 
Washington Post said: "Under amendments to the [Voting Rights] acL in 1 982 and Supreme Court rulings since then, 
legislatures drawing district lines in areas with histories of racially polarized voting are effectively required Lo create 
districts giving blacks and Hispanics voling majorities whenever reasonably possible." Edsall, "Another Candidate 
for the Endangered Species List White Democrats," Washington Post National Weekly Edition, June 3-9, 199 1 ,  p. 
12. During the Terrazas v. Slagle trial before a three-judge federal panel, Sen. Sibley asked Sen. Eddie Bernice
Johnson whether she had repeatedly told colleagues during the session " If  you can draw a minority district, you must 
draw a minority district. " Agreeing that she did, she justified the statement as reflecting her understanding of the 
Voting Rights Acl. Trial Transcript, Dec. 12, 199 1 ,  at 253. 
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E: 1 99 1 : THE SEQUEL 
1 .  Circumstances Changed, Lessons Learned 
Republican gains in Texas during the 1 980s -- a rise in State House members from 38 to 57 and 
in congressmen from 5 to 8 -- had the paradoxical effect of increasing Democratic cohesion and power 
during the 1 99 1  reapponionment.303 Instead of holding the governorship, enjoying a de facto 
alliance with the conservative legislative leadership, and facing a loosely organized opposition, Texas 
Republicans in 1 99 1  confronted a newly elected and partisan Democratic governor, Ann Richards, and 
more moderate and less fractionated Democratic legislative and congressional delegations. The jump 
in Republican membership in the legislature also meant that African-Americans and Latinos made up a 
larger proponion of the Democrats -- 34% of the 1 8 1  members of the two houses, as opposed to 26% 
in 1 98 1 .  More than ever, Democrats could not ignore their minority group members, and blacks and 
Hispanics appeared to be an ever more tempting targets for Republican deal makers. As in 1 98 1 ,  
some minority politicians seemed receptive. "The best friend that minorities have," announced 
Houston City Councilman Ben Reyes, "is the Republican Pany."304 
The census results and the development of computer technology interacted with politics and legal 
developments to set the stage for reapportionment in 1 991 . For one thing, the burgeoning of the 
state ' s  population added three seats to the congressional delegation, which made it possible to satisfy 
new demands while maintaining incumbents. But since most of the population growth occurred either 
in Republican-leaning suburbs or among Hispanics in Houston and South Texas, the new seats could 
go in two very different demographic, political, and geographical directions.305 For another, the 
widely noted undercount, which was especially concentrated among minorities, and the decision by 
political appointees of the Bush Administration not to correct or update the results of the original 
census heightened the alienation of minority activists from the GOP.306 For a third ,  rapid, frequent, 
and inexpensive redrawing of boundaries became possible and vinually inevitable during the 
consideration of district lines because of the extremely fine-grained population information made 
303The Texas legislature became more partisan throughout the decade of the 1 980s. Robert Harmel and Keith 
E. Hamm, "Development of a Party Role in a No-Party Legislature," Western Political Quarterly, 39 ( 1986), 79-92. 
304Alan Bernstein, "Seminar is held on plan to form Hispanic district," HC, Feb. 3, 1 99 1 , p. 4C. 
305Alan Bernstein, "New 'Hispanic district' pushed," HC, March 2 1 ,  1 99 1 , p. I A . 
306R.G. Ratcliffe, "Census revise may add congressional seat," HC, March 23, 1 99 1 ,  p.30A; Alan Bernstein, 
"Republicans, Democrats agree on remapping for minority vote," ibid. , March 24, 1 99 1 ,  p. 2C, c . l ;  Sam Attlesey, 
" Minorities amass arsenal for redistricting 'war'," DMN, April 1 5, 1 99 1 . 
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available by the Census Bureau; because hardware and software developments facilitated the 
recalculation of linked political and ethnic statistics with every major or minor boundary change; and 
because the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Karcher v. Daggett in 1 983 that every population 
deviation between congressional districts was constitutionally suspect meant that a very large number 
of city and county boundaries would have to be breached.307 As the Chairman of the House 
Redistricting Committee noted, "because of the tight [population] tolerance the courts have approved, 
there is no way that we can avoid county cuts. "308 Technical progress and inflexible legal rules, in 
other words, inevitably increased the conflicts in and the complexity of the redistricting process.309 
For a fourth, numerous successful minority voting dilution cases during the 1980s, particularly the 
massive documentation of racially polarized voting and discrimination in Williams v. City of 
Dallas,310 issued in 1 990 on the eve of reapportionment, surely reminded the legislators of their 
potential liability if their plans failed to allow Hispanics and African-Americans an equal opportunity 
with Anglos to elect candidates of their choice. 
Anglo Democrats had also learned certain lessons from the 1 98 1  experience. Nol only were they 
better organized this time, but they did not ignore finances. In 1 98 1 ,  only the conservative 
Democrat-Republican coalition had brandished promises of campaign money before legislators during 
reapportionment. A decade later, the Democratic congressmen most obviously threatened by 
redrawing lines, Martin Frost of the 24th and John Bryant of the 5th, had made 1 990 campaign 
contributions of $56,700 to state legislators. Frost alone contributed to 19 of the 23 Democratic 
winners in the Stale Senate and 45 of the 92 in the House, gifts that probably at least assured him an 
audience to plead his case.31 1  Moreover, early in the process, Democrats decided to make minorities 
a better offer than Republicans could afford to tender. Republicans initially hoped that one or two of 
307Sam Alllesey, "RedistricLing work proceeds under cloud of liLigaLion," DMN, Aug. 25, 1 991 . 
308Texas House Floor Debale, Transcripl of Audiotapes, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p.7. 
3091l is disingenuous for opponenls of I.he 1 99 1 -92 reapportionments to compare Lhe number of divisions in 
counties and precincts wilh I.hose of Lhe 1 980s plans, because I.he "zero Lolerance" Lhal many redistriclers thought 
Lhe Karcher decision required forced many more cuts. For I.he disingenuily, see Yorhees 's dissent in Shaw v. Barr, 
al 477; Vera v. Richards, supra, n. X, at 1 334. 
31°734 F.Supp. 1 3 1 7  (N.D. Tex. 1 990). For a listing and exlcnsive discussion of other cases see Robert 
Brischetto, David R. Richards, Chandler Davidson, and Bernard Grofman, "Texas," in Davidson and Grofman, eds., 
Quiet Revolution in the South: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-1990 (Princeton, N.J . :  Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1994), 233-70. 
3 1 1Chuck Alston, "Incumbents Share the Wealth, With Redislricting in Mind," Congressional Quarterly Weekly 
Report, 49, #21 (May 3 1 ,  1 991) ,  pp. 1 343-50. 
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the three new congressional seats would be located in the suburbs, and both leaders and followers 
pushed for this. Hoping to head off a minority-Republican coalition, knowing that, except in 
extraordinary circumstances, every minority seat was a Democratic seat, and realizing that they would 
be able to craft districts to accommodate both new minority and incumbent Democratic positions, the 
Democrats announced that all three of the new districts should go to minorities -- Latino districts in 
. Houston and South Texas and a black district in Dallas.312 
2. The Second Battle of Dallas
With Democrats in control of the legislature and the executive, with both political parties and all 
of the pertinent leaders at least rhetorically committed to a new African-American congressional 
district in Dallas, with a Dallas county black population now amounting to 65.3% of the ideal 
congressional district, with extremely detailed ethnic and general population statistics available, and 
with a black State Senator, Eddie Bernice Johnson, as chair of the relevant subcommittee, it should 
have been relatively painless to agree on congressional district lines in the Metroplex. As Martin Frost 
put it optimistically when he endorsed the principle of a black Dallas district nearly a year before 
census data became available, "The minority population exists in Dallas County to create a 
majority-minority district. It 's just a matter of drawing the lines."313 Had the process taken place 
behind closed doors, without any necessity for public posturing and no premium on disagreements, 
instead of a relatively open process with plenty of opportunity for comments, cri ticisms, and 
redraftings, consensus would no doubt have come more quickly. Messiness is often a byproduct of 
reform. 
The Frost and Bryant strategy was simple. There were two keys to electing a black member of 
Congress: first, make sure that no strong Anglo candidate ran in the district by giving potential 
candidates other winnable districts; second, make sure that the black population of the district 
comprised a comfortable majority of a probable Democratic primary electorate, and that the district 
contained enough reliable non-black Democrats to blunt any likely Republican campaign. The fi rst 
principle, conveniently enough for the Anglo Democrats, suggested keeping Frost in his Oak Cliff 
base, letting him retain some South Dallas blacks, and cannibalizing Republican Joe Barton's 6th 
District, which stretched south from Dallas and Tarrant counties, to include enough Anglo Democrats 
to send Frost back to Washington. Bryant 's 5 th District would head south and east from its starting 
point in Dallas county. As the fourth-ranking Democrat on the influential Rules Committee in the 
312Alan Bernstein, "Republicans, Democrats agree on remapping for minority vote," HC, March 24, 1 99 1 ,  p.2C, 
c. l ;  Sam Attlesey, "Democrats land heavy blows in redistricting,"DMN, April 7, 1 99 1 ;  Dave McNeely, "Redistricting
mostly pluses for Democrats," AAS, April 2 1 ,  199 1 ,  p. B l .  
313Ed Housewright, "Minority congressional district urged," DMN, July 14 ,  1 990, p. 35A, c . 1 .  
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House and the new chainnan of "IMPAC 2000," the national redistricting ann of the Democratic pany, 
Frost's  growing national power and proven fundraising ability would enable him to do well in a 
substantially redrawn district. Bryant, a practiced campaigner, would also survive.314 The second 
principle suggested that the proportion of minorities did not have to be overwhelming, certainly not the 
much-mentioned 65% target, if a large number of the Anglos in the district could be expected to vote 
in the Republican primary. If  the Dallas black district, early on given the number 30, went north into 
the affluent "Park Cities" (Highland Park and University Park), in other words, it could be fairly 
compact in shape and still leave enough blacks outside its southerly edge to keep Frost and Bryant 
happy and reelected .3 15 These principles were implicit in the proposal agreed on by the Democratic 
members of Congress, which made district 30 a 6 1  % combined minority district, 43% black and 19% 
Latino, and which, a historian hired by Frost contended on the basis of a statistical analysis of Dallas 
elections, could be carried by a black candidate. The keys were black and Anglo turnout in the 
primary, the level of Anglo Democratic support for a black candidate in the general election, and the 
relatively high percentage of Republicans -- 40% for President Bush in 1 988 and 45% for Senator Phil 
Gramm in 1 990 - - which meant that even with only 43% of the population, blacks alone might 
comprise two-thirds or more of the nonnal Democratic vote.316  
But this was not the key for Sen. Johnson, who astonished her colleagues by announcing her 
candidacy for the seat even as its boundaries were being debated and who had more power to set its 
limits than anyone else did.317 The key for her was to make it black enough to satisfy demands for 
a district that African-Americans could win without coalescing with anyone else, demands that had 
314R.G . Ratcliffe, "Redistricting becomes the ultimate power play," HC, Dec. 23, 1 990; Seth Kanton, "Dallas 
congressman's stock rising in the 1990s," AAS, Dec. 23, 1 990. 
315Richard S .  Dunham, "Johnson's redistricting plan seen as slap Lo DemocraL<;," DTH, May 1 ,  199 1 ;  Dunham, 
"Minority seat may spell peril for 3 congressmen," ibid., May 5, 199 1 .  
316Sam Alllesey, "Minorities assail lines proposed for new district," DMN, April 1 6, 1 99 1 ;  R.G. Ratcliffe, 
"Witness says black could win in Dallas," HC, April 1 6, 1 99 1 ;  Dave McNeely, "Redistricting mostly pluses for 
Democrats," AAS, April 2 1 ,  1 991 , p. B 1 ;  Susan B .  Glasser, "For Texas Redistricting, IL' s Make or Break Time," Roll 
Call, May 20, 199 1 ;  Allan J. Lichunan, "Analysis of Proposed Minority Congressional District, Dallas County, 
Texas," (typescript, July, 1 99 1 ). If only 55-60% of the district's voters could be expected to participate in a 
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43/60 or more than two-thirds of the expected voters in a Democratic primary. If they united behind the black 
candidate, this left a. good deal of slippage for a younger ·age structure and a lower turnout among blacks, even if 
a black candidate did not get a single Hispanic or Anglo vote. 
317Gardner Selby, "Johnson confirms she'll seek congressional seat in '92," DTH, May 16, 1 99 1 .  
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festered since the days of the "Coalition for Minority Representation," of which she was a leading 
member,31 8  but not black enough to elect someone else, particularly her chief riv al, Dallas County 
Commissioner John Wiley Price. At first, Johnson proposed a district 30 that was 45% black and 2 1  % 
Hispanic.319  
The response to this plan is worth considering in  considerable detail, because it demonstrates the 
widespread understanding among Republicans as well as Democrats, Anglos as well as Afri­
can-Americans, that the shape of the 30th District would be detennined by personal and partisan, as 
well as by racial factors. As Tom Pauken, then a radio talk show host and columnist for the Dallas 
Times-Herald, and now State Chainnan of the Republican Party, noted, the argument was not over 
establishing a black district, but over whether to include Anglo and Hispanic precincts currently in 
Frost's district in the Grand Prairie area " in order to give her [Johnson] an advantage over John Wiley 
Price in a Democratic primary race. Price has very little political support outside the black 
community. "320 Frost agreed, telling the national magazine Roll Call that "The argument at this 
point is not over the minority content of the Dallas district. The argument is over white Democrats in 
Grand Prai lie and Pleasant Grove. "321 Sen. Johnson herself noted that she 'd gotten considerable 
support in her 1 986 State Senate contest from Anglos in Grand Prairie, where her sister was Assistant 
Superintendent of Instruction in the public schools.322 She was interested in extending the 30th 
District in that direction. 
318Lawrence E. Young, "GOP, blacks assail congressional map," DMN, Aug. 9, 199 1 ;  Fred Blair (D-Dallas), in 
Transcript of Texas House of Representatives Floor Debate, Aug. 21 , 1 991 , pp. 1 96-7; Lawrence E. Young, "GOP, 
blacks assail congressional map," DMN, Aug. 9, 1 99 1 ; Sam Attlcsey, "Johnson Lo press for black district," ibid. , Aug. 
10, 1 99 1 ;  ALtlesey, "Remap decision called unlikely in session," ibid., Aug. 12, 1 99 1 ;  R.G. Ratcliffe, "Drawing 
outside the lines," HC, Aug. 19 ,  1 99 1 ;  Dave McNeely, "House narrowly passes redistricting plan,"  MS, Aug. 22, 
1 99 1 ;  Herbert A. Sample, "House OKs minority district plan," DTH, Aug. 22, 1 99 1 ;  Texas Congressional 
Redistricting Staff, "Narrative of Voting Rights Act Considerations in Affected Districts" (September, 1 99 1), p.2; 
Eddie Bernice Johnson testimony in Terrazas v. Slagle, Dec. 1 2, 1 99 1 ,  pp. 237-38, 242 of Trial Transcript. 
319Susan B .  Glasser, "For Texas Redistricting, It's Make or Break Time," Roll Call, May 20, 199 1 .  The district 
was actually no more safely black than the Frost proposal. Since only 33% of the district's vote went for President 
Bush in 1 988, perhaps 67% might be expected to vote in the Democrntic primary. 45/67= .672, while in the Frost 
plan, 43/60 = .712 .  
320paukcn, "GOP can expect gains in redistricting plan," DTH, Feb. 1 7, 1 991 . 
321Susan B. Glasser, "For Texas Redistricting, It's Make or Break Time," Roll Call, May 20, 1 99 1 .  See similarly, 
Thomas B. Edsall, "Another .Candidate for the Endangered Species List: White Democrats," Washington Post 
(National Weekly Edition), June 3-9, 199 1 ,  pp. 1 2- 1 3 .  
322yerrazas v .  Slagle, Dec. 12, 1 991 Trial Transcript, p .  246. 
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The fact that most of the major newspapers covering the Metroplex reported that jockeying by 
politicians within the black community helped to shape the lines of the 30th District indicates how 
widespread that view was, if not before the appearance of the articles, then certainly afteiwards. 
Dallas Morning News: "While Ms. Johnson will have a hard time cutting many of the commissioner's 
[ i .e . ,  Price's] present southern Dallas County constituents out of the district, she no doubt will try to 
draw it to include more white precincts in Oak Cliff and Grand Prairie. Such voters would consider 
Ms. Johnson far more acceptable than the combative Mr. Price."323 Ft. Worth Star-Tribune: 
"Johnson is expected to draw a district somewhat less dominated by minority residents than Price's 
precinct."324 Austin American-Statesman: " Ironically, they [Johnson and Frost] are battling not over 
black Democrats, but over white ones in Grand Prairie and Oak Cliff. Johnson wants the white 
Democrats in the district because as a moderate Democrat, she fears a challenge from her left if the 
district becomes too minority-dominated. Frost wants them to be sure he can win the general election 
against a Republican."325 Dallas Times-Herald: "In the end, however, the choice of a black 
representative could boil down to which white voters are used to supplement the new district's 
minority core. If northern Dallas County Republicans are included in the district, black voters would 
dominate the primary, perhaps helping a more liberal candidate. If Democratic voters in Grand Prairie 
or Irving are included in the district, the Democratic primary would be split between blacks, Hispanics 
and whites, assisting a more centrist candidate or enhancing a white candidacy. As one Dallas 
Democratic strategist put it, 'Go north and help John Wiley. Go west and you help Eddie 
Bernice. " '326 
Driving the 30th District west to pick up Anglo Democrats from Frost 's 24th and south to try to 
attain the symbolically important 50% black population goal , which became a popular slogan that no 
politician could ignore, however meaningless i t  was in practical electoral terms, had two consequences 
that largely determined the shape of congressional districts in Dallas and Tarrant counties. First, the 
borders of the pan of the 30th District outside the black population core had to be drawn with some 
care in order not to take in too many Anglos and Hispanics. In a sense, this had nothing to do with 
race. To win the 30th District, Johnson needed reliable Anglo Democratic votes from her Senate 
district, but if she did not produce a district that blacks could indisputably control, she risked losing 
black voters to John Wiley Price or Texas House member Fred Blair. It was not because Sen. Johnson 
wanted a segregated constituency or a segregated district that she drew irregular lines on the map, but 
323Barta and Rennell, "Sen. Johnson will have big say in drawing new minority district," DMN, Jan. 20, 1991 .  
324Kaye NorthcotL, "New districting lines present many angles," FWST, Mar. 1 7, 1 99 1 .  
325Dave McNeely, "Redistricting mostly pluses for Democrats," AAS, April 2 1 , 1 991 , p .  B l .  
3�ichard S .  Dunham, "Minority seat may spell peril for 3 congressmen," DTH, May 5, 1 99 1 .  
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precisely because she was trying to protect an interracial coalition that would send her, and not 
another, more radical politician, to Washington. To anonymous critics in the legislature and Congress, 
it appeared that "her only interest was in creating a district that she could win. "327 Second, the more 
Democratic voters, black and white, that Johnson took from Frost, the more he had to look for 
substitutes. Eventually, he found them in Tarrant county, extending the 24th to encompass most of the 
legislative district of Garfield Thompson (D-Fort Worth), the county 's  only African-American state 
legislator. This became part of a complicated three-way swap in which Frost gained black areas from 
Fort Worth Democratic Congressman Pete Geren, Geren acquired white Democrats from the proposed 
30th, and Frost gave up South Dallas black areas to the 30th.328 The trade made all of the poli-
ticians and, arguably, their constituents, better off, and it certainly forwarded the goal of interracial 
coalitions: The ideological balance of the 24th did not shift so much as to endanger the moderate 
Frost, who continued to represented a black influence district; the comparatively moderate Johnson329 
got close enough to the magic number of 50% which had the effect of deterring more racially militant 
challengers; and the more conservative Geren retained enough minority constituents to keep the district 
from turning Republican, but not enough to encourage Anglo liberal opposition to himself. 
3. Republicans and "Fairness" 
What made moderate Democrats happy made Republicans apoplectic, and they charged Democrats 
not with a racial, but with a partisan purpose. "This plan," State House member Kent Grusendorf 
(R-Arlington) said of the proposal that the House passed, "was drawn with only one thing in mind and 
3Z7Kaye Northcott, "Luck of the draw: Senator pushed for new Dallas district to be 50% black population," 
FWST, Dec. 1 6, 1 99 1 .  
328Kaye Northcott, "House remap gives Frost big chunk o f  Fort Worth," FWST, Aug. 22, 1 99 1 ;  Dave McNeely, 
"House narrowly passes redistricting plan," AAS, Aug. 22, 1 99 1 ;  Herbert A. Sample, "House OKs minority district 
plan," DTH, Aug. 22, 199 1 ;  Frank Perkins and James Walker, "Geren says he was blind-sided on changes in district 
lines," FWST, Aug. 23, 199 1 .  
3�vidence o f  Johnson's moderation as a member o f  Congress comes from the Congressional Quarterly ' s  
"conservative coal ition" scores mentioned previously. I n  the 1 993 session of  Congress, Johnson voted with the 
conservative coalition 34% of the time, which was quite comparable to the 30% score attained by Dallas liberal John 
Bryant of the 5th district and the 40% score of Houston "Hispanic district" congressman Gene Green, and much more 
conservative than the 6% obtained by Craig Washington, the state's  only other African-American member. Martin 
Frost, who had scored 39% and 43% in 1989 and 1 990 soared Lo 56% in 199 1 ,  7 1 %  in 1992, and 79% in 1 993 , 
apparently "voting his district" each time, but shi fting his behavior as the ideological complexion of the voters that 
he would have to face changed. Frost 's shifts as he first anticipated ( 199 1 )  and then received ( 1 992-93) a more 
conservative constituency constitute strong testimony on the responsiveness of members of Congress to the voters. 
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LhaL is Lo protect Democratic incumbents."330 One of his colleagues appl ied the generalization 
directly to the boundaries of the 30th District: " It has nothing to do with minority representation 
because if we were really concerned about minority representation, we could have drawn this map in 
such a way that minorities were considered and not simply to elect Democrats. "331 
Republicans were no more consistent in their dedication to compact shapes and municipal and 
county boundaries than Democrats were. Thus, they vehemently protested the move to reduce Joe 
Barton's 6th District from an elongated Dallas-to-Houston district to a more compact Metroplex 
suburban one. The old 6th, often referred to as "the most gerrymandered district in Texas, "  had been 
designed for conservative Democrat Olin Teague during the late 1 960s and had survived to become 
first Phil Gram m ' s  in 1 978, and when he left for the Senate in 1 984, Joe Barton 's. It was the subject 
of a much-quoted description by State Senators Oscar Mauzy and "Babe" Schwanz that has been more 
recently misquoted as applying to the North Carolina 1 2th District: " If you left from the north," 
Mauzy and Schwartz solemnly pronounced, "and went down Interstate 1 5  from Dallas in a four-door 
sedan with all four doors open, and you drove all the way south LO Houston, you would kill or 
seriously maim half the population in the district. " Barton, the chief Republican congressional liaison 
on redistricting, insisted that he should be allowed to keep the district, which contained College 
Station, much as it was because he was a Texas A&M alumnus and his children were then attending 
the same university.332 Nor did Democrats object to the lack of compactness of the 6th District. 
They just needed to chop pans of it off, as Houston Chronicle reporter R.G. Ratcliffe put it, "so they 
can create a black congressional district in Dallas while maintaining the security of two districts held 
by l iberal Anglo Democrats. "333 Moreover, Republicans, who in 198 l had staunchly favored 
splitting Corpus Christi along ethnic lines, just as strongly protested when in 1 99 1 ,  Democrats spli t  
several West Texas cities in  the same manner.334 Neither party held closely to such principles when 
partisan or other advantage conflicted with them. 
330Kaye Northcott, "House remap gives Frost big chunk of Fort Worth," FWST, Aug. 22, 1 991 . Such statements 
caused Rep. Grusendorf some difficul ties during his testimony in Vera v. Richards, in which he argued thal the only 
motive of Democratic line-drawers was racial. 
331Texas House Floor Debate, Transcript from Audiotape 10-B, Aug. 25, 1 99 1 ,  comments of Mr. Hill, pp. 27-3 1 .  
332Sam Attlesey, "Sprawling U.S. House district," DMN, May 1 ,  1 99 1 .  
333Ratcliffe, "Redistricting becomes the ultimate power play," HC, Dec. 23, 1990. Simi larly, see Dave McNeely, 
"Redistricting mostly pluses for Democrats," AAS, April 2 1 ,  1 991 , p.B l .  
3�exas House Floor Debate, Transcript of Audiotapes, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  pp. 1 36-40. 
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Indeed, partisan advantage, not surprisingly, best explains the overall differences between 
congressional redistricting plans offered by Republicans and Democrats. Although Texas has no 
partisan registration, Republican consultants paid special attention to the patterns in "down-ticket" 
races such as the Court of Criminal Appeals. Despite substantially less participation, perhaps 
particularly among minority voters, compared to that in contests for governor, senator, or 
attorney-general, the votes in these lower visibility races, insiders think, give one the best estimate of 
the core partisanship of each district.335 The 1 992 results provide considerable support for that view. 
Candidates from the same political party carried both congressional and Criminal Appeals Court 
contests in 28 of the 30 congressional districts.336 In other words, in all but two districts, the 
Criminal Appeals Court returns accurately predicted the congressional winner. 
Democrats carried 2 1  of the 30 congressional seats in 1 992 and their  candidate for the Court of 
Criminal Appeals prevailed in 2 1 ,  as well. I f  the votes are reaggregated to detennine who would have 
carried each congressional district in the Criminal Appeals race if other plans had been in effect, every 
major Democratic plan337 gives the same number -- 21 Democrats. By contrast, all Republican plans 
give the Democrats between 1 5  and 1 8  seats.338 Using regression techniques similar to those I 
employed in Section III , above, an expert witness for the State of Texas in Vera v. Richards estimated 
that under the plan proposed by the plaintiffs in that case, Democrats would have carried only 1 7  seats 
in 1992. 339 If the 1 990 governor's race is taken as an indicator, Democratic plans produce 17  to 1 9  
Democratic victories, while Republican plans range from 1 3  LO 1 5 .340 The chief difference between 
Republican and Democratic control of Texas reapportionment, by these measures, was four to six seats 
in  Congress. 
In private, where they did not need Lo posture for the press, Republicans admitted that they did 
not care much about ethnic minority interests in redistricting. Responding to the Texas Legislative 
335Testimony of Jim Duncan, Terrazas v. Slagle Trial Transcript, Dec . 1 1 , 1 99 1 , pp. 60-63, 96- 1 00, 1 20. 
3:i&rhe two exceptions were District 4,  where Democrat Ralph Hal l is particularly popular, and District 23, where 
Democrat Albert Bustamante was plagued by scandal. 
337The major plans were given the following numbers in the legislature's computer system: 500, 505, 525, 55 1 ,  
552, 574, and 657. 
338The chief Republican plans were designated 503, 52 1 ,  557, and 6 1 5 . 
339"Final Report of Allan J. Lichtman," Vera v. Richards, p. 1 1 . 
340Al l  of these results are calculated from data provided by the Texas Legislative Council. Election data in this 
form for years before 1 992 were available to legislators when they drew and assesed plans during 199 1 .  
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Survey, a poll run by University of Texas-Dallas Government Professor Greg Thielemann and funded 
by three newspapers, most Republican members of the State House ranked "helping minori ties" last of 
their four priorities. On a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being most important, the average Republican score 
for "helping minorities" was 3 .46. "Helping your party" ranked first at 1 .66 for Republicans. 
(Democratic House members ranked "helping minorities" at 2 .06, just behind "protecting yourself' at 
2.03 as their most important goal.)341 
In public, Republicans claimed, as they had a decade earlier, to be the erstwhile best friends of 
African-Americans and Hispanics, and they appropriated the euphemistic title used by others in 1 98 1 ,  
referring to themselves as the "Texas Fair Redistricting Committee."342 "When you draw minority 
districts," Gusendorf explained in April, 199 1 ,  "you enhance Republicans. Redistricting is a time 
when Republicans and minorities have a great deal of common interest." Stripped of Gusendorf's 
euphemisms, the Republican strategy, Dave McNeely of the Austin American-Statesman noted, "was to 
help m inority group members pack as many blacks and Hispanics as possible into some inner-city 
congressional districts -- and to create suburban districts friendly to the GOP."343 As McNeely 
suggested and Republican redistricting consultants made explicit, packing the most reliable Democratic 
voters was most efficient for Republicans if African-Americans and Latinos could be treated as unitary 
and cohesive.344 Then, all one had to do was to set and reach some artificial target to create a 
"minority district," whether it contained enough actual minority voters to elect anyone or not. One 
Republican consultant even contended that minority candidates would do better in combination 
minority districts than in black or Hispanic districts alone.345 
341Stuart Eskenazi, "Redistricting poses problems," San Antonio light, Mar. 12 1 ,  198 1 ,  p.A- 1 .  
342Testimony o f  Mary Ann Wyatt i n  Terrazas v.  Slagle, Dec. 10, 1 99 1 ,  p. 15 .  Revealingly, Ms. Wyatt 
immediately slipped into calling the committee the "Republican Redistricting Committee. " p. 16. 
343Dave McNeely, "Redistricting mostly pluses for Democrats ," AAS, April 2 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p.B l .
3�his was also the strategy followed by the plaintiffs' expert witness in Vera v. Richards, Prof. Ronald Weber, 
in drawing districts at the trial stage. The suit was reportedly largely financed by Republicans. 
345Henry Flores testimony in Terrazas v. Slagle, Dec. 1 1 ,  1 991 , pp. 1 38- 1 65. By combining the percentages of 
blacks and Hispanics before comparing them to election returns, and by using a small number of unrepresentative 
elections, Flores rendered his results meaningless. See testimony of Allan Lichtman, Dec. 1 2, 1 99 1 ,  pp. 25 1 -60. 
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4. The Houston "Hispanic District"
People in Dallas and Houston knew that minority cohesion could not be so blithely assumed. In 
1983, the only Hispanic on the Dallas City Council ,  Ricardo Medrano, lost a runoff to Paul Fielding, 
an Anglo, in a district that was approximately a third black, a third Latino, and a third Anglo. 
Although African-Americans had supported Medrano, a member of a prominent Hispanic political 
family, in his first election in 1979, black political leaders refused to back him in 1983 because many 
felt that he had been tardy in taking action to abate pollution from a lead smelting operation and 
because he refused to pledge to endorse a black for the position in the future. At a press conference 
after his defeat, Medrano exploded. Progressive Voters League leaders John Wiley Price, Mattie Nash, 
and Jesse Jones, he charged, "have tom the foundation (of the black-brown coalition) down. Judas got 
30 pieces of silver -- they got more than 30. Money, that's always been the bottom line."346 
Houston in 199 1  suffered an even more high-profile example of the breakdown of minority 
cohesion, as black State House member Sylvester Turner lost a bitter mayoral race to Anglo Bob 
Lanier. Although ugly personal rumors circulating about Turner may have damaged his campaign, 
Hispanic support for Lanier was public and overwhelming, and may have cost Turner election as the 
first African-American mayor of a major Texas city. "We turned out our voters for Lanier in the 
mayoral election," Lisa Hernandez of Southwest Voter Registration Education Project later 
boasted.347 
The first plan presented by Sen. Eddie Bernice Johnson for a "Hispanic congressional district" in 
Houston made the district only 44% Hispanic in population and excluded the home of the principal 
Latino on the House Redistricting Committee, Roman Martinez. Widely rumored to covet the seat for 
himself, Martinez was said to have been furious about Johnson 's move. Without naming names, 
Johnson remarked that the Houston situation was complicated by the fact that some Hispanic leaders 
wanted to cut the homes of other Hispanics out of the prospective district.348 That was only a small 
part of the complexity. 
The census of 1 990 found 644,935 persons of Hispanic origin in Harris county, a more than 
sufficient number to fonn a congressional district of the ideal size for Texas of 566,2 17 .  Whether
346Ford Fessenden, "Progressive Voters president says Medrano's job is on line," DTH, April 14,  1 983; Ester M. 
Bauer, "Medrano blames black leaders for defeat," DMN, April 17, 1 983, p. 20-A; Sam Atllesey, "Minorities split 
on suit for districts," ibid. , April 1 7 ,  1 983, p. 2 1 A; Ford Fessenden, "Voters oust Medrano in runoff," DTH, April 
17 ,  1983, p. l A. 
347Robert Eckels, Testimony in Terrazas v. Slagle, Dec. 10, 199 1 ,  pp. 1 1 9-26; Lori Rodriguez, "One Vote, One 
Voice; Through redistricting and growing voter registration, Hispanics say, a new political age is dawning in Texas," 
HC Texas Magazine, May 3, 1992, p. 10. 
348R.G . Ratcliffe, "Redistricting plan draws battle lines," HC, May 1 ,  1 99 1 .  
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enough of them could be united without damaging the chances of blacks, who had held the 1 8th 
District since 1 972, and without alienating surrounding Anglo incumbents was more problematic. 
Craig Washington 's 1 8th District actually contained more Hispanics, 37% of its voting age population, 
than blacks, who made up just 34.5%. Extracting the fairly interspersed Hispanic population and 
adding blacks from three adjacent districts, each of which was about 20% black, would somehow have 
to be accomplished, everyone assumed, in order to avoid retrogression under the Voting Rights 
Act.349 Since only 30-45% of the Hispanics of voting age were then registered to vote in Harris 
County,350 and since blacks could hardly be assumed to be certain to back a Latino candidate in a 
primary, the total population would have to be substantially more than 50% Hispanic in order to assure 
the Hispanic community of an opportunity to elect a candidate of its choice. 
There were essentially two ways to get that population -- go northeast and take it from Republican 
Jack Fields's 8th District, which would please Democrats and make it impossible to create another 
suburban Republican district north of Houston, or go southeast and take it from Democrat Mike 
Andrews 's 25th District, which would alienate Democrats. Republicans proposed a plan that gutted 
Andrews 's district to create a seat that was 47% Hispanic and 1 5 %  black, and therefore, with 
approximately equal numbers of black and Hispanic voters, a district of maximum potential interethnic 
conflict. Andrews's house was carefully placed several miles outside the line of the Republicans ' 
proposed 25th.35 1  There was no way to avoid mixing partisanship with the attempt to create a new 
Hispanic district. 
In Houston as in Dallas, the jockeying of potential candidates for advantages combined with 
partisan factors to affect the shape of the new congressional district. Since the number of State 
Senators in Texas in 199 1 ,  3 1 ,  was almost the same as the number of members of Congress, 30, many 
State Senate districts overlapped considerably with congressional seats and, with experience in running 
campaigns in large, similar districts, Senators become the natural predators of congressional 
incumbents. Sen. Gene Green, a labor union-oriented Anglo Democratic state legislator from Houston 
349Dave McNeely, "Redistricting mostly pluses for Democrats," AAS, April 2 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p.B l .  I f  Hispanics, a large 
portion of whom were non-citizens or under 1 8  years old, were extracted from District 1 8  to build up the Hispanic 
population of District 29, the black percentage of District 18 would have to be actually raised to avoid retrogression, 
because blacks would comprise a smaller percentage of the voters in District 1 8  if Anglos were moved in when 
Hispanics were moved out. Whether or nOL the new District 18 needed Lo have a 5 1  % black population for 
African-Americans to have a good chance to elect a candidate of their choice is much less clear. Judge Jones's 
treatment of this issue, Vera v. Richards, p. 19 ,  which follows the narrative in the state's Section 5 Submission to 
the Department of Justice, is so simplistic as to be misleading. 
35°These figures are calculated from data supplied by the Texas Legislative Council at the congressional district 
level for districts partly or wholly lying in Harris County . 
351R.G. Ratcliffe, "GOP redistricting plan draws wrath of Democratic lawmakers," HC, April 30, 199 1 ,  p. 2 1A. 
The plan produced by Democratic members of Congress left Harris county blank. 
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for 20 years, was an obvious candidate for the new Houston seat, designated early on as the 29th. In 
his position as the principal line-drawer for Harris county congressional districts in the State House, 
Roman Martinez's "chief aim," according to one report, "is to draw a district that would exclude the 
home of state Sen. Gene Green." Since Green's home was in the northern part of Houston, this 
consideration tilted Roman Martinez and his mentor, City Councilman Ben Reyes, who was also 
interested in going to Congress, toward the pro-Republican option of moving the district south to 
attack Andrews.352 
Sen. Johnson's redrafted plan, which raised the Hispanic population percentage in the 29th to 56%, 
was thus not enough to satisfy Rep. Martinez, because Green 's home was left in the district. 353 In 
August, Martinez unveiled a plan that not only excluded Green's house, but also Baytown, which was 
the home territory of longtime LULAC activist Tony Campos, whose son Marc was supporting Al 
Luna, a bitter rival of Reyes and Martinez, for Congress. The percentages and shapes seemed to 
matter less than the personalities. "We've got that thing so close now, "  commented Democratic State 
Chairman Bob Slagle, who took an active role in the reapportionment, that "it's just a matter of 
everybody playing for an angle. "354 Finally, Green and Martinez met and agreed that neither would 
draw the other, or any other prospective Democratic candidate or even campaign consultant, out of the 
district. As finally meticulously drawn with help from the Southwest Voter Registration Education 
Project, which had ironically acquired i ts redistricting software without cost from the Republican 
National Committee earlier, when the Republicans were trying to woo minority activists in Texas, the 
29th was 60.6% Hispanic and 1 0.2% black in population, though only 55.4% Hispanic in voting age 
population and 26.3% in registered voters.355 
Partisanship, the desire to protect Anglo, as well as black incumbents in adjacent districts, and the 
personal struggles for power that are an inevitable concomitant of democracy combined with a desire 
352Juan R. Palomo, "Is Martinez out to get Andrews?" HP, April 30, 199 1 ,  p.A- 1 1 (quotation); Alan Bernstein, 
"Seminar is held on plan to form Hispanic district," HC, Feb. 3, 1 99 1 ,  p.3C; Sam Attlesey, "Minorities amass arsenal 
for redistricting 'war,"' DMN, April 1 5, 1 991 . 
353Michael Cinelli, "Hispanic-dominated district nearing reality as talks go on," HP, May 1 5 ,  1 99 1 ,  p.A- 17 ;  
Cinelli, "Senate panel OKs new congressional districts for Texas," ibid., May 1 6, 1 991 . 
354Gardner Selby, "Panel excludes Baytown in new 'Hispanic ' district," HP, Aug. 6, 199 1 ;  R.G. Ratcliffe, 
"Redistricting plan politics is charged," HC, Aug. 6, 1 99 1 ;  Ratcliffe, "Drawing outside the lines," ibid., Aug. 1 9, 
1 99 1 ;  Alan Bernstein and Jim Simmon, "Hispanics' eyes on the prize," ibid. , Dec. 22, 199 1 .  
355R.G. Ratcliffe, "Area Democrats O K  pact to form Hispanic congressional district, " HC, Aug. 24, 1 99 1 ;  
Gardner Selby, "GOP loses on congressional redistricting," HP, Aug. 1 5 , 199 1 ;  Selby, "Architects of new 29th 
District claim big victory for Hispanics," ibid. , Sept. 1 ,  1 99 1 ;  Alan Bernstein, "Group examines the gap between 
Hispanics, GOP," HC, Feb. 18 ,  1 99 1 ,  p.1  I A, c. 1 .  Registration and population statistics from Texas Legislative 
Council. 
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lo establish an ethnic district to shape its lines. To represent the complex story as if it were wholly 
determined by ethnicity would be to misunderstand it fundamentally. And as if to prove that the 29th 
was not a "segregated district," its representative solely dedicated to a single group's undifferentiated 
interest, three Latinos -- Ben Reyes, Al Luna, and Chief Municipal Judge Sylvia Garcia -- contested 
the Democratic primary with Gene Green.356 After two bitter, racially polarized runoffs with Reyes, 
Green, with a combination of National Rifle Association and labor union financing and backed by a 
coalition of Anglos, many blacks, and even a few Mexican-Americans, became the congressman from 
the "Hispanic district."357 The Vera v.  Richards plaintiffs ' version of the district would have cut the 
Hispanic portion of the voting age population by nearly half, insuring Anglo control for the forseeable 
future, if it had been adopted.358 
5. A District of His Own 
Hispanic population growth in South Texas was so great that there was little controversy over 
whether to draw a new district there. Nor was the state about to repeat its 1 98 1  decision to pack one 
356When Reyes entered the race for Congress, Ramon Martinez dropped out, deciding instead to contest 
incumbent Sen. John Whitmire, an Anglo, whose seat, designed by a federal district court, was 57% Hispanic in · 
population. Putting together a coalition of Anglos and blacks, but getting only about 20% of the Latino vote, 
Whitmire eked out a 52-48% victory in a nastily fought runoff with Martinez. Alan Bernstein, "Hispanic voter group 
backs Sen. Whitmire; Challenger Martinez claims it's spite," HC, Feb. 1 5 ,  1992, p.A26; Bob Tutt, "Martinez, 
Whitmire face Senate runoff; Hard duel in 1 5th District stays close," ibid., March 1 1 ,  1 992, p.A25; Bernstein , 
"Hispanic drive for power is up to 3 candidates with previous ties," ibid., March 1 2, 1 992, p.A 14;  Paul Burka, "Battle 
Lines," Texas Monthly (March, 1 992), pp. 50-56; Lori Rodriguez, "Some gain seen in narrow losses," ibid. , April 
1 8, 1 992, p.A23. 
357 Alan Bernstein, "Race for new congressional seat begins to gather speed; Democrats Green, Luna nab 
endorsements," HC, Jan. 3 1 ,  1 992, p.A2 1 ;  Bernstein ,  "Hispanic voter group backs Sen. Whitmire; Challenger 
Martinez claims it's spite," ibid., Feb. 15 ,  1 992, p.A26; Bernstein,  "Luna blasts opponents as campaign catches fire," 
ibid., Feb. 29, 1992, p.A l ;  Bernstein,  "Personalities and populations; 29th District primaries stir Hispanics," ibid. , 
March 1 ,  1 992, p. 1 of "Voter's Guide"; Bernstein,  "Green's  campaign has plenty of green," ibid. , March 4 ,  1 992, 
p.Al6; Bernstein, "29th District poll indicates Reyes, Green head for runoff," ibid. , March 5 ,  1 992, p.A l ;  Bernstein,  
"Green, Reyes are heading for runoff in 29th District," ibid. , March 1 1 , 1992, p.A 1 ;  Bernstein, "Reyes' neighborhood 
is invaded by Green; Late tax payments by councilman hit," ibid. , March 27, 1 992, p.A.26; J im Simmon, "Green, 
Hispanic judges lambaste Reyes," ibid., March 3 1 ,  1 992, p.A 10; Bernstein,  Catherine Chriss, James Campbell, 
"Election '92; Green wins in tight race with Reyes, ibid. ,  April 1 5 ,  1 992, p.A l ;  Lisa Teachey, "Green, Reyes swap 
more heated charges," ibid., July 25, 1992, p.A28; Bernstein, "It's a rerun: Green defeats Reyes again;  5 1 .5% win 
deals blow to Hispanic activists," ibid. , July 29, 1 992, p.A l ;  Bernstein,  "Candidates put rush on District 29; Green, 
Ervin attempt to woo Reyes backers," ibid. , July 30, 1 992, p.A 17. 
358"Final Report of Allan J .  Lichtman," Vera v. Richards, at 26. 
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district with Hispanics, while leaving a next-door district with less than a working majority of Latinos, 
a decision of which the Justice Depanment and the federal couns in the 1 980s had emphatically 
disapproved. And the presence in the State Senate of an ambitious and popular legislator, Frank 
Tejeda, made the third minority congressional district in the state, the 28th, noncontroversial.359 
Drawn by and for Tejeda, the 28th provided him with virtually uncontested victories in the primary 
and general elections.360 
6. Race-Consciousness and the Process of Redistricting in Texas in 1 99 1
Seemingly recognizing that the legislature was moved by partisan and personal motives, as well as 
desires to allow African-Americans and Latinos to have equal opportunities with whites to elect 
candidates of their choice, which could be accomplished in Texas in the 1990s only in substantially 
minority districts,361 the plaintiffs in Vera v. Richards disregarded Justice O'Connor's explicit 
statements in Shaw v. Reno and announced the theory that any use whatsoever of knowledge about 
where people of different races lived would render a redistricting unconstitutional .362 It did not 
matter what the percentages of minorities in the resulting districts were or whether race was employed 
merely as a means to some other, non-racial end, such as incumbent protection.363 Thus, they 
359Kemper Diehl, "Congressional redistricting changing the.face of Texas," San Antonio Express, April 28, 199 1 .  
3000avid Elliot, "Tejeda maps easy road to Congress," AAS, March 2 ,  1992. 
361Even though plaintiffs and defendants in the case differed on the proportion of minorities necessary in a district 
to elect a candidate of a particular minority and whether cohesion of Latinos and blacks could be assumed, they 
implicitly agreed that racial bloc voting by whites would prevent the election of minority candidates unless the 
proportion of minorities in a district were appreciable. 
362At points in her contradictory and loose-ended opinion, Judge Jones seemed implicitly to accept the plaintiffs' 
theory (Vera v. Richards, supra, note xxx, at 1 326-28, 1 339), but in the end (id, at 1 344-45), she rejected it because 
the districts did not appear excessively ugly to her eye and because the racial percentages in the irregularly drawn 
parts of the district did not constitute a large enough percentage of the total district to mauer to her. It is difficult 
to uncover the principle at work here. 
363Plaintiffs' Post Trial Brief in Vera v. Richards, at 1 -4. In their legal papers, plaintiffs only held to this theory 
inconsistenlly (see, e.g., id., at 5"6; Plaintiffs ' Proposed Findings of Fact at 1 1 - 1 2, par. 72), not bothering to pose 
any other legal theory formally prefaced by such locutions as "In the alternative . . .  " and not seeming to notice their 
striking contradictions. If a court were to accept the theory outlined in the text, then incumbent protection which 
involved drawing persons of one race in and those of another ethnic group out of a district would not constitute a 
non-racial explanation of district lines, but a racial one, and there would be no reason to ask a court to reject it, as 
the plainti ffs did in their Post Trial Brief at 5.  
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challenged not just the three new majority/minority districts, or even the nine total majority/minority 
districts, but all thiny districts in the state. In a less-developed, but apparently deeply felt companion 
theory, the Vera plaintiffs attacked any politically-conscious redistricting as unconstitutional under 
Reynolds v. Sims364 because it discriminated against voters whose candidates lost.365 
364377 U.S .  533 ( 1964). To accept this theory, the Supreme Court would have to reject not only common sense, 
but the well-established majority opinion of Justice White in Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S .Ct. 232 1 ,  233 1 -32 (1973), 
that "Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment." No Justice dissented 
from this part of White's opinion. 
36Slt is not clear how seriously this proposal to enable all-powerful courts to "take politics out of redistricting" 
was meant, and the three-judge panel only flirted with it (Vera v. Richards, supra, n. X, at 1 334). Under the 
plaintiffs ' doctrines, any congressional or legislative district that somehow managed to escape challenge as 
race-conscious would fall to political consciousness, putting all power in the hands of judges. That turning 
redistricting over to judges may not remove politics is suggested by the experience of Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F.Supp. 
828 (W.D.Tex. 1991) ,  in which a brazenly partisan former Texas legislator, Judge James Nowlin, was caught 
allowing his 1981  redistricting buddy, George Pierce, to draw part of the State Senate district in which Pierce 
subsequently ran. Despite Nowlin's self-righteous avowal that his only purpose was to empower ethnic minorities, 
his plan only slightly amended a previous Republican arrangement of lines, representatives of minority groups bitterly 
attacked his scheme, which paired seven Democratic and no Republican incumbents, and the 1992 outcome produced 
one less Latino and four fewer Democratic Senators than the plan that the legislature had adopted almost certainly 
would have. The casualties included the Democratic Senate Majority Leader and the Chairman of the Redistricting 
Committee. After an outcry over Nowlin's provable misdeeds, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals appointed a 
committee that conducted a short investigation and slapped the judge on the wrist. Still, it took more pressure to 
get Nowlin to recuse himself from the case. See Wayne Slater and Sam Attlesey, "Judges uphold congressional 
remap plan," DMN, Dec. 25, 1 99 1 ,  p. l A; "Federal judges OK congressional remap," Waco Tribune Herald, Dec. 25, 
1 99 1 ;  "Redistricting Effect Unclear," Tyler Courier-Times, Dec. 26, 1 991 , p. l ;  Jim Krane, "Court redraws Zaffirini's 
district," Laredo Morning Times, Dec. 27, 199 1 ;  R.G. Ratcliffe, "Redistricting draws line in political sand," HC, Jan. 
6, 1 992, p.1 A; Ratcliffe, "Democrats see only even odds for voting plan," ibid., Jan. 8, 1992; Ratcliffe, "Democratic 
redistricting plans OK'd," ibid. , Jan. 9, 1992, p. l A; Ratcliffe, "Judges reject state Senate's remapping plan," ibid., 
Jan. 1 1 , 1992, p. l A; Gardner Selby, "Senate redistricting plan rejected by federal judges," HP, Jan. 1 1 ,  1992, p.A- 1 ;  
Dave McNeely, "Redistricting plan drawn by Senate i s  rejected," AAS, Jan. 1 1 , 1992, p.A l ;  John Gonzalez, "Remap 
drafts sealed," Fort Worth Star-Telegram, Jan. 1 5, 1992, p. 1 3 ;  Sam Attlesey, "Lawmaker allegedly aided court's 
clerks in remap," DMN, Jan. 1 5 ,  1 992, p. IA ;  Kaye Northcott, "Remap accusers called 'desperate,"' Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram, Jan. 16, 1992, p.2 1 ;  Gardner Selby, "Court rejects Texas's plea to block map's use," HP, Jan. 1 7 , 
1992, p.A- 1 1 ;  Dave McNeely, "Complaint filed over redistricting," AAS, Jan. 2 1 ,  1 992, p.B l ;  McNeely, "Morales 
asks federal judge's aid in Nowlin investigation," ibid., Jan. 29, 1992; Denise Swibold, "records show Pierce phoned 
redistricting court often," San Antonio light, Feb. 7, 1992, p.A 1 ;  Clay Robison, "Redistricting plan may be scrapped," 
HC, Feb. 8, 1 992, p. l A; Diana R. Fuentes, "Special judge sought to probe redistricting case," San Antonio Express, 
Feb. 1 1 ,  1 992; Edward M. Sills, "Redistricting inquiry blocked," San Antonio light, Feb. 1 1 ,  1 992; Sarne AttJesey, 
"Remap plans drawn by judge's  clerks, GOPJ>imilar, analysis shows," DMN, Feb. 2, 1992; Mary Lenz, "Hispanic 
leader says court's action resulted in loss of state Senate seat," HP, May 12, 1992; Dave McNeely, "Findings shed 
light on Pierce's redistricting role," AAS, May 19, 1992; "Senate staffers call for impeachment of redistricting judge," 
ibid., May 24, 1 992; Kaye Northcott, "Nowlin quits seat on panel," Fort Worth Star-Telegram, July 23, 1992; Rick 
Casey, "Nowlin already out, now down as well," San Antonio light, Aug. 30, 1992, p.A l ;  Rad Salee and Linda 
Gilchriest, "New district costs 'Dean of Senate'," HC, Nov. 5, 1 992, p.A l ;  Alan Bernstein, "County elections 
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For evidence of racial legislative intent, they merely compared ethnic and district maps and 
calculated ethnic percentages of split counties and Voter Tabulation Districts ("VTDs"). Unless the 
ethnic percentages in parts of counties or VTDs in different congressional districts were exactly the 
same, the plaintiffs, ignoring geography entirely, inferred that they were intentionally split on racial 
lines.366 Falsely denying that any evidence of past discrimination in redistricting had been presented 
by the various parties defendant,367 they nowhere contradicted other explanations of the demographic 
and geographic composition of districts, but merely ignored them. " [T]he overriding factor in the 
construction of the Congressional Plan [sic] was the use of race to separate the residents of Texas by 
race and the assignment of those persons of common race to common districts. "368 
In fact, evidence brought out during the Vera litigation undermines the plaintiffs ' and judges ' 
maps ' eye view that the process of redistricting had one pervasive purpose.369 It reveals, first, the 
decentralization that allowed incumbents and influential prospective candidates to shape their districts 
and therefore to maximize their election or reelection probabilities free of most top-down constraints; 
second, the degree to which facts about partisan and racial geographic concentrations could be used 
interchangeably as predictors of electoral behavior; third, the extent to which elected officials wanted 
their districts to include (or, sometimes, to exclude) voters whom they had represented or had contact 
followed grand design," HC, Nov. 8, 1 992, p.2; Henry A. Politz et al., "In Re: The complaint of Lewis H .  Earl 
against United States District Judge James R. Nowlin under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980," 
(mimeo. ,  May 1 5, 1992). 
366Plaintiffs' Proposed Findings of Fact, Vera v. Richards, al 4-10,  pars. 24-45, 58. To take perhaps the most 
egregious example, plaintiffs inferred a racial intent in the split of Johnson County because the part in Congressional 
District 6 was 7.8% black and Hispanic; whereas that in District 12 was 1 1 .3%. How the racial balancing needed 
Lo gel the percentages Lo come out approximately equal could be accomplished without race-conscious design, the 
plaintiffs did not explain. 
In a larger sense, the plaintiffs and Judge Jones (Vera v. Richards, pp. 46-5 1 )  ignored the submergence of minority 
voters in overwhelmingly conservative Anglo districts that would often result if municipal or county boundaries were 
held sacrosanct during redistricting. As I have argued elsewhere, a refusal to recognize the concept of influence 
districts makes the rights of a minority individual depend on the percentage of her group in an arbitrarily defined 
area, and insures that those voters least likely Lo be able to protect themselves (because they comprise a smaller 
percentage of the voting population) receive the least protection from the courts. See Kousser, "Beyond Gingles: 
Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law," 27 U.S.F.L.R. 551  ( 1993). 
367Plaintiffs ' Post Trial Brief, Vera v. Richards, al 1 8. 
368Plaintiffs [sic] Proposed Conclusions of Law, at 3, par. 8. 
3wi.awyers and judges sometimes give considerable deference Lo sworn evidence taken during litigation, but 
deride newspaper articles as "hearsay ."  In both the North Carolina and Texas cases, each type of evidence, viewed, 
as historians are wont, with a critical eye, strongly reinforces the other. 
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with before, characteristics that were oflen more imponant to the politicians than the ethnicity, class, 
or party of voters who might be included in their districts; and fourth, the imponance that arbitrary 
numbers -- 50%, 60%, 65% ,  80% - - took on, goals that forced those actually drawing the lines Lo 
increase the irregularity of districts for reasons that only appeared to be concerned with race or 
ethnicity. 
Asked during her deposition what her involvement was in drawing District 1 8  in Houston, Eddie 
Bernice Johnson, chair of the State Senate subcommittee on congressional redistricting in 1 99 1 ,  replied 
"None." She put Sen. Gene Green in charge of arranging districts for H arris county and Sen. Frank 
Tejeda in charge of those in  South Texas.370 The correlation between which Senators had charge of 
drawing each new congressional district and the ultimate victors in those districts was exact.371 
Questioned as to why a line was marked at a particular place in  B razos county, Johnson responded: 
"Frankly I don't know, because on this pan of the plan the incumbents did most of the 
archi tecture."372 "Incumbents," she remarked later, "came in and worked the pans of the map that 
they desired and if it worked in the total picture that's what we did. We basically attempted to satisfy 
these incumbents."373 Nor were only Democratic incumbents accommodated, she claimed. "Q. Are 
you telling me now that what drove this was a friendly bipanisan incumbent protection plan? A. 
Exactly . . . .  I was open Lo everyone who came to see me and it was not all [ DJemocratic influence in 
this plan. Q. It was bipanisan, there was no attempt to prefer and maximize the [ D]emocratic 
representation? A. It was an effort to protect those incumbents because there was no way I could 
survive without doing it in this process."374 
Legislative redistricting technician Christopher Sharman, who observed and helped craft many of 
the details of the maps as he sat at a computer terminal and assisted elected officials and their staff 
members in drawing districts, reflected the same view. "Q. In the districting process overall for 
Congress, were there people who had more regional interest versus being involved in the whole 
districting map? A. There were very few people that were involved in the whole districting map. It 
37°Eddie Bernice Johnson Deposition Transcript, Vera v. Richards (hereinafter referred to as "Johnson Depo.", 
June 1 3 ,  1 994, pp. 47-48. 
3711n the 1992 primary in her overwhelmingly Democratic 30th District, Johnson's only opponent was the black 
owner of a tamale restaurant, who had never held elective office and who was able to raise litlle money. Robert V. 
Camuto, "Senator's  role in mapping hot issue in Dallas race," FWST, Feb. 1 1 , 1 992. 
372Johnson Depo. ,  pp. 74-75 . 
373Johnson Depo., p. 1 0 1 .  
374Johnson Depo., p .  1 2 1 .  
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mostly was regional . . . .  Dallas/Fon Wonh was a region; Harris County was a region; the [Rio 
Grande] Valley was a region; Bexar County was a region. Q. What about East Texas? A. East Texas 
was certainly a region, yeah. "375 Although El Paso Congressman Ron Coleman was designated by 
the Democrats in the delegation as their liaison on redistricting with the legislature, Coleman and his 
staffer Paul Rogers, according to Sharman, "just kind of observed the process and tried to play 
mediator for certain conflicts. "376 Unlike Speakers Mutscher and Clayton or Lt. Governors Barnes 
and Hobby in 1 97 1  and 1 98 1 ,  Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock was only a mediator in 199 1 ,  and House Speaker 
Gib Lewis 's  principal role was to throw "a wrench, so to speak, into the works" at the last moment 
because of a parochial concern with his hometown, Fort Worth.377 Strikingly unlike Gov. Bill 
Clements in 1 98 1 ,  Gov. Ann Richards barely rates any mention at all in connection with congressional 
redistricting in 199 1 .378 Although individual Republican congressmen directly or indirectly made 
their wishes known to the DemocralS who were in charge of redistricting, and although the party, 
through its "Fair Redistricting Commi ttee," produced a comprehensive plan, there is no mention in the 
newspapers or depositions of comprehensive negotiations between leaders of the two parties. Such 
high-level interparty negotiations, had they taken place, would have been another means of providing 
authoritative control . 
The combination of a lack of overall direction and the necessity to satisfy incumbents of both 
parties379 produced both bitter conflicts and the resolution of those conflicts by drawing irregular 
lines. The fact that this happened in areas containing few minorities, as well as many minorities 
suggests that the irregularities reflected the particular interests of politicians more than they did racial 
interests. Sharman described a meeting in Lt. Gov. Bob Bullock 's office on Sunday, apparently Aug. 
20, 1 99 1 ,  at which staffers presented a tentative map to Congressmen Mike Andrews, John Bryant, Jim 
Chapman, Chet Edwards, Martin Frost, "Kika" De La Garza, Pete Geren, Ralph Hall, Greg Laughlin, 
Solomon Ortiz, Bill Sarpalius, and Charles Wilson -- twelve of the nineteen Democratic incumbents. 
There were "numerous confliclS that arose when they saw what their districts actually looked like, and 
375Christopher Martin Sharman Deposition Transcript, Vera v. Richards (hereinafter Sharman Depo.), June 1 8, 
1994, pp. 83-84. 
376Sharman Depo., pp. 104-05 . 
377Sharman Depo., pp. 82, 1 16. Sharman 's account is butressed in Richard S .  Dunham, "Johnson wins big for 
blacks," DTH, Sept. 1 ,  199 1 ,  p. A l .  
3780nly in the final negotiations did Richards .threaten to veto any plan that paired Congressmen Bryant and Frost. 
Richard S .  Dunham, "Johnson wins big for blacks," DTH, Sept. 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p. A l .  
379Sharman Depo., pp. 193-95. 
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then the process went on from there."  Bullock "basically wenl congress member by congress member 
asking them what it was that they needed changed with their districts in order to be happy."380 A 
typical example was in East Texas. Congressman Charlie Wilson in the Second District managed to 
rid himself of those pans of Nacogdoches county that had voted against him, which produced a ripple 
effect in Congressman Jim Chapman's  First District. Since Chapman did not want Smith coumy, 
where he had not been successful in the past, and Congressman Ralph Hall did not want to give up 
what was for him good territory in Hunt county, Gregg county ended up being split.38 1 One of the 
several splits in Denton county came because a minor newspaper editor "just hated Congressman Hall 
and wrote very nasty things about him ," and Hall wanted to jettison the editor's community.382 
Cong. Jim Sarpalius didn't want to give up an airport in Lubbock, while Eddie Bernice Johnson 
wanted her district to include DFW Intemational.383 Other seemingly anomalous extensions to 
Johnson' s  district were the results of her desires to pick up areas where she could raise campaign 
funds from Jewish voters and from middle-class blacks who had moved far out of central Dallas, and 
her effort to include an overwhelmingly white, but liberal area in Grand Prairie that had provided her 
margin of victory -- over a black opponent -- in the 1 986 State Senate race.384 In S an Antonio, 
Democrat Albert Bustamante and Republican Lamar Smith insisted on having areas containing their 
houses included in their districts, and Smith was pleased to have communities where key campaign 
contributors lived within his district's perimeters.385 Having sponsored the armed forces base closing 
bill, Republican Dick Armey received so much opposition when the Carswell Air Force B ase in 
Tarrant county was slaLed for closure that he moved his home from Tarrant to Denton county and 
made sure that his new 26th congressional district excluded as much of Tarrant as he could manage. 
380Sharman Depo., pp. 106-09. 
381Sharman Depo. ,  pp. 1 1 6-20. Sharman's  accounl is confirmed in "Gregg Spl i t," Longview News-Journal, Aug. 
27, 1 99 1 .  
382Sharman Depo., p. 1 26. 
383Sharman Depo. ,  pp. 1 24-25 , 53. 
384Sharman Depo, p.53;  Johnson Depo, pp. 1 36-4 1 ,  162-65. 
385Sharman Depo. ,  1 8 1 -84 . There is a similar report in Edward M. Sills, "Redistricting plan OK'd by House," 
San Antonio light, Aug. 8, 199 1 ,  p.B l .  
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" ' He 's getting as far away from Carswell as possible, ' said state Rep. Jim Horn, R-Denton. "386 In 
overwhelmingly Hispanic South Texas, splits or proposed splits in Harlingen and Kingsville involved a 
prospective 1 994 contest between Congressman Solomon Ortiz of Corpus Christi and State Sen. Eddie 
Lucio, Jr., of Brownsville, both Democrats and both Hispanics. Lucio told the Harlingen Valley 
Morning Star that Ortiz 's 27th congressional district was being shaped '"to ensure Solomon gets 
elected time and time again. "'387 
Naturally, in more ethnically mixed areas, ethnicity was used by both Democrats and Republicans 
as an index of voting behavior. The principal dividing line in Texas society since the days of the 
Republic, race could hardly be ignored in politics. As Teel Bivins, R-Amarillo, the chief Republican 
spokesman on redistricting in the Senate, put it: "We started first with minority communities in the 
state and tried to draw every minority district that we could. Now I will be the first to admit to you, 
as I 've stated on this floor previously, that when you take that approach and you create the ability for 
minorities to elect one of their own, that there is clearly an indirect benefit to Republicans who are 
going to seek to run in other districts . . .  "388 Republicans were at least as self-conscious about 
using racial and ethnic characteristics to help their party and their incumbents as Democrats were. I t  
was just, as Bivins 's  statement clearly sets out, that Republicans wanted to pack minorities and make 
sure that there were too few minority voters outside the packed districts to elect Anglo Democrats; 
whereas, Democrats, as the depositions of Johnson and Sharman reaffirm,389 wanted to include 
enough reliably Democratic minorities in their districts to protect them from Republicans. 
But the same depositions underline the fact that even in Dallas and Houston, race was not the only 
index, and that if it had not been available, proxies would have been nearly as efficient in spotting 
voters useful to incumbents and other prospective candidates. To determine which voters fit her 
conception of the 30th District, Sen. Johnson used referenda on rapid transit and school bonds, as well 
386Johnson Depo., p. 1 5 1 ;  Jim Fredricks, "House plan splits Denton," Denton Record Chronicle, Aug. 8, 1 99 1 ,  
p. I A. The home of a Republican legislator who was a possible opponent of Armey conveniently ended up in another
district. J im Davis, "Bad gerrymandering," Plano Star Courier, Aug. 28, 199 1 ,  at IA .  
387Rickey Dailey, "Redistricting may divide Harlingen," Harlingen Valley Morning Star, July 1 7, 1 99 1 ,  p.A l ;  
Scott Stanford, "Redistricting involved behind-the-scenes intrigue," Kingsville Record, Aug. 2 1 ,  199 1 .  A State Senate 
plan approved in a compromise settlement by a state court, which was adverse to the conservative Lucio, was 
eventually overturned by a three-judge federal court, which substi tuted the "Nowlin plan," one much less favorable 
to Lucio 's liberal Hispanic opponents. James Pinkerton, "New plan redraws all 3 1  Senate districts," HC, Oct. 8, 
1 99 1 ,  p. 1 3A; Cindy Tumiel, "Redistricting struggle heats up in the Valley," Corpus Christi Caller-Times, Oct. 22, 
1 99 1 ;  John Weimer, "Lucio, Hinojosa at odds over latest proposal," McAllen Monitor, Dec. 27, 199 1 :  Rickey Dailey, 
"Lucio says calls to judge's  office simply inquiries," Harlingen Valley Morning Star, Feb. 28, 1 992, p.A l .  
388Transcript, Texas Senate Committee of the Whole, Aug. 24, 199 1 ,  Tape 2, p.5. 
389Johnson Depo., 1 1 7-20; Sharman Depo., 78. 
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as race, other election returns, and personal observations. " [W]hat we also looked at is voting patterns 
and voting patterns were just as easy to get [on the legislature 's "Red Apple" computer system] as 
ethnic background . . .  " Frost and Bryant, she said, did not ask to have minority voters per se put 
into their districts, but they did ask for Democrats. "They were fighting over those blue voters 
[ Democrats, in  Red Apple's code]. They wanted blue voters, the voting patterns that showed up blue 
on the computer screen . . . .  Traditionally minority voters vote [D]emocrat overwhelmingly, 97, 98 , 
99%, so when you 're looking for [D]emocrats you're looking virtually for the same population."390 
Nor did Johnson want every black. Chris Sharman's  deposition confirms newspaper reports that 
Johnson wanted to avoid African-American areas in Dallas that might support County Commissioner 
John Wiley Price, and adds the information that Johnson wanted to avoid Duncanville because it was 
the territory of Royce West, a prominent black lawyer who had run a high visibility campaign for 
district attorney a few years earlier, and who was another potential candidate for Congress against 
her.391 And Johnson also wanted to avoid a black area north of downtown Dallas because she knew 
(not from the census, but presumably from personal observation) that il was filled with non-citizen, 
transient, non-political Haitian apartment dwellers.392 As this example emphasizes, even if there 
were no detailed census, politicians would still be able to rely on their own rough knowledge of the 
sociopolitical traits of various areas to tailor districts for themselves. 
Just as Johnson picked and chose among both blacks and whites, B ryant and Frost and, in 
Houston, Green and Martinez did not cast their ethnic nets blindly. Politics was the end, and race not 
always the means. More than just raising their black percentages, Bryant and Frost, according to 
Johnson, "mostly wanted people they had represented before that they thought would be fam iliar with 
their name. "393 Sharman 's instructions in building District 30 were to find Democrats, especially 
black Democrats, "that were not old constituents of' Frost or Bryant, because the congressmen were 
"very interested" in keeping people who knew them.394 Gene Green, who had long represented 
heavily Latino Baytown and Hispanic areas north of downtown Houston, wanted them in the 29th 
390Johnson Depo., pp. 85-86, 1 1 7, 144. 
391Sharman Depo, pp. 59-60. Lawrence E. Young, "GOP, blacks assail congressional map," DMN, Aug. 9, 199 1 ,  
p .  l A mentions West as a potential congressional candidate in district 30. 
392Sharman Depo. ,  pp. 79-80. Newspapers reported the general nature of this dispute. Sam ALtlesey, "House 
approves minority congressional seat in Dallas," DMN, Aug. 8, 1991 , p. l A. 
393Johnson Depo., pp. 82, 146. Quote from p. 1 46. 
394Sharman Depo, pp. 5 1 ,  55, 60-63. 
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congressional district, and for the same reason, Roman Martinez did not.395 As Sharman put it, 
"Roman Martinez was trying to include Hispanics that lived in the southern end of the county that had 
never been represented by Gene Green, didn't know who Gene Green was. "396 And while Green 
favored including in the 29th district the middle class black area of Pleasantville that he represented in 
the State Senate, as well as parts of Houston dominated by Central Americans, Martinez, who 
disagreed, won out.397 On the other hand, Martinez asked to include his whole State House district 
within the 29th, in spite of the fact that 1 0% of its population was black, and he pushed to take in 
areas, whatever their ethnic percentages, that previous elections had proven to be "not racially 
polarized" against Latinos.398 
A detailed examination of the process also emphasizes the importance of arbitrary percentages in 
determining boundaries. Black leaders in Dallas insisted on a district that was 50% black in 
population and loudly threatened to protest to the Justice Department and to sue if a district that was 
47% black was approved.399 Roman Martinez agreed that Gene Green could draw his house, which 
was in a majority-Anglo area, into the 29th district only if the Hispanic percentage remained over 
60%, which probably not coincidentally was the same percentage as Martinez 's State House district. 
The only way to include Green 's neighborhood and keep the Latino percentage over that symbolic 
threshold was to divide a great many voter tabulation districts.400 Republican Teel Bivins predicted 
395Roman Martinez Deposition Transcript, Vera v. Richards, 3 vols. (hereinafter Martinez Depo.), I, 33-34; II ,  
16 ,  36-37; III ,  1 7. 
396Sharman Depo., pp. 160-61 .  
397Gardner Selby, "Lawmakers closer on Hispanic district," HP, Aug. 20, 1 99 1 ;  Selby, "State to fight redistricting 
plans' rejection," ibid., Aug. 24, 1 99 1 ,  p.A23, c. 1 ;  Dave McNeely, "Senator says city disputes may doom redistricting 
bill," AAS, Aug. 12,  1 99 1 .  
398Sharman Depo. ,  p .  1 69; Martinez Depo. , I I ,  36-37. 
399Sam Attlesey, "House approves minority congressional seat in Dallas," DMN, Aug. 8, 1 99 1 ,  p. l A; Lawrence 
E. Young, "GOP, blacks assail congressional map," ibid. , Aug. 9, 199 1 ,  p . lA ;  Sam Attlesey and Christy Hoppe, 
"Legislature to begin 2nd special session," ibid. , Aug. 1 9, 1991 , p. 1 3A; Dave McNeely,  "Second special session 
geared to fast finish," AAS, Aug. 20, 199 1 ,  p.B l ;  Mary Alice Robbins, "Redistricting panel OKs splitting cities into 
2 districts," Amarillo News, Aug. 20, 1 99 1 ;  Gardner Selby, "House approves congressional redistrict plan," HP, Aug. 
22, 1 99 1 ;  Herbert A. Sample, "House OKs minority district plan," DTH, Aug. 22, 1 99 1 ;  Sam Attlesey, "House OKs 
redistrict plan despite GOP complaints," DMN, Aug. 22, 1 99 1 ;  Fred Blair, in Transcript of Texas House Floor 
Debate, Aug. 2 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  pp. 39-42; Richard S .  Dunham, "Johnson wins big for blacks,"  DTH, Sept. 1 ,  1 99 1 ,  p. A l .  
4�artinez Depo., I ,  28-3 1 .  
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that the Justice Department and federal judges would prefer his plan over that adopted by the 
legislature because the GOP plan contained a district that was 65% combined minority, failing co note 
that the 40% of the district that was Hispanic shrank to 25.6% of the voting age population and only 
1 1 . 1  % of the registered voters. Despite reaching the magic number of 65%, Sen. Johnson noted, the 
B ivins plan only constructed another influence d istrict.401 And late in the process of redistricting, 
Cong. Pete Geren insisted that 80% of the population in his district be located in Tarrant county, 
which caused ripple effects in adjacent districts and county splits in rural counties close to the 
Metroplex. Geren, according to Sharman, wanted his district to encompass "[R]epublican and 
suburban . . . areas that he felt he would run better in or would do better in than most 
[D]emocrats. "402 In other words, the conservative Geren, who had replaced the much more liberal 
Jim Wright, wished to design his district to protect himself from a liberal challenge in a Democratic 
primary. 
All these details give substance to the generalizations of Dave McNeely of the Austin 
American-Statesman, who had closely attended the redistricting story: 
Drawing those new districts, while still seeking to protect Democratic incumbents like 
Martin Frost and John B ryant, who have enjoyed strong support from minorities, has 
brought some awesomely illogical district lines . . . .
The districts they have drawn are largely at the behest of the 1 9  incumbent 
Democrats in Congress, with new minority districts in Houston, Dallas and San 
Antonio. 
The Democratic incumbents also seek to lop off unwanted territory that is infested 
with Republicans, and give it to Texas ' eight Republican congressmen. 
While some of the Republican congressmen complain about that, most are privately 
happy, because it means their districts become so Republican that they are in no 
danger from pesky Democrats. And under the current Republican ethic, Republican 
incumbents are almost always left free of serious challenge in the GOP primary.403 
Republican editorialists agreed. Decrying the bifurcation -- along county lines -- of Amarillo, the 
Amarillo Daily News declared that "the only people of Texas who will truly benefit from this plan 
appear to be the two incumbent congressmen. The redrawn districts gives [sic] [Larry] Combest 
[R-Lubbock] the pan of Amarillo that is considered a Republican stronghold,  while [Bill] Sarpalius 
401Transcripl, Texas Senate Committee of the Whole, Aug. 24, 1 991 , Tape 2, pp. 3, 9-1 1 ;  statistics from Texas 
Legislative Council. 
402Sharman Depo., 86-90. 
403Dave McNeely, "A salute to Elbridge Gerry," Austin American-Statesman,  Aug. 1 5, 1 99 1 .  
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[D-Amarillo] gets areas that are more entrenched with Democratic voters. "404 The cities were split, 
according to Delwin Jones, R-Lubbock, vice-chair of the State House Redistricting Committee, 
because '"Sarpalius [ is] hunting for every Democratic vote he can find. "'405 Even the Wall Street 
Journal, decrying the shape of the 30th District, admitted that "It would have been easy to draw 
rational minority districts, but then several white Democratic incumbents would have been in political 
jeopardy with the loss of minority voters."406 
Although the legislative leaders on redistricting did not broadcast the messy details in  public, they 
did quite forthrightly represent the results of those often idiosyncratic boundaries and the process that 
produced them. Addressing the House on the day that the almost-final plan passed, Redistricting 
Committee chair Tom Uher (D-Bay City) remarked that "Because of the flexibility that we had due to 
the fact that we had three additional seats, we were able to try to design districts that would recognize 
each incumbent and how that incumbent might be able to win in a district, having a reasonable chance 
to win in that district. In each of the new districts, we attempted to draw districts that would permit 
certain candidates who wanted to run to be elected from those new districts. "407 Disagreeing on the 
bipartisanship, but not the essentially non-racial nature of the process and results, Republican Kent 
Grusendorf of Arlington concluded that " . . .  these lines are very logical and very rational. The l ines 
have been drawn, dissecting communities very creatively in order to pack Republicans and maximize 
Democratic representation . . . .  This plan was drawn with only one thing in mind, and that is to protect 
Democratic incumbents, period."408 His colleague Fred Hil l ,  R-Richardson, specifically denounced 
the final plan for placing African-American districts in southern Dallas county in District 24 "simply 
for the single purpose of assuring his re-election because those are Democrat voters . . . .  It has nothing 
to do with minority representation because if we were really concerned about minority representation, 
we would have drawn this map in such a way that minorities were considered and not simply to elect 
Democrats. "409 
404"Gerrymandered plan protects incumbents," Amarillo Daily News, Aug. 7, 199 1 ,  p.4A, c. l .  
405Philip Parker, "Legislature OKs plan that splits Panhandle, city," Amarillo News, Aug. 26, 1 99 1 ,  p. I A. 
4�ditorial, "Monster Map," Wall Street Journal, Ocl. 1 8, 199 1 .  
407Transcript, Texas House Floor Debate, Aug. 2 1 ,  199 1 ,  pp. 14 1 -42. 
4CJJ/bid., pp. 1 90, -195. Italics added. 
400J'ranscription of Texas House Floor Debate, Aug. 25, 199 1 ,  Tape 10-B, pp.27-3 1 .  Italics added. "Overall," 
announced the press secretary to Rep. Joe Barton, the congressional liason on redistricting for Texas Republicans, 
"the redistricting plan passed by the Legislature was designed to protect Democratic incumbents." Robert Hough, 
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7. Only Race?
Was race the only reason for drawing Texas's  congressional district lines the way they were drawn 
in 1 99 1 , panicularly in Dallas, Tarrant, and Harris counties, as O'Connor repeatedly stated was 
necessary for a constitutional violation under Shaw v. Reno? While no one doubts that the 
redistricting was race-conscious and that race played a role in fashioning the boundaries, no one who 
has reviewed the evidence laid out in considerable detail in Section IV. of this paper can reasonably 
conclude that race was the sole factor in shaping those districts. 
It would have been possible to draw districts that scored higher on an index of compactness if 
legislators had not desired to enable African-Americans and Latinos to have an opponunity to elect 
candidates of their choice, as the solons thought the Voting Rights Act, the Constitution, and for some, 
their consciences required. (Of course, had partisan, personal, and incumbent-protecting considerations 
somehow been ignored, it would have been possible to draw much more compact majority-minority 
districts.) Not to have drawn majority-minority districts would have risked having the Justice 
Department refuse to preclear the plan under the Voting Rights Act; what federal courts had 
condemned as the discriminatory records of the 1 97 1  and 198 1 legislatures could have been counted 
against the 1 99 1  legislature in a constitutional challenge based on discriminatory intent; and many 
legislators stated, and some no doubt genuinely believed, that to establish such districts was simply the 
right thing to do. 
It would have been possible to sketch boundaries that looked "prettier" on a flat, featureless map if 
legislators had not been concerned to protect incumbents Frost and Bryant in the north and Andrews 
and Washington in the south. As all the previous reapponionments , and panicularly that of 198 1 
demonstrate, legislators always pay close attention to the effect of redistricting on the fortunes of 
incumbents. 
It would have been possible to draw districts with shorter perimeters and with much less 
controversy if legislators with power over redistricting, Senators Eddie Bernice Johnson and Gene 
Green and Rep. Roman Martinez, hadn' t  been concerned to guard themselves against rivals, often 
rivals from their own ethnic group. District lines in America have always reflected struggles for 
power, in Texas as elsewhere, as the 1 97 1  redistricting starkly illustrates. Should anyone be surprised 
that m inority politicians do not act very differently from majority politicians, that they follow the same 
real -- not cosmetic and rhetorical -- "traditional districting principles" as everyone else? 
It would have been possible to avoid much heated controversy and many lawsuits if there had 
been no question of partisan or ideological advantage connected with the establishment of 
majority-minority districts in 1 98 1  and 1 99 1 .  Republicans and conseivative Democrats wanted to pack 
undifferentiated minorities into central city districts in order to replace liberal and moderate Anglo 
Democrats with people with whom they were more ideologically compatible. The targeted Democrats 
"County moved to new district in state plan," Corsicana Daily Sun, Aug. 29, 199 1 .  
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wanted to retain their seats at the expense of conservatives if possible, but at the expense of minority 
candidates if necessary. Many of the irregularities in district lines were the consequences of efforts to 
produce certain outcomes not in the majority-minority districts, but in the adjacent districts where 
African-Americans or Latinos were distinctly in the minority. 
It is conceivable that there are instances in which a desire to create a district for one racial or 
ethnic group is the only explanation for the shape of legislative boundaries. The evidence shows 
conclusively that Texas in 1 991  is not such an instance. 
V. RESTORING REALITY TO REDISTRICTING LITIGATION 
The redistricting process of the 1 990s, the fairest to ethnic minorities in the history of the 
United States, resulted in  the largest increase ever in minority representation in Congress.410 At the 
local, as well as the federal level, only the constraints of the Voting Rights Act have allowed the 
growth of representation by men and women who are the first preferences of the vast majority of 
African-American and Latino voters.41 1 Shaw v. Reno, at least as interpreted by some commentators, 
plaintiffs, and judges, threatens to reverse those gains, returning discrete and insular minorities to a 
condition of blatant inequality with whites, a condition in which whites can easily elect their first 
choices, but blacks and browns cannot unless they happen to be arranged in geographic patterns that 
seem attractive to judges. This utterly vague "standard" of "aesthetic correcmess,"412 nowhere 
mentioned or fairly derived from specific phrases in the Constitution and clearly contradicting 
seemingly settled federal. Jaw and precedent, is separate and unequal, both in the present and in con­
trast to the past: If implemented as in Vera v. Richards, it would allow any amount of geographic 
manipulation of majority-white districts, while condemning minority opportunity districts that are as or 
more compact by some numerical measure;41 3 and as Sections III and IV above extensively 
41<>i'he number of African-American members of Congress rose from 28 Lo 40 (counting the delegate from 
Washington, D.C., and the sole black Republican, who represents a heavily white district); of Latinos, from 9 to 14. 
411Davidson and Grofman, eds., Quiet Revolution in the South, passim. 
41°rhe phrase is due lo Lani Guinier, "Analysis: Lessons of 'History, '"  Voting Rights Review (Fall, 1993), at 
3 .  
413In Texas, the 88% white 6th District, with a "dispersion" compactness score of 0 .21  and a "perimeter" 
compactness score of 0.02 -- higher scores are more compact -- was not ruled unconstitutional by the Vera v. 
Richards opinion. The 30th district, 50% black, was struck down despite equal or higher compactness scores - - 0.24 
and 0.02, respectively. See Pildes and Niemi, supra, n. XXX, al Table 3, p. 1 83. 
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document, such a standard has never previously been followed in North Carolina or Texas414• 
Moreover, in contrast to the requirements in minority vote dilution cases, whites in cases that follow 
Shaw v. Reno are exempt from proving discriminatory effects --another sense in which Shaw marks a 
return to separate but unequal. And if recently elected black and Latino members of Congress are 
deleted from the 87% white Congress as a result of Shaw, Congress and public life in general will 
literally become more segregated -- exactly the shibboleth with which Justice O ' Connor assaulted the 
"segregated" (57% black) districts in North Carolina. 
The i rony of using weapons forged in the First Reconstruction to crush the Second adds 
stigmatic insult to concrete injury. The Reconstruction Amendments were primarily intended to 
protect former slaves, free persons of color, and their descendants from discrimination against 
them.415 Their framers, as veterans of an extended and often desperate campaign against racial 
slavery and for civil rights, knew that racial discrimination w as not easily erased.4 16 Slavery existed 
for 250 years in North America; freedom, so far, has lasted about half that long. The Amendments 
could not have been meant to facilitate -- not just allow,  as in Plessy v .  Ferguson, but reestablish -- a 
separate but unequal standard, but that is precisely the effect of Shaw v. Reno. For courts to institu­
tionalize unequal justice under law in the guise of "color blindness" not only perverts the intentions of 
the framers, it turns them upside down. Some commentators and judges purport to be color blind 
when, in fact, all they can see is white.417 
Fortunately, the Supreme Court can still avoid such a broadside attack on the political rights 
of minority voters. Shaw's m any ambiguities and its preliminary nature allow five ways out that do 
not require an embarrassing scuttling of the opinion. First, the Court could rule that Anglos have to 
bear the same burden of proof of a discriminatory effect that minorities do in vote dilution or 
redistricting cases. In the leading lower federal court case on anti-minority redistricting, Garza v. Los 
414State-by-stale chapters of Davidson and Grofman, Quiet Revolution in the South, demonstrate that North 
Carolina and Texas were typical of southern states in this regard. 
415It is instructive to note, for instance, that the index to the 1 866 hearings on the Freedman's Bureau B il l  
conducted by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, the Committee that framed the Fourteenth Amendment in the 
same year, contains two pages of entries under the heading "Freedmen, evidence of general hostility and occasional 
cruelty towards." Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law (New York: Collier Books, 1965), at 203. 
416See the speech of Rep. Thaddeus Stevens, just prior LO passage of the Fourteenth Amendment by the House 
of Representatives, quoted in Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's  Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1988), al 254-55.  
417Abigail Themstrom, "Redistricting, in Black and While," New York Times (Dec. 7, 1994), al p. A l9, c.2. In 
contrast to Dr. Themstrom 's rosy picture of race relations, the facts are that only two African-Americans (Andrew 
�Young and Harold Ford) have ever been elected LO Congress from the ex-Confederate South from majority-Anglo 
districts, southern Republicans in Congress vote almost unanimously against the views of any black constituents who 
may be wasted in their districts, and, as Section III.A. I ,  above, shows, white Democratic members of Congress from 
the South seldom closely reflect the preferences of their black constituents. 
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Angeles County Board of Supervisors,4 18 a case that the Supreme Court declined to review, both 
district and circuit courts ruled that even when plaintiffs proved that a line had been drawn partly 
because of a racially discriminatory intent, minorities still had to make some showing of a racially 
discriminatory effect. Since no Latino had been elected to the five-member Board since 1 874, despite 
the fact that the population of Los Angeles county in 1 990 was 37% Latino, it was not difficult to 
demonstrate such an effect.419 For the Supreme Court to fail to apply a similar standard in Shaw-
type cases would be in itself patently unequal.420 Second, the Court could determine that 
the alleged consequences of "racial gerrymandering" -- incorrectly treating minority voters as if they 
shared interests, increasing racial bloc voting, and electing unusually racially parochial 
representatives421 -- tum out in fact not to follow from race-conscious redistricting.422 
Alternatively,  the Court might remand the cases, or some of them, back to the lower courts for more 
evidence on this matter. 
Third ,  the Supreme Court could rule that it meant what Justice O'Connor said when she 
repeated again and again that race had to be the sole reason for the shape of the districts, and that 
evidence presented to the lower courts convincingly refuted that contention. In particular, it could 
affirm that it was not the decisions to take race into account or to draw minority opportunity districts 
per se that potentially infringed the Constitution, but the decision to draw the lines in a particular 
fashion.423 ll could then tum to a question that O'Connor did not squarely address in Shaw --
whether a redistricting plan amounted to a "racial classification" if partisan politics or such other 
motives as preserving communities of interest played an important role in shaping the precise lines in 
the minority opportunity districts, as they clearly did in North Carolina and Texas. Nothing in the 
majority opinion in Shaw v .  Reno prevents the Court from ruling that a set of districts whose lines are 
418Supra, note XXX. 
419The natural baseline for such an effect is, as Johnson v. DeGrandy and Holder v. Hall, supra, n. XX, point
out, is jurisdiction-wide proportionality. In none of the southern states are Anglos currently represented in Congress 
in less than their proportion in the population. 
42l1n Garza, the district and circuit courts did not merely rely on a comparison of district lines with ethnic maps, 
but supplemented these with a very extensive review of other direct and circumstantial evidence of the intent of the 
redistricters, evidence that is presented in full in Kousser, "How to Determine Intent," supra, n. XX, at 593-684.
421See Section 11 .3. ,  supra. 
4221L is possible that some Justices, perhaps a majority, regard these as a priori truths, nm subject to verification 
or falsification. If judges may simply . assume any fact that justifies a policy, then a court may become a 
superlegislature guided only by political whim, and not even subject to factual demonstration. 
423See Section II .2., supra. U.S. v. Louisiana, in which the State redrew a second black-majority district to have 
much more compact lines, offers an especially good opportunity for the Court to affirm this distinction. 
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the product of very mixed motives may be constitutional, and much in the opinion seems to require 
it.424 
Founh, even if it were to reject the first two arguments and get to strict scrutiny, the Court 
could rule that rectifying specific instances of past anti-minority racial gerrymandering or avoiding 
well-grounded suits under Sections 2 and/or 5 of the Voting Rights Act consti tuted sufficiently 
compelling state interests to justify the actions that the States took. Sections III and IV of this paper 
demonstrate at the very least that reasonable people could have believed such rectification necessary or 
such suits likely to succeed. Thus, these reasonable legislators need not have been motivated by any 
racial purpose whatsoever in drawing the districts at issue, but only by serious non-racial interests -­
remedying past injustice and avoiding costly litigation. The Court would then have to clarify what it 
meant by narrow tailoring in a redistricting context. If i t  said that a redistricting plan that provided for 
a number of minority opportunity districts that was less than or equal to the proportion of minorities in 
the population or voting age population was legally unobjectionable, and that drawing districts 
containing a fairly high proportion of one minority group was necessary, because of continued racial 
bloc voting by whites, to attain that end, then all of the new southern districts would pass muster. 
Fifth, the Court could set out specific compactness and segregation standards -- that is, it could 
give its constitutional blessing to one or a group of mathematical compactness indices and a specific 
level of minority percentage in district population that triggered constitutional doubt. Then, depending 
on the levels chosen, some districts would pass muster and others would not. On the other hand, the 
difficulty of reading specific threshold numbers into the Constitution might convince the Court to 
abandon Shaw as unmanageable or at least constitutionally unjustifiable.425 In practice, Shaw 
imposes a difficult dilemma: If it does not require specific numerical standards, it invariably leads to 
subjective and unequal decisions on what is legal; if it does require, say, a "perimeter compacmess 
score" of 0. 1 0  and an African-American or Latino percentage of 55%, then where in the Constitution 
could such numbers be drawn from? In either case, Shaw is inevitably arbitrary and should be 
reconsidered on this ground alone. 
All five paths away from Shaw require abandoning the ivory tower world of legalistic 
abstractions. With the retirement of Justice Byron White, the author of so many of the Court's voting 
rights decisions, a person of often "conservative" principle, but a Justice of relentless common sense 
4'.IADistrict l ines that purposefully dilute the overall voting strength of minorities, as in the Garza case, supra, n.  
XX, should be held unconstitutional regardless of whether there were additional motives for drawing the lines
because they representa discrimination against a relatively powerless group. 
425Cf. Justice O'Connor's denunciation of the "nebulous standard" adopted by the Court in Davis v. Bandemer, 
106 S.Ct. 2797 ( 1 986), at 28 1 7. 
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on the topic of voting rights,426 the ideal person on the Coun Lo execuLe this realignmenL of legal 
theorizing with real world experience is the only Justice with experience in redistricting, the senior 
"moderate" Justice, former State Sen. Sandra Day O'Connor. 
4�hite was the author of the opinion of the court in seven major voting rights cases -- more than any of his 
colleagues during his three decades on the Supreme Court: Swann v. Adams, 87 S .Cl. 569 ( 1967), Whitcomb v. 
Chavis, 403 U.S. 1 24 ( 197 1 ), White v. Regester, 4 1 2  U.S. 753 ( 1973), Gaffney v. Cummings, 93 S.Cl. 2321 ( 1973), 
White v. Weiser, 93 S .Cl. 2348 { 1973), United Jewish Organizations of Wi/liamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S . 144 
( 1977), and Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 6 1 3  (1 982). In addiLion, he issued noLable dissents against mechanical and 
inflexible applications of absolute population equality in Wells v. Rockefeller, 89 S .Ct. 1234 (1969) and Karcher v. 
Daggell, 1 03 S.Cl. 2653 ( 1983); against a clumsy and unwarranted application of intent requirements (requirements 
that White had introduced in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 ( 1976)) in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S .Ct. 1490 
( 1980); as well as in Shaw v. Reno. 
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TABLE 1: DIFFERENCES IN RACIAL ATTITUDES IN NORTH CAROLINA, 1993 
Percent With Attitude 
PANEL A: GENERAL BELIEFS ABOUT PREJUDICE 
race relations/discrimination an 
important problem 5 
racial discrimination and prejudice 
today in N.C. very serious 17 
prejudice and discrimination 
against blacks in N.C. more 17 
prevalent in 1 993 than in 1980 
agree very strongly that most 
whites in N.C. have prejudiced 38 
views 
most whites in N.C. want to keep 
blacks down 13  
20 
37 
36 
70 
40 
PANEL B: DEGREE OF PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION TODAY 
whites have better chance in N.C. 
to get any job qualified for 19 
any housing can afford 13 
good education 9 
blacks often treated more slowly 
or less politely in N.C. restaurants 8 
or retail stores 
qualified blacks are denied jobs, 20 
scholarships 
qualified whites lose out on jobs, 
scholarships 40 
70 
54 
38 
45 
74 
6 
PANEL C: GENERAL BIAS IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
local governments in N.C. favors 
whites over blacks 1 3  
law enforcement i n  N.C. tougher 
on blacks 19 
equal justice for minorities in N.C. 
is major problem 1 5  
federal and state governments 
have done too much to help blacks 
achieve equality in the past 10  
years 
--too little 
prefer local housing ordinances 
that permit discrimination 
strongly oppose giving blacks 
preferred treatment in college 
admissions or employment 
strongly favor busing 
schoolchildren for racial 
integration 
30 
23 
PANEL D:  POLICY PREFERENCES 
44 
52 
4 
52 
64 
65 
1 
76 
1 5  
24 
26 
Source: September-October, 1 993 telephone sample of 403 whites and 409 blacks in North Carolina by 
Howard, Merrell and Partners of Raleigh, sponsored by Z. Smith Reynolds Foundation. 
TABLE 2: STATISTICS FOR PARTY REGISTRATION REGRESSIONS 
Year Intercept Dem. Rep. 
PANEL A: PERCENTAGE OF VOTE FOR DEMOCRATS 
1980 -0.53(-1 .41)  1 .43(3.53) 0.25(.54) .72 
1982 -3.09(-.91) 3.9 1 ( 1 . 1 5) 3.53(.91) .49 
1 984 0.36(.47) 0.45(.61) -0.60(-.59) .70 
1986 - 1 .06(-.68) 1 .94(1 .24) 1 . 1 1(.62) .91 
1988 1 .05(.29) -0. 12(3.61) - 1 .48( -.36) .65 
1990 0.01(.00) 0.92(.45) -0.22(- .01) .62 
1992 3 .81(2.93) -3 .00(-2.26) -4.53(-3 .03) .88 
PANEL B: PERCENTAGE OF VOTE FOR REPUBLICANS 
1980 1 .53(3.93) - 1 .43(3.43) -0.24(-.5 1)  .71  
1982 3.41(1 .36) -3.31(- 1 .3 1 )  -2.57(-.90) .72 
. 1984 0.63(.83) -0.45(-.61) 0.60(.59) .70 
1986 2.06(1 .33) � 1 .94(1 .24) - 1 . 1 1 (- .62) .91 
1988 -0.05(-.01) 0.12( .03) 1 .50(.36) .65 
1990 0.99(.49) -0.92(-.45) 0.22(.10) .62 
1992 -2.66(-1 .71)  2.81(1 .78) 4.35(2.44) .85 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. 
Regressions are computed only for contested districts, which numbered 10 in 1980, 10 in 1982, 1 1  in 1984, 9 
in 1988, and 1 1  in 1986, 1990, and 1992. 
Sources: Votes from Richard Scammon, et al. , America Votes, relevant years. Registration computed from 
data provided by North Carolina Dept of State and North Carolina General Assembly. 
TABLE 3: PREDICTED AND ACTUAL WINNERS FROM PARTY REGRESSIONS 
Election Democratic Winners Republican Winners % Correct 
Predicted Additional Predicted Additional 
1980 5 1 3 2 73 
1982 9 0 9 1  
1984 4 2 4 73 
1986 6 2 2 73 
1988 5 3 3 0 73 
1990 5 2 4 0 82 
1992 7 4 0 92 
Source: Computed from Table 2 
TABLE 4: PARTISAN EFFECTS OF REDISTRICTING PLANS PROPOSED IN 1991 AND 1992 
Plan Name Predicted Democratic Seats Based on Regressions from Election of 
1988 1990 1992 
PANEL A: DEMOCRATIC PLANS 
Cong. Base Plan 1 (CB 1) 7 9 7 
CB2 7 8 7 
CB3 7 8 7 
CB4 7 7 7 
CBS 7 7 7 
CB6#(1991 Final) 7 9 7 
Merritt/Rose/NAACP 8 8 8 
CB7 7 7 7 
CB8 7 7 7 
CB9 7 8 7 
CB IO (1992 Final) 7 8 7 
PANEL B: REPUBLICAN PLANS 
Justus, 1991 6 6 6 
Justus, Compact 2-minority 6 6 6 
Balmer 6.2 6 6 6 
Balmer 7.8 6 6 6 
Balmer 8 . 1  6 6 6 
Balmer 9 . 1  6 7 6 
Balmer 10.1  6 7 6 
Flaherty 6 6 6 
Ho feller 6 6 6 
Source: Computed from Regressions in Table 2 and registration data from state Section 5 Submissions. 
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